

to renumber section 3 so as to stand as section 2, making the bill read:

Be it enacted, etc., That the President of the United States shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an additional judge for the district of Arizona, who shall reside in said district and shall possess the same qualifications and have the same powers and jurisdiction and receive the same salary now prescribed by law in respect of the present district judge therein.

Sec. 2. That the clerk of the district court for the district of Arizona and the marshal and district attorney for said district shall perform the duties appertaining to their offices, respectively, for said court.

The amendments were agreed to.

The bill was reported to the Senate as amended, and the amendments were concurred in.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

ORION MATHEWS.

The bill (S. 922) for the relief of Orion Mathews was considered as in Committee of the Whole, and it was read, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That in the administration of the pension laws and laws conferring rights and privileges upon honorably discharged soldiers, Orion Mathews, late of Battery D, Second Regiment United States Artillery, shall be held and considered to have been honorably discharged as a private from said battery and regiment on the 22d day of March, 1865: *Provided*, That no pension shall accrue prior to the passage of this act.

The bill was reported to the Senate without amendment, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

PAYMASTER ALVIN HOVEY-KING.

The bill (S. 3403) for the relief of Paymaster Alvin Hovey-King, United States Navy, was considered as in Committee of the Whole. It authorizes the Comptroller of the Treasury to consider appeals from settlements of the Auditor for the Navy Department under date of April 25, 1916, in which settlements certain disallowances were made in the accounts of Paymaster Alvin Hovey-King, United States Navy, and in which cases the time within which appeal may lawfully be made to the comptroller has expired.

The bill was reported to the Senate without amendment, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Mr. MARTIN. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After five minutes spent in executive session the doors were reopened and (at 3 o'clock and 45 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, February 6, 1918, at 12 o'clock meridian.

CONFIRMATIONS.

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate February 5, 1918.

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS.

Edmund Billings to be collector of customs for customs collection district No. 4, with headquarters at Boston, Mass.

NAVAL OFFICER OF CUSTOMS.

H. Otto Wittpenn to be naval officer of customs in customs collection district No. 10, with headquarters at New York, N. Y.

SURVEYOR OF CUSTOMS.

Joseph A. Maynard to be surveyor of customs in customs collection district No. 4, with headquarters at Boston, Mass.

CONSULAR SERVICE.

CLASS 8.

Lloyd Burlingham to be a consul of class 8.
Leonard G. Dawson to be a consul of class 8.
Shelby F. Strother to be a consul of class 8.
Harry L. Walsh to be a consul of class 8.
Romeyn Wormuth to be a consul of class 8.

COAST GUARD.

Third Lieut. of Engineers Paul Revere Smith to be second Lieutenant of Engineers.

POSTMASTERS.

GEORGIA.

D. F. Davenport, Americus.
Vivian L. Stanley, Dublin.
J. A. Stokes, Gordon.
W. Custis Nottingham, Macon.

MONTANA.

John J. Courtney, Antelope.
T. C. Armitage, Billings.

Elmer C. Sprague, Box Elder.
Lulu C. Woolson, Brady.
William Krofft, Choteau.
Fred T. Tasa, Flaxville.
Robert B. McNeil, Inverness.
Richard T. Sjoldal, Kremlin.
Grant Robinson, Lewistown.
Rose M. Sargent, Nashua.
Israel A. Oakes, Plentywood.
Letta Conser, Plevna.
L. H. Adams, Somers.
Lizzie Gorsuch, Winnett.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Albin P. Yarnall, Ashbourne.
James W. Taylor, Dallastown.
Andrew Wahl, Evans City.
E. K. Eichelberger, Hanover.
John Orth, Marietta.
Edward S. Haws, Narberth.
Albert K. Kneule, Norristown.
James W. Hatch, North Girard.
J. B. Esch, Spangler.
John H. Krumbine, Vintondale.
James H. Alcorn, Waterford.
C. J. D. Strohecker, Zelenople.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Tuesday, February 5, 1918.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Rev. William Couden, of Washington, D. C., offered the following prayer:

Father of all souls, Thou hast kept us through the dark hours of the night; lead us through the complexities of the day's dangers, opportunities, and responsibilities.

In times past Thou hast blessed our country. Continue Thy blessing upon us in these critical present times. Strengthen us on land and sea, at home and abroad. Give us wisdom and skill in the use of our powers and resources. And back of all our outward might and organization, make us strongest of all in personal and social righteousness, justice, and faith; for Christ's sake. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Waldorf, its enrolling clerk, announced that the Senate had passed bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House of Representatives was requested:

S. 2116. An act to increase the salary of the United States district attorney for the district of Rhode Island.

SENATE BILLS REFERRED.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, Senate bills of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and referred to their appropriate committees, as indicated below:

S. 2116. An act to increase the salary of the United States district attorney for the district of Rhode Island; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 3126. An act to provide temporary promotion for retired officers of the Navy and Marine Corps performing active duty during the period of the present war; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3427. An act for the relief of certain ex-paymasters' clerks; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3445. An act to authorize the payment of gun pointers and gun captains while temporarily absent from their regular stations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3402. An act to fix the age limit for candidates for admission to the United States Naval Academy; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3129. An act to provide for the disposition of the effects of deceased persons in the naval service; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3130. An act to amend section 1570 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3400. An act to regulate the pay of retired chief warrant officers on active duty; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3404. An act to authorize the President to drop from the rolls any Naval or Marine Corps officer absent without leave for three months, or who has been convicted of any offense by

the civil authorities, and prohibiting such officer's reappointment; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3406. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to determine where and when there are no public quarters available for officers of the Navy and Marine Corps; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

S. 3401. An act to authorize the President to reduce temporarily the course of instruction at the United States Naval Academy; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

LEAVE TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday morning, immediately after the reading of the Journal, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. TILSON] may have opportunity to address the House for 40 minutes. He desires to have a definite time fixed in view of the fact that he expects to have here some exhibits of considerable weight and volume, and have them here at a given time.

The SPEAKER. Are the exhibits going to be loaded or not? [Laughter.]

Mr. MONDELL. The gentleman has promised that they shall not be loaded.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Wyoming asks unanimous consent that on Thursday morning, after the reading of the Journal and the disposition of the business on the Speaker's table, the gentleman from Connecticut, Col. TILSON, shall have 40 minutes in which to address the House on the subject of explosives, not to interfere with privileged matters one way or other, or appropriation bills, conference reports, and so forth. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

Mr. GREGG, by unanimous consent, was granted leave of absence indefinitely, on account of illness.

HOUSING EMPLOYEES, EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the bill (S. 3389) to authorize and empower the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to purchase, lease, requisition, or otherwise acquire improved or unimproved land, houses, buildings, and for other purposes, be made a special order to follow the disposition of the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill.

Mr. MADDEN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, is this the bill for the housing of the men to build the ships?

Mr. ALEXANDER. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Does it deal with any other subject?

Mr. ALEXANDER. No.

Mr. MADDEN. What does the bill propose to do?

Mr. ALEXANDER. It authorizes the expenditure of \$50,000,000 to be expended at the shipyards at which the United States is building ships under the control and direction of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

Mr. MADDEN. Has the gentleman from Missouri any information as to the number of shipyards that are in operation now, building ships for the Emergency Fleet?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I think 132.

Mr. MADDEN. One hundred and thirty-two yards?

Mr. ALEXANDER. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Where they are building ships or building yards?

Mr. ALEXANDER. There are two or three yards that the Government is constructing that are not yet completed and at which they are not yet building ships, and it is at those yards particularly—for instance, Newport News, Va.; Hog Island, Pa.; and that of the Submarine Boat Corporation at Newark, N. J.—where these housing facilities are the most urgent at this time. If we would speed up this shipbuilding program, I think the gentleman from Illinois will agree with me that we must make arrangements for increased transportation and housing facilities at once. We now have about 180,000 men employed in the shipyards building ships for the Government, and the turnover of labor amounts, as Admiral Bowles says, to 500 or 600 per cent, and it is absolutely necessary to make provision for housing these men if we would speed up the shipbuilding program and increase the number of men from 180,000 to 300,000 men.

Mr. MADDEN. I agree that it is one of the most important things we have on hand, and if anything can be done to facilitate the building of ships and putting them into the water and getting them ready for transportation, we ought to do it. Does the gentleman think we will be able to get the increased number of men if we have the houses?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I think so.

Mr. MADDEN. Does anybody know how long it will take to build these houses after we authorize them?

Mr. ALEXANDER. The bureau of the Fleet Corporation, having this matter in charge, has been giving it great study for some time past; their plans are not fully developed yet, and it is impossible to determine in advance how long it will take and what the expenditure will be. This bill authorizes the expenditure of \$50,000,000. It will be necessary for the Fleet Corporation to go to the Committee on Appropriations and submit their plans and get an appropriation made available at once for the balance of this fiscal year and for the next fiscal year to prosecute this work.

Mr. MADDEN. It seems to me the matter is so urgent that we ought not to have to wait. We ought to pass this bill and make the appropriations in the bill and let the Committee on Appropriations wait awhile, and let us get the ships moving.

Mr. ALEXANDER. This is a Senate bill. It was referred to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and it is reported to the House with a unanimous report, and the committee feel the urgency of beginning the work at the earliest possible date. For that reason I am making this request at this time.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. MONDELL. Reserving the right to object, when was the bill reported?

Mr. ALEXANDER. Yesterday.

Mr. MONDELL. The bill was reported yesterday. The Members of the House are not familiar with it. I do not think it is very good practice to fix by unanimous consent a time for the consideration of a measure the provisions of which are not generally understood. It seems to me there would probably be no objection to having a time fixed later, before we get through with the consideration of the diplomatic bill, and I hope that the gentleman will withdraw his request for the present and make it a little later. I should have to object at this time in view of the fact that the Members are not familiar with the bill.

Mr. ALEXANDER. I sincerely hope the gentleman will not do so. I have word from the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs that it will take at least two days to dispose of the diplomatic appropriation bill, and there will be ample time for the gentleman from Wyoming and the Members of the House to inform themselves about the provisions of this bill before it comes up for consideration if the unanimous-consent request is granted.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Speaker, that information should be had to a certain extent before the House by unanimous consent fixes a special time for the consideration of a measure. I presume that there will be no objection if the gentleman proffers his request before we conclude consideration of the diplomatic bill. There will be plenty of time.

Mr. ALEXANDER. I will certainly renew my request from day to day, because I do not care to carry the responsibility myself for any unnecessary delay.

Mr. EDMONDS. Mr. Speaker—

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. May I ask the gentleman—

Mr. COX. I demand the regular order.

The SPEAKER. The regular order is, Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. ALEXANDER]? Mr. MONDELL. For the present I shall have to object.

LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS.

Mr. POWERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. On what subject?

Mr. POWERS. On the coal situation.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

CIVIL-SERVICE EXAMINATIONS.

Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I again ask unanimous consent to bring up Senate joint resolution 117, in reference to holding civil-service examinations.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from North Carolina asks unanimous consent for the present consideration of a bill, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read the title of Senate joint resolution 117, amending the act of July 2, 1909, governing the holding of civil-service examinations.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I wish to inquire whether the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSTER], who had some objections to the bill in its present form, has withdrawn his objection? There have been objections to certain provisions of the bill raised on this side. I wish to inquire of the gentleman whether he proposes to offer any amendments in addition to those that are recommended by the committee?

Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina. The amendment suggested by Dr. FOSTER would require those from the States taking the examination in the District of Columbia to have resided here for not exceeding a year. For instance, permanent residents in the District of Columbia could not take advantage of the opportunity to take the examination in the District of Columbia. In other words, it would be restricted to those who had been here a year or less. That was the suggestion he made.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. A year or less.

Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina. A year or less, not more than a year. I have no objection to that amendment myself.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. ROBBINS] spoke to me about the bill yesterday. He is not in the Chamber at this moment. I ask that the gentleman withdraw his request for the time being.

Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina. Did he have an amendment to suggest?

Mr. STAFFORD. The gentleman from Pennsylvania desired to offer an amendment. He is not in the Chamber at the present time.

Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina. I withdraw the request for the time being.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman withdraws his request.

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR APPROPRIATIONS.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9314) making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919; and pending that motion, Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. COOPER] if we can not make some arrangement about time for general debate on this bill.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I have received requests for time from Members on this side of the Chamber aggregating more than five hours. Before the gentleman makes response to that suggestion I wish to say that among those who have asked to speak—and I think their requests indicate that the debate will be an interesting one—are two of the members of the committee who spent a number of weeks over on the battle front, and another request is from the gentleman who was consul general in Egypt and can speak with first-hand knowledge of the Armenians and Turks. In view of the important character of the bill and of the number who have asked for opportunities to speak, I do not think that five hours on this side is an unreasonable time.

Mr. FLOOD. Could the gentleman get along with four hours?

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. We can not get along with four hours, because there are so many who have asked for an opportunity to say something, and they are still coming in. I have had one request this morning, and now I have another from a distinguished Member of the House who asks for 10 minutes. Another equally distinguished and equally insistent gentleman wants 10 minutes more. The gentleman had better hasten to a conclusion before any more requests come in. [Laughter.]

The SPEAKER. What does the gentleman from Virginia say?

Mr. FLOOD. Could we agree to finish the general debate to-day—run on until we finish it to-day?

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Oh, that is utterly impossible. There is no reason for that. I can not understand why we should hasten to a conclusion to-day and then adjourn over. Why can we not let the debate run to-day, Mr. Speaker?

Mr. KITCHIN. That is what I suggest, to let the debate run to-day, and then the gentleman from Virginia and the gentleman from Wisconsin can agree on some time.

Mr. FLOOD. We will agree to let the debate run on to-day.

The SPEAKER. Who is to control the time?

Mr. FLOOD. While we will not need half the time, I ask that the time be controlled, half by the gentleman from Wisconsin and half by myself.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia moves that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill; and pending that he asks that the time to-day be equally divided between himself and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. COOPER]. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The motion of Mr. FLOOD was agreed to.

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9314) making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, with Mr. HUMPHREYS in the chair.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia asks unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, this bill carries a considerably larger amount than the appropriations heretofore made in the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill. For that reason I desire to address the House in reference to the splendid work that has been accomplished by that branch of our public service which is supported by the appropriation carried in this bill. Our foreign service is handled by the Department of State.

The Department of State has always been one of the very important governmental departments. It was the first department of our Government created, and has been the center of the stage during most of our history.

It was first known as the Department of Foreign Affairs, and had to do exclusively with our foreign relations; but during the very year in which it was created, 1789, an act was passed charging the Secretary of Foreign Affairs with the safe-keeping of the acts and records and seals of the United States and changing the name of the department to its present name.

All through our history, in peace and in war, this department has played a great and important part, but never a more important part than during the present great crisis in the world's history. We have had great Secretaries of State, among them Jefferson, Pickens, Marshall, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Webster, Buchanan, Black, Seward, Everetts, Blaine, Bayard, Olney, Root, Knox, and Bryan, but none of these distinguished men have discharged the duties of this great office more efficiently than the courtly gentleman, the able lawyer, the dignified official who now holds it. [Applause.] The Secretary of State has a splendid corps of assistants. They have done their work quietly and unostentatiously, but with great efficiency and good to this country and to the cause of humanity. [Applause.]

I feel that at this time when such tremendous burdens and responsibilities have been placed upon the State Department, and when these responsibilities have been so splendidly and successfully met and discharged that some statement of their accomplishment is due to the Secretary and his efficient corps of assistants. [Applause.]

With the entry of the United States into the war there arose at once vital problems of coordination and cooperation between this country and the allies. What America had or could produce in men, supplies, and money had to be determined and then fitted to the needs and requirements of the various fronts. The problems of apportionment were tremendous, necessitating negotiations of great magnitude. The situation led to the sending to this country of diplomatic missions from England, France, Italy, Russia, Japan, Belgium, and a number of other countries. These missions came with intricate problems, questions for diplomatic cooperation and decision, questions of financial arrangements, and of military and naval requirements, and of general policies.

These missions carried on their negotiations through the Department of State. Their military experts were brought into relation with ours; their financial experts were put in contact with the Treasury Department; their economic and blockade experts were taken to the appropriate American authorities. Arrangements of all sorts were speedily made. The Department of State had directly to do with many of these problems, such as those concerning supplies to neutral countries contiguous to Germany, and with military and naval problems, when the military and naval activities assumed a political tinge.

The negotiations begun at the time of America's entry into the war have since been carried on with undiminished vigor, as questions of world importance have one after another arisen. In every new situation the Department of State has measured up fully to the necessities of the occasion and to the very best traditions of our Government and our country. In no instance has it fallen down. [Applause.] In no instance has a single bureau failed to give a good account of itself.

In addition to the diplomatic missions, our State Department officials received and negotiated with special commercial missions from Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, taking up with them the very intricate problems of supplies to be exchanged, based on the part of the United States on a determination to permit nothing to go to these countries without full guarantees that American commodities should not reach the enemy, and on the part of the others of their own welfare and economic and political needs and requirements.

The successful conduct of these negotiations constitutes one of the vital aspects of the war and reflects great credit upon the Department of State. [Applause.]

Under the direction of the Secretary of State, the special war mission, headed by Col. House, went to England and France,

carrying on toward completion the work begun by the special diplomatic and war missions which came to this country. All of us are familiar with the House mission in bringing into the war America's full strength—military, naval, financial, and economic. The discussions in Europe, as did those which took place in this country, led to a thorough and complete understanding of precisely what the allies needed from this country and exactly what this country could furnish, with the equally important decisions as to when and how they could be furnished, and under our great Secretary of the Treasury and our able and efficient Secretaries of War and Navy, we will furnish more in men and means than was expected of us in a far shorter time than had been the fondest hope of our own people or the nations with which we are associated in this war. [Applause.]

The visit of the Japanese mission to this country resulted in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and Viscount Ishii, which removed causes of friction between the two countries and works for peace in the Far East, making quite remote the possibility so often discussed of trouble between this country and Japan.

Under instructions from the department, a mission was sent to Russia under the distinguished leadership of the Hon. Elihu Root.

The war, with all of these new activities, has brought upon the department and its corps of workers here and abroad an avalanche of problems, many of them entirely new and most complicated. A very considerable number of these problems affect not only this country but other countries engaged on our side in the war. This makes necessary general negotiations, exchange of views between the several foreign offices and co-ordination of opinion, and finally unanimous decision. This necessitates a largely increased force of all classes of officials in our Diplomatic and Consular and Secret Services.

To meet these increasing burdens and supply a sufficient force to discharge the demands upon our foreign service, we are asked for a very considerable increase of appropriations over the amounts our bills have carried during the past.

The existing appropriation law carried a total of \$5,082,746.66; the pending bill carries a total of \$8,206,086.66, making an increase of \$3,123,340. This increase is made up largely of allowances for additional clerks at embassies and legations, contingent expenses for foreign missions, the secret fund, post allowances, allowance for clerk hire at consulates, contingent expenses of consulates, relief of American citizens and prisoners of war, and other similar items.

The bill also carries provision for 25 new secretaries to our embassies and legations. When we entered the war there was, of course, a complete cessation of intercourse between Germany and the United States, and later between this country and Turkey and Austria. This meant the withdrawal of the large American embassies in Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople, as well as the whole of the consular service in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. The personnel thus made available was instantly absorbed while the constantly increasing intercourse between this country and the allied nations, as well as with most of the neutrals, caused such a tremendous increase of work that it was found that more secretaries, as well as clerks, in embassies and legations were absolutely necessary.

I believe the House will agree with the committee that in no item of the bill has the committee allowed a larger increase for our foreign service than the exigencies and necessities of the present emergency imperatively demand.

Even during the years before America became an actual participant in the war there was a constant expansion of the work of the State Department. Although we were neutral, the department's problems constantly increased. Caring for the interests of belligerents in various countries was one detail of the new work, while the constantly arising problems of neutrality, as well as those of protecting America's interests abroad, added more work. The department, however, undertook to carry on this work without any very great increase of appropriations, but the time has come when these increases are absolutely necessary in order to do at all efficiently the work that falls to this great department of the Government.

When the United States entered the war some of the problems involving the defense of her neutrality and other similar problems disappeared, but immediately there sprung up greater problems of another character.

Every additional letter and telegram to or from the department or to or from our embassies, legations, and consulates means, of course, additional work for the departmental personnel and for the personnel of the embassies, legations, and consulates.

Owing to the importance of the work done by the Department of State, which is the connecting link between this and all other

nations, most of it is conducted by cable. This is more true now than ever before, owing to the war urgency of most of the foreign business and to the irregularity and slowness of the mails caused by the shipping situation. I am told that there has been an increase of nearly 800 per cent in this character of work. In the period from the 1st to the 15th of January, 1914, there were 28,300 words cabled. In the same period in 1918 there were 217,597 words.

Every message sent by telegraph requires the service and receives the attention of a number of high-class officials in the department, and the same is true of the cables sent from our embassies, legations, and consulates. This is only an instance of the increased work in our foreign service. The communications recorded in the Bureau of Indexes show a great increase, while the department's correspondence with the foreign service, and contra, which is carried on in pouches, shows an astonishing increase.

These facts establish the mere volume of work that has been accomplished and which progresses in increasing magnitude.

In addition to all the new war work, the ordinary functions of the department go on. While there is little which happens which does not touch or is not touched by war, there still remains the usual volume of work in connection with the protection of American citizens and interests abroad—less than before the war because of the severance of relations with several large countries, but still enough to occupy the time and attention of a staff equal to that which was maintained prior to August, 1914.

Therefore, the department has as much to do in mere quantity as it had in time of peace, and added to this is all the new war work.

First in importance among the new activities of the department comes, of course, the matter of general diplomatic intercourse between this country and those associated with us in the war, questions of politics and diplomacy, and, where the two go together, of military action and diplomacy. All this falls to the Department of State, and along with it a vast amount of labor in connection with certain coordinate branches of the Government which have vital mutual interests with America's associates in the war and no direct means of communication except through the Department of State.

There exists now the War Trade Board, charged with the enforcement of the trading with the enemy act and making up the enemy trading list. Its chairman, the Hon. Vance C. McCormick, is the department's representative on the board, and the Department of State, under the guidance of this able Pennsylvanian, is largely responsible for the policy of this board. The work of the War Trade Board involves investigation of thousands of firms the world over to ascertain if they have an enemy taint and if they should be placed on the enemy trading list, so that American citizens may not deal with them. Here the American Consular Service is utilized most extensively, consuls in all countries being used to investigate and report on the character of firms and to make recommendations as to whether licenses for exports from the United States shall be permitted. These investigations are running into the thousands.

The War Trade Board comes into close contact with the department in the matter of determining the quantity of supplies permitted to go to neutral countries contiguous to Germany and elsewhere. The questions are complex, involving the necessity, which must be determined, as to American needs as well as those of neutrals, the matter of supply and demand, of expediency and barter, which means arranging that in return for supplies from this country the other party concerned shall furnish us with commodities which they have and we need. The ramification leads to the Food Administration, where the availability of foodstuffs for export as well as the necessity for certain foods abroad is determined, and to the Treasury, where matters concerning money and supplies are settled. The department's business with the War Trade Board alone requires the services of several administrative officers, numerous clerks, and the constant consideration of the actual head of the department. The furnishing of supplies to neutrals and associates almost invariably has a political tinge which requires very careful consideration and action.

Another important work of magnitude which has come to the department is that of distribution of enemy shipping. At the outbreak of the war many enemy ships took refuge in ports which have ceased to be neutral ports. The obtaining of this highly valuable tonnage and its distribution among the allies for war operation has made necessary long and arduous negotiations.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I will.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. With reference to the services now being rendered by the War Trade Bureau, I would like to

ask the gentleman whether American merchants are still required to apply to the Textile Alliance for leave to obtain ship space. It was the practice in certain cases for American merchants to go to the British consul general at New York or to the Textile Alliance, a British corporation, to obtain leave to do foreign business. I want to know if that condition still holds?

Mr. FLOOD. I should think not, although I am not prepared to answer the question because it has not come under my observation.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The gentleman has referred to the work done by Mr. McCormick, and the question seems important because American merchants were being prejudiced by having to submit their business affairs to foreign agents, due, of course, to the war. In my judgment the practice ought to be discontinued since an American official is presumed to have control of that situation.

Mr. FLOOD. I agree with the gentleman, and I think perhaps he will find that that has been done, but I am not prepared to answer positively.

When we entered the war Canada was the only country in the Western Hemisphere in the war, nor in the Far East was there any country at war except Japan. Since America entered the war, Cuba, Panama, Brazil, China, and Siam have declared war, and Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Guatemala have severed diplomatic relations with Germany, thus placing themselves on the side of the United States. In the case of these Latin-American countries and China, the example of the United States undoubtedly had a potent influence. The Department of State by the distribution of the President's speeches through the Diplomatic and Consular Service and in other ways did much to bring these countries to a full realization of what the war was about, and in that way exercised a strong influence upon the action those countries subsequently took. [Applause.]

The series of exposures which the department has made, beginning with the Zimmermann note early last year, and followed by the Luxburg telegrams, the Bernstorff telegrams concerning Caillaux, and the secret German censorship regulations showing how the German press is controlled undoubtedly served to bring to the attention of Latin America as well as to the world the precise character of the German Government, with the consequent influence upon the policy of many of these countries toward Germany. Of the department's general secret service work little can be said at this time further than to most highly commend it, and to state that it has been most effective and useful.

Since America's entry into the war her foreign relations, for which the State Department is responsible, have greatly developed, and this in the face of enormous difficulties. The rationing of neutrals, for instance, involving an interference with some of the vital supplies of such countries as Holland, Denmark, and Sweden is a matter calculated to create intense irritation with the tangible risk of its developing into enmity.

Too much can not be said of the splendid manner in which the State Department has handled this delicate situation. There is no friction with any of these neutrals growing out of the course which our Government was compelled to pursue with reference to these matters. [Applause.]

There are innumerable lesser phases of departmental war work which add to the volume of labor. It falls to the department to look after the interests and to assure proper treatment for American prisoners of war in enemy hands. Of these there are now only a few, less than 150, but it is to be expected that there will be more, and elaborate machinery for their care has been created. A committee in Switzerland has been organized under the supervision of the legation at Berne which sends to the Americans in German prison camps food, money, and clothing, without which they would soon be destitute. The history of the war shows that the lot of prisoners in Germany is an unhappy one. Without food from the outside they would starve; without clothing they would freeze. Their welfare demands constant vigilance, instant protest against mistreatment, and firm demand for remedies. The department must also protect other Americans in Germany and property left behind by Americans who have departed.

In turn the Department of State is responsible for the welfare of enemy aliens in this country. Here Sweden represents Austrian interests and Switzerland Germany's, and with the legations of those two countries in Washington there is a constantly growing correspondence, involving much investigation as to the welfare of interned enemy aliens and of prisoners of war. In addition there is much work connected with the handling of enemy property by the alien property custodian.

Another feature of the department's new work concerns the welfare of subject races. In Palestine, Armenia, Syria, Poland, and various other places the plight of the people is pitiable. Several organizations have interested themselves in affording succor, and this is sent through the Department of State. Often the question of sending supplies and money involves diplomatic interchange between this country and the allies and between us and the enemy, through established neutral channels. Proper safeguards must be established to prevent relief supplies sent to occupied Poland from falling into the hands of the enemy. Similarly the department has to do with the relief of Belgium and the occupied portions of northern France.

The American Red Cross is extensively engaged in several places abroad, in Russia, Poland, the Balkans, and elsewhere. The work of the Red Cross receives the support and assistance of the department, without whose machinery the Red Cross would have difficulty in carrying on its work.

A very important and a very complicated feature of the department's work has been the negotiation, still proceeding, of treaties with several nations for reciprocal drafting of nationals. These negotiations are now about concluded.

Information is, of course, the most vital element of war. Prior to America's participation there existed a certain system of interchange of information between America's Diplomatic and Consular Service and the department. This has since been greatly expanded. The missions abroad are now kept fully informed of all essential developments. Each week the various political bureaus collate all information pertaining to their work. When the facts are brought together a review of the week is appended and then the whole is made up into "information series." These are sent to embassies and legations which are entitled to see them. They are confidential and nonconfidential. The nonconfidential contain much information of great value for publicity purposes abroad, leading to a clearer public understanding of America's aims and activities. I am told that the embassy in London receives from the department each week between fifty and seventy-five thousand words of material. In addition to this the department carries on a cabled information service. Facts from London of interest to the embassy in Rome, or possibly the legation in Peking, are speedily transmitted. The department also supervises the exchange of certain information between this country and the cobelligerents.

While war tasks accumulate many questions arise just as in the days of peace. For instance, the department has lately been most busily engaged in an effort to prevent a boundary dispute between Guatemala and Honduras becoming something worse. The questions arising out of the proper distribution of the waters of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers between this country and Mexico are being handled so as to avoid any dispute between the two Republics in the future. Negotiations looking toward making the Army's and the farmers' supply of nitrate certain have gone on simultaneously with the efforts to keep peace in the oil fields of Mexico. Steps have been taken for the relief of the earthquake sufferers in Guatemala, while the department was giving careful attention to the situation in Russia.

In addition to all these, the department has been making careful and efficient efforts to watch all developments in enemy countries, and has succeeded in establishing a flow of information which keeps the Government well informed as to what is happening within the enemy lines.

When peace comes the work of the department will be increased. The various problems of peace will need much attention. The Consular Service has to a considerable degree stopped its ordinary commercial work, owing to other important activities and to the disappearance of commerce. With the dawn of peace commercial activities and reports will be of more importance than ever before. For the proper promotion and protection of America's interests during the period of intensified commercial competition which is to follow the war, the Department of State must now during the war prepare for the time that is to follow. This is being done—splendidly and efficiently done. [Applause.]

All of these manifold duties the officials of the State Department, those at home as well as those abroad, under the guidance of the Secretary of State, have performed with a splendid fidelity and a singular degree of efficiency. [Applause.]

The Secretary of State, entertaining a thorough disdain for noisy notoriety, has been content, with arduous toil, to move steadily along the path of duty in the faithful, able, and splendid performance of the labors and responsibilities that appertain to his position. [Applause.]

It is said by Bacon that "the greatest builders are the builders of state." But their most important works are performed

in the closet and not before the public gaze. They are like the silent workers that in the unseen depth of the ocean lay the coral foundations of uprising islands and the enduring beams of mighty continents.

And so the impress of the mind, character, and diligence of Robert Lansing will be left upon the important and far-reaching measures that come under his consideration as an international leader, and will add to the advancement of the cause of humanity and to the prosperity, the glory, and the honor of this Republic. [Applause.]

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I will.

Mr. FESS. In the interesting review of the activities of the State Department, diplomatically considered, the chairman mentioned the name of Col. House. Would the chairman care to state just what status he possessed while in Europe?

Mr. FLOOD. I would say that Col. House was the personal representative of the President. Men occupying similar positions and having similar functions to those of Col. House have been called confidential agents, secret agents, commissioners, and secret plenipotentiaries.

Mr. FESS. Would that include any authority whatever?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes; such authority as the President conferred upon him.

Mr. FESS. Is there any limit to that diplomatically considered; could such authority go to any extent?

Mr. FLOOD. The President is the organ of our diplomatic intercourse. The authority of his personal representative could only be limited by him.

Mr. FESS. It is rather an unusual procedure in the history of diplomacy.

Mr. FLOOD. No; we have resorted to that character of representation frequently in our history. President Washington did in negotiating a treaty of peace with Algiers. The gentleman will recall that a former President sent Mr. Blount, of Georgia, to Hawaii with paramount authority over our minister there and for the purpose of protecting American lives and interests, to bind this country in any agreement between this country and Hawaii.

Mr. FESS. That was President Cleveland.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. FESS. The reason I ask the question is that there has been a good deal of inquiry by Members as to the exact status, diplomatically considered, that this representative in Europe occupied. It is not that of a minister plenipotentiary nor an ambassador?

Mr. FLOOD. No. As the personal representative of the President. He was appointed in pursuance of a precedent established by Washington and followed by many of our Presidents.

Mr. FESS. Would he be received officially by any country there?

Mr. FLOOD. Theoretically he could not claim full diplomatic privileges, yet practically I assume that any man who went from this country as a personal representative of the President would be received with all the courtesies and honors that are accorded to our ambassadors.

Mr. FESS. The report, if he has one to make, will be made specifically to the President?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. FESS. And that information is not common property?

Mr. FLOOD. When the public interests would not be jeopardized thereby I presume that the President would make the report public; otherwise he would not, as he should not.

Mr. AUSTIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. AUSTIN. Is there any provision made in this bill for increasing the salaries of consular officers located in the Republic of China?

Mr. FLOOD. No; except this: This bill carries what is known as a post-allowance fund.

Under the provisions of this bill that can be used in any country in the world, and the purpose of the department, as we gathered from the hearings, was to make allowances out of that fund to all of our diplomatic and consular officers, attachés, and employees when the increased cost of living justified it.

Mr. AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, my understanding from a friend in the foreign service in China is that on account of the increased value of the silver coin in China and the high cost of living the old standard of wages or salaries fixed in the consular and diplomatic appropriation bill is not sufficient; in other words, that their salaries were based upon a low valuation of the silver coin or currency in the Republic of China, and therefore they thought that Congress ought to increase

their salaries in order to meet the increase in the value of the silver coin and the high cost of living.

Mr. FLOOD. The salaries were not in the first instance based upon the low value of the silver. They were fixed without reference to that, but when these gentlemen got our exchange in China they were able to get a good deal more money in silver than was mentioned in the appropriation. Sometimes they would get \$2 for \$1 and sometimes \$2.25 for \$1. Silver has increased in value, and of course that is not now the case with these salaries. They get now just about the salaries that they were thought to be getting all along. But the Department of State realizes that the increased cost of living in China is very great, as it is in all other countries, and it proposes, while there is no increase in the salaries carried in the bill, out of the post-allowance fund, to make allowances to officials there just as they do in other countries.

Mr. AUSTIN. Did the committee consider the question of the Government purchasing the present quarters or purchasing land for the construction of quarters for the American consul general at Hankow, China?

Mr. FLOOD. No; that was not before the committee.

Mr. AUSTIN. Has it ever been considered by the committee?

Mr. FLOOD. It never has.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN] inquired as to the disposition of alien property taken over by the alien property custodian. I am interested in that matter. I did not catch the answer of the gentleman from Virginia. Did I understand the gentleman from Virginia to say anything about the disposition of the alien property?

Mr. FLOOD. I said where it was not Government property and was not confiscated during the war, I thought it would be returned to the owners after the war.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Does not the act creating the alien property custodian provide that Congress itself shall dispose of that property in its own way after the war? That is my recollection of the act.

Mr. FLOOD. I think it does.

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will permit, that is correct.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The alien property custodian, as I understand it, is merely a custodian.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. He takes the property over as he discovers it or uncovers it and holds it for the disposition of Congress at the close of the war.

Mr. FLOOD. My view is—and I suppose that is the view of the gentleman—that that property that is here and has not been confiscated and sold by our alien property custodian will be returned to the people who own it after the war. That will be the will of Congress.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Subject to the will of Congress.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ESCH], who is on the committee, refreshes my memory. I merely wanted to know whether I got the gentleman's answer correctly. It is up to Congress to dispose of that property as it sees fit after the war.

Mr. FLOOD. Certainly; Congress could confiscate it all.

Mr. SLAYDEN. Was not that a wise reservation of power, with the thought in mind that the disposition that is made of property of aliens now in charge of our custodian would be dependent somewhat upon the treatment accorded American owners of property in Germany confiscated or taken control of by the Germans?

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Certainly. I merely wanted to emphasize the fact that the alien property custodian is a custodian merely, and has no power to dispose of property. Congress does that.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Virginia permit me to make an inquiry of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. FLOOD. Certainly.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I want to inquire whether Germany enacted its law concerning the holdings of Americans in Germany after our enactment or prior thereto?

Mr. SLAYDEN. I can not state about that, but I understood the reservation of power of Congress to dispose of the property afterwards was a step to enable us to act properly if there were reciprocity in the matter by Germany.

Mr. BANKHEAD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Virginia yield?

Mr. FLOOD. Certainly.

Mr. BANKHEAD. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman in his speech made some reference to the committee that had been appointed with headquarters at Berne, Switzerland, to look after the health and comfort of American prisoners of war. Is that a civilian committee, or is it a committee that has governmental jurisdiction from the United States, or what are its functions?

Mr. FLOOD. It is not a committee. It is the American legation at Berne. Of course, that legation has been very much enlarged for the purpose, through the friendly relations of Switzerland with Germany, of bringing about an arrangement by which our legation at Berne and the Swiss foreign office at Berne can provide for our prisoners of war in Germany.

Mr. BANKHEAD. For instance, one of the first prisoners of war captured came from my State, Alabama. Would it be possible through that legation for the relatives or parents of a particular prisoner of war to keep in touch with his whereabouts and whether he is alive?

Mr. FLOOD. As soon as they get in touch with him, certainly. It would be absolutely possible, it would be easy.

Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. I am interested in the colloquy which took place between the chairman of the committee and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Fess], with reference to the status of Col. House. I would ask if he is sent as the prerogative of the presidency itself, and not based at all upon any legislation that the Congress of the United States has ever provided? I ask this not as a matter of criticism, but as a matter of inquiry.

Mr. FLOOD. My understanding is that it is the prerogative of the President, that almost since the foundation of the Government Presidents have been sending representatives of this character to foreign nations when vital questions were concerned, to get information and to negotiate for the Executive when this class of appointees could serve a better purpose than the ambassadors and ministers and other regularly appointed and confirmed diplomatic agents.

Mr. HAMLIN. Let me refresh the gentleman's memory. President Roosevelt while President sent a man by the name of Hollander to Santo Domingo, put him on a warship and sent him down as his special representative.

Mr. FLOOD. I thank the gentleman for the reminder. I now recall that case and the debate in the Senate between Senators Bacon and Spooner in reference to it.

Mr. HAMLIN. And President Lincoln also sent one.

Mr. FLOOD. I think it has been done quite a number of times, and it has been thrashed out in the Senate frequently, and the right of the President to make such appointments has always been sustained. There can be no question about the right.

Mr. FESS. I should like to know who President Lincoln sent.

Mr. FLOOD. I said it has been done a number of times. I can not recall any instance in President Lincoln's administration, and I also said it had been thrashed out in the Senate, and the right had been fairly established years ago.

Mr. SLAYDEN. I can remind the gentleman of one very historic instance, in which a man was sent by Mr. Cleveland to Mexico when Gen. Johnson, of Savannah, was minister. It was an unfortunate selection the President made, because this man did not reflect credit. He was sent, however. These people were only sent to advise, and they had no official function to perform in the way of an officer of the Government at all.

Mr. SLOAN. I was not questioning the authority of the President, but it was an inquiry directed as just how he was sent, whether as a prerogative or whether he followed out something that legislation heretofore had paved the way for sending him.

Mr. FLOOD. As a prerogative of the President who has the jurisdiction of our foreign relations, not as the result of power conferred by legislative enactment.

Mr. FESS. Will the chairman please state and insert in the Record what particular power, if any, was made public that the commissioner or representative carried with him?

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman, of course, remembers the unlimited powers given Mr. Blount in the Hawaiian matter.

Mr. AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I wish to ask the gentleman if I understood him correctly a while ago as to President Cleveland sending ex-Congressman Blount to Hawaii with a view to taking over the islands? My recollection of that matter is the administration sent him there to use his influence as a representative of this Government to restore the queen.

Mr. FLOOD. I did not know whether the purpose was to restore the queen or to take over the islands. I was not discussing that phase of the question; but President Cleveland sent Mr. Blount to Hawaii as his personal representative to take in consideration the situation and act in a way that would be to the best interests of this Government and this country and the Hawaiian people.

Mr. AUSTIN. Does not the gentleman well remember in the McKinley campaign following the Hawaiian incident that the charge was that President Cleveland had sent a representative there with instructions to haul down the American flag and restore the queen?

Mr. FLOOD. I would not like to stand sponsor for all the things the gentleman has said in his political campaigns.

Mr. AUSTIN. That was said all over the country, and was one thing that aided very largely in creating a sentiment in the United States against the reelection of President Cleveland, that it was the intention of the administration to haul down the American flag in the Hawaiian Islands and restore the queen.

Mr. SLAYDEN. But Mr. Cleveland was not a candidate.

Mr. AUSTIN. Well, that defeated the Democratic Party.

Mr. FLOOD. I know there were charges of that kind, and doubtless the gentleman made them on the stump; but I am not discussing what the President's purposes were in sending Mr. Blount as his personal representative. I am only discussing his right to send such a representative.

Mr. AUSTIN. I misunderstood, perhaps, what the gentleman said when his attention was called to it by the Representative from Ohio, and therefore I wanted the Record to state what actually occurred and the reasons why he was sent there.

Mr. FLOOD. Well, I do not know those were the reasons. There were no specific instructions along that line given to Mr. Blount.

Mr. AUSTIN. "Paramount Blount."

Mr. FLOOD. He was sent there with wide and unlimited powers, with paramount authority, and he exercised the powers and authority given him.

Mr. AUSTIN. Well, he failed in his mission. The queen was not restored, the Cleveland administration refused consent to take over the islands, they established the Republic of Hawaii, and on the election of President McKinley a treaty was negotiated in the Senate and the islands became a part of the United States.

Mr. FLOOD. I do not know that he failed in his mission. That was not the question asked me and that is not what I intended to address myself to in answer. I know that he had wide and extensive powers and that he exercised the powers. Whether he was successful in exercising them I can not undertake to discuss here.

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. The power conferred upon the President in sending Mr. House to Europe is on all fours with the power conferred upon the President in sending Mr. Root to Russia, is it not, as an advisor in each instance?

Mr. FLOOD. The House mission, of course, was sent with wider powers and—

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. I meant to say that the authority vested in the President is the same in each instance?

Mr. FLOOD. Yes; the authority is the same in each instance.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, to be perfectly understood, I would like to state to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Constitution quite specifically defines the powers of the President over these appointments—how our country shall be represented and with what authority in other countries—and by legislation these representatives have been classified in various classes; and Col. House does not fall, as I understand the chairman to state, in any of the classes, either as an ambassador, minister plenipotentiary, resident minister, or any other that we have thus far officially recognized. And what I wanted was, in no captious criticism but inasmuch as there has been a point of dispute, to say that the chairman should put in his remarks the exact status, if we can get it, of Col. House, and what particular authority, if any, he possessed when he went there, in order that the country, which has raised the question as to this particular authority, might be informed. I ask it as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs—

Mr. FLOOD. I will do it with great pleasure.

Mr. FESS (continuing). And not at all with captious criticism.

Mr. REED. Will the chairman of the committee yield?

Mr. FLOOD. I will.

Mr. REED. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs may perhaps enlighten me on this point: I am inter-

ested to know what the gentleman's opinion is as to Germany's position in regard to alleviating the condition of American prisoners. Does he believe that Germany will cooperate in any way to let America, or the prisoners' friends in America, alleviate their condition?

Mr. FLOOD. I believe it has to be carefully watched and the rights and interests of our prisoners insisted upon, and I believe if that is done they will be taken care of for fear of retaliation on our part if they are not.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 40 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ROGERS], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I desire to address myself to-day in some detail to the status of the mail service between the United States and the members of the American Expeditionary Force in France. The House will remember that a week ago to-day a resolution was adopted without debate, which I had previously introduced, which called upon the Postmaster General to furnish the House with certain information on that subject. On January 31 the Postmaster General made his report to the House, and that report has been printed as House Document No. 892. I have here on the desk a number of copies, in case Members may care to consult it, or, of course, they can get it as usual through the document room.

Here is perhaps the key sentence of Mr. Burleson's report:

The time required to transmit postal matter from the United States to members of the American Expeditionary Force in France has been found to be from 15 to 30 days, according to the location or frequency of change of the location of the military unit to which the addressee belongs and according to the regularity of the ocean transportation.

Mr. Burleson continues:

Instances have been reported where letters from the Middle West, mailed so as to make close connection with departing French liner or fast transport, have reached addressees at the front in from 12 to 14 days.

And he proceeds:

Owing to the irregularity of sailings from New York and constant shifting of military units, about 30 days, on an average, should be allowed for the average letter from the United States to reach the camps in France.

But the substance of the report, as I said, is that the time required to transmit postal matter from the United States to the members of our expeditionary force is from 15 to 30 days.

I confess I was very much surprised at that statement of the Postmaster General. Let me say at the outset that I do not approach this matter in a controversial spirit or in a critical spirit. I have no desire to comment adversely upon the Post Office Department or upon any other department or upon any individual.

But I am impelled to say this: Although Mr. Burleson, of course, believes his statement to be true, there are at least 150,000 American soldiers in France to-day, from Gen. Pershing down to the newest recruit in the American forces, who can testify of personal knowledge that his statement does not represent the usual fact. There are 150,000 homes in the United States who from their own bitter experience know how wide of the mark his statement is.

I had expected that the Postmaster General in his report would recognize that there were very considerable postal delays, would indicate that the usual time of mail in transit was a very much greater period than that which he mentions, and that he would then go on to indicate what changes he proposed to make in order to bring about the sorely needed improvement. But he begins with the hypothesis that it takes from 15 to 30 days for the transit; he continues in a tenor which indicates that he is perfectly satisfied with the conditions to-day, and that in his judgment they are not capable of improvement.

So, under those circumstances, it becomes my first duty to set forth what I believe to be the fact as to the time which is actually required to transmit mail from the United States to members of the American Expeditionary Force in France.

Members of the House will pardon me if I allude to a personal experience which befell me in December when I was in France and on my way from Paris by train to the headquarters of the American troops. I found myself, quite by accident, in a railroad compartment seating six, with five officers of the American forces on their way back from Paris to the front. Three of them happened to be personal acquaintances. And without any suggestion of mine, because at that time I had never heard this question even discussed, they began to talk about the mail service. All of these five men are widely known on both sides of the ocean, so that it can not be argued that their experience resulted from their own obscurity or from difficulty in tracing their whereabouts. These are the facts about their experiences with the mail as jotted down by me in my journal at the time:

Gen. A had sailed from the United States on September 25. The date of this railway journey was December 11. His wife had written him daily during that time. He had received only five of her letters. He had received none by mail for 47 days.

Lieut. B had sailed from the United States on August 25. He was a subscriber to two Boston daily newspapers. He had received but five issues in all and but five letters.

Lieut. C had sailed from France on September 26. His mother had written him regularly twice a week; only four of the letters had reached him, the last dated October 23, about seven weeks prior to the time of our conversation.

Capt. D had been in France since June 1. Although his wife had written to him weekly, as he knew from other sources of information, he had received but one letter from her since his arrival.

Col. E sailed from the United States about September 20. All his wife's letters to him are numbered in the order of her writing. Letter No. 1, dated September 23, reached him November 30. A friend brought over letter No. 15, dated November 11. He had received only one other up to the date of our conversation. He had received none of the second-class mail which had been sent him.

A few days after that time, and about the middle of December, I was at a small town in which a portion of the American troops are undergoing training, not very far from general headquarters. I asked the officer in charge of the military post office if I might examine the letters which were in his post office awaiting delivery, and ascertain for myself the dates when those letters had been canceled in the United States. I secured that opportunity, and I examined, I think, every letter which had come from the United States and which was awaiting delivery to the soldiers. This was the middle of December. Not one of those letters was canceled on a date as late as November 1. In other words, as a minimum—and I can assure the Members of the House that this does not at all indicate the maximum of delay—as a minimum, at least seven weeks had elapsed between the date of cancellation in New York City, for example, and the moment when I examined them as they were there in the post office awaiting delivery.

I talked, of course, with a great many officers and soldiers of the American forces. I talked with them from Gen. Pershing down to the youngest and most recently arrived private. I never saw so uncomplaining a body of men from the top to the bottom. They had no complaint about their equipment, about their food, about their billets, or about the training methods; but almost without exception, and without any drumming up on my part, every man, from major general down, said: "Can anything be done to improve the mail situation?"

Some of them would add, "We do not care so much on our own account, but it troubles the people at home to know that we are not getting their letters." I told them—and I am sure the Members of the House would have told them—that we should and must do everything that can be done in order to bring about an improvement.

Mr. Chairman, of course, we have a war on our hands. Of course, military exigencies must come first. But the condition with which I deal is not a mere sentimental matter. It is not merely a question of the feelings of the soldiers themselves, or of their wives or parents at home. Those considerations are extremely important, but there is the military aspect, also. Upon the morale of an army hangs a very large portion of its utility and excellence. If the morale of these soldiers is suffering, their training and fighting ability will also suffer. I submit to Members of the House that nothing can be easily conceived that will tend to lower the morale of those men more than to feel either that their people at home are neglecting them by not writing or that the Postal Service is so negligent and so slack that the United States is not able to deliver their mail in a reasonable time.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I had an illustration of that very line called to my attention recently in the case of a soldier who had been sick for a long time, who kept writing home and asking his parents why they did not write to him. He was not able to hear from them for 30 days. At the same time they were continually writing letters to him and were unable to reach him, until I found ways of communicating with him through channels outside of the ordinary.

Mr. ROGERS. The men of the American forces abroad realize that there is a 3,500-mile ocean between their homes and themselves, and that of course they can not expect the kind of service that we demand in this country. I do not think they are unreasonable about it. I do not think that they fail to realize

that war exigencies must come first, or assert that the problem is wholly easy with a submarine-infested ocean between them and their homes.

But they do ask that everything possible shall be done. They have gotten rather beyond the point of expecting packages to reach them. They have gotten beyond the point of expecting that when packages do come they will come in an unbroken condition. Time after time it has happened that when packages arrive the wrappers have been broken and the contents have been rifled, if not altogether removed.

They have gotten over expecting to receive newspapers, simply because newspapers do not come. The soldiers recognize that things which take up bulk in trans-Atlantic liners can not, perhaps, be cared for with the same ease and celerity that letter mail can be. They ask of the American people that at least their letter mail shall be delivered to them as expeditiously and as safely as is possible.

Mr. KNUTSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. KNUTSON. Is the gentleman from Massachusetts aware of the fact that the conditions he speaks of as existing in Europe also exist in some of the camps in this country? For instance, Jefferson Barracks mail from Minnesota is 10 to 12 days old when it finally reaches the hands of the soldiers at Jefferson Barracks.

Mr. ROGERS. I have heard statements of that kind. But I think the problem of postal service between here and the expeditionary forces in France is an entirely different one. I prefer to-day to address myself to the over-seas aspect, which will be of even greater importance as time goes by and as our troops in France become much more numerous. If the service has failed to care for the mail of 150,000 men, what will happen when one or two million of our men are in France?

Mr. KEARNS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. KEARNS. Has the gentleman made any investigation as to whether the trouble is on this side or on the other side?

Mr. ROGERS. I will come to that in a moment.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I intended to call the gentleman's attention to a question in relation to the case that I alluded to, which was down at San Antonio, and that is that if the postal authorities are so negligent in a case like that, what will happen to our soldiers abroad?

Mr. COOPER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. COOPER of Ohio. I have received several letters from a gentleman in my district who has a son in France, and he tells me it is almost impossible to get mail to his son. Do you know whether there is any effort being made on the part of the authorities in this country to try to see whether the mail gets to our soldiers boys in France?

Mr. ROGERS. I will give to the gentleman a copy of the report by the Postmaster General which has just been transmitted to the House, and which indicates the present prospect, or rather the lack of prospect.

Now, Mr. Chairman, at the risk of being somewhat wearisome, I am going to read extracts from 15 or 20 of the very many letters which I have received, because they present actual and recent cases. The Post Office Department will tell you, if you take this matter up with it, that it wants specific cases. It is my purpose, so far as possible, to cooperate with the Post Office Department by furnishing specific illustration of the conditions which I believe exist.

I shall not read into the RECORD the names of the people who have written me, but I shall be very happy indeed to furnish those names to the Post Office Department if they desire them in connection with any investigation. I shall also be very glad to offer any information that I have and to render any assistance that I can to the Post Office Department in running down the difficulties and in correcting them if possible.

I have here, for example, a letter from a man in Massachusetts, who is chairman of a local draft board. He says:

When the mails are delayed it causes both Mrs. K. and myself some worry. I am inclosing a copy of my son's letter, in which he says his mother's letter of August 12 has just been received November 29. Now, that is the kind of thing that gets on one's nerves. The longest his letters to us have been on the way was four weeks, which is not so bad. Most of them came through in three weeks, which is very good, all things considered. Either Mrs. K., my daughter, or myself write each week in turn. We do not wish to overburden the mails by writing oftener, but how we do wish that our letters could be delivered promptly and that we could feel sure that, barring accidents, he gets them all.

I think that as I proceed the Members will find that almost all the letters which discuss that phase of the case indicate that much the worse delays arise going east to France, and

that, on the whole, the service coming from France is as expeditious as can perhaps be expected.

Mr. TILSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. With pleasure.

Mr. TILSON. Does the gentleman intend later in his remarks to speak of the debarkation facilities?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. TILSON. And the congestion of mails at the points of debarkation?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes; I shall come to that in just a moment. I shall be very glad to have the gentleman's observations on that point, because I confess I have not the detailed information which I should like.

Mr. TEMPLE. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. ROGERS. With pleasure.

Mr. TEMPLE. With regard to delays to mail coming this way, the letters are not always promptly sent. I have received only two letters from a soldier in France, one of which was 39 days on the way and the other 41 days on the way.

Mr. ROGERS. I was trying to put the best foot forward for the department. I think it is unquestionably true that the service is much less delayed coming this way than going the other way.

Here is a letter from the president of a national bank—and I may say that the only bright spot in this mail situation is that the delays fall upon the just and the unjust, upon the rich and the poor, upon the high and the low alike. The Postal Service favors nobody. It is equally bad to all. [Applause.]

This letter says:

I have a son in the medical branch of the service in France whose mail is sent in care of chief surgeon, lines of communication. It takes from six to eight weeks for him to receive a letter from the United States, and there were sent four Christmas packages on November 5 and about the 15th; that to 6th of January, 1918, had not reached him. These packages were all within the limit of 7 pounds and two wood cases. The first Christmas box, sent November 3, was received December 11, and then the four others not at all up until January 6.

The letters written home from France are received in from 16 to 30 days, usually in about three weeks, but the letters from the States to him are very irregular, and to obtain a reply from a letter sent to France one must figure on about 12 weeks, at the least.

Here is a letter which came to me in my absence on the other side, but which is typical of scores which I have received and of which I shall read only a few:

I am writing this letter in interest of boys in the One hundred and first Regiment now in France.

Every letter I have read, either personal or in the newspapers, the fellows all want to know why people don't write to them. I, for one, have written 35 letters and my husband complains he has only received 2. It can't be on account of the wrong address, for surely some one would write the address correctly.

I think you will agree with me that nothing would make those soldiers happier than to get mail from home.

Here is a letter from a physician in my home city of Lowell, whose son is a lieutenant in the expeditionary force:

Would again ask your help in securing better facilities for reaching the men in France with comforts of various kinds. I have sent seven parcels to him (my son) for personal use and that of his command to the value of about \$140. Only one parcel has reached him—December 26—which left here October 2. One of his company received a parcel which had been opened and two or three pairs of heavy socks removed. Cases of this kind seem too frequent to be an accident.

Here is a letter from a neighbor of mine whose son is abroad:

My son has been in France since August, but has received less than a half a dozen letters from home. For the past six weeks in every letter he states the fact, "Still no mail from home." I average writing five letters a week. In his last letter he mentions on that day receiving two letters from me with widely different dates, one dated October 1, the other a date in November.

A Mrs. Quinn writes:

The family and friends have written almost daily to the young man ever since he left with the troops, but all of his letters from the other side express great surprise at not hearing from his friends, and great anxiety because he does not hear. A letter received only a few days ago by one of his friends here in Lowell inquired whether his parents were all right, and wished the friend to tell them that he was anxiously awaiting mail from them.

Mrs. Quinn was greatly distressed that their letters had not been received by the young man, as they had been faithful correspondents, and was wondering if there was any way in which Mr. ROGERS could ascertain why they had not been delivered. Of course, the failure of a single letter (or of two or three letters) to reach the young man could not be wondered at, but she can not understand why all letters from both family and friends have gone astray.

Here is a letter from a Frenchwoman:

Friends of mine who went away with the Eleventh Engineer Corps in July had as many as 15 packages addressed to them, and not one of them has been received. My two sons are on the eve of their departure for dear France to be on Gen. Pershing's staff. Now, a mother's heart is at stake. All I have left is to write and send little delicacies to my dear boys—the only children I have ever had. Yes; my sacrifice is complete, but all for the sacred cause.

A little touch of home is a whole lot to the lonely soldier in the trenches.

And we all know that that is true. [Applause.]

Here is a letter from a man in Lawrence, Mass.:

We took great pains to early forward articles to our boy in Paris, France. To be more specific, on November 8, 1917, I mailed at the Lawrence post office (personally) a package of combination paper and envelopes.

On November 9, 1917, I mailed (delivered personally) at the Lawrence post office one box with Christmas articles from all members of the family.

We have received from my boy during the last two months mail every two weeks on the average, but until he had been away from home two months, from September 12, 1917, he heard nothing from us. Up to January 18, 1918 (the date of his last letter), he had not received the articles I have mentioned.

Here is a letter from a Vermont friend:

Lots of our boys from here have had no letters; and, as I go among people, it is hard to keep spirits up when the lad is writing "no letters; why doesn't mother write?"

Here is a letter from a constituent of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LONGWORTH]:

There certainly must be something radically wrong. Packages, Christmas boxes, mailed and packed and examined by the Post Office Department as being in good condition before November 14 have not been received up to December 27.

I am only one who has given up all we have, our two sons, who are in the Rainbow Division. I can fully appreciate that the Government has its hands full, but we feel that some consideration and feeling should be shown those brave boys over there somewhere and those they have left.

You will notice that throughout this correspondence there is no bitterness, no vindictiveness, of attack. We find everywhere an expression of regret that the conditions are as they are, and the expression of a hope that something may be done.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Recently I received a letter from a number of ladies at Council Bluffs, who are mothers of boys who are across in France, and who sent a joint communication to me. They state that of the parcels that they had sent they were satisfied that at least 90 per cent had never reached the soldiers to whom they were consigned, and never would.

Mr. ROGERS. I had a letter yesterday from Pittsburg, Kans., a town of which the gentleman from Iowa may know the location, but of which I had not previously heard, I regret to say. This letter says:

I have sent my son in France four boxes. Two I sent October 23 via New York, the others we sent since Christmas. I received a cablegram yesterday telling me he had received nothing. Can you imagine, Mr. ROGERS, a boy 19 years of age, away over there among strangers in this terrible conflict? Christmas came and nothing from mother. I do hope you will take this up and investigate this. I am only one among hundreds here in Pittsburg that have had the same experience. We pay all the postage the Government requires, and would be only too glad to insure them if we were allowed to. I insured one box for \$5 to Camp Mills, N. Y., before the boys sailed; that was never received. I put in a claim here at the office two months ago. The postmaster told me to-day I might not hear about it for two years, and may never hear.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. ROGERS. This is dated January 29.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly.

Mr. SLOAN. I desire to say that Pittsburg, Kans., is considerable of a city in the southeastern part of the Sunflower State, consisting of houses built almost entirely around the residence of our distinguished colleague, Mr. PHILIP PITT CAMPBELL. [Applause.]

Mr. ROGERS. I apologize to the sunflowers. Here is a letter which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FESS] has just handed me, and which I will read at his request:

As I have read in this morning's paper that the question of mail to American troops in France has been brought to the attention of the House of Representatives, I am emboldened to write what I have been wanting to write for some time. And I am writing on behalf of many families of soldiers in France, as well as for myself.

I have an 18-year-old boy with the Rainbow Division in France. I have written to him every three days, or twice a week, ever since he left home. The last letter I received from him was written December 10, and at that time he had received two letters from me after arriving in France. Other boys from this town have written that they had received none of the letters their families were sending in a steady stream.

We have not heard whether our Christmas boxes ever reached the boys, for it is almost a month since we received letters from them, although about 10 days ago every officer's family here received letters; some four and six at once.

We have tried to be patient and uncomplaining, for we know the transportation difficulties and that the Government has so many problems to solve, but it is getting to be very hard. An army of homesick boys abroad and a lot of heart-sick mothers at home will not be very efficient aids in winning the war. There surely is need of an investigation of the matter, and I am sure that you will do all in your power to help us keep in touch with our boys.

Here is another letter somewhat in the same vein:

As you have recently returned from the "war zone," I take this liberty to write you concerning my two brothers who are with the American Army in France.

My brothers left the States in the fall of 1917 with the One hundred and first Infantry. Since then my family has written at least two letters a week to them. In addition to this several parcels have also been sent.

I am just in receipt of a letter from my brother Charles, in which he says that he has received no news from me since he left home. All of his recent letters are written in a disheartened manner as if he were led to believe that the folks at home had forgotten him. This also applies to the letters of my other brother, Thomas.

I have three or more letters of somewhat the same character which I ask unanimous consent to have incorporated in my remarks without reading.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. HOUSTON). The gentleman from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent to insert letters in the Record as a part of his remarks. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The letters are as follows:

A soldier writing under date of January 1, 1918, to his mother asks why she did not write? Dated August 8, 1917.

A captain writes his aunt that he has not received her letter nor from his sisters. Packages sent him failed to show up. He also sailed August 8, 1917.

My oldest son has been in France since August 12, 1917, and I have written to him every week since then, but yet he has only received one of my letters. My youngest son landed in France the latter part of last September and he has only received one of my letters and one from his sister, and during the first week of last November I sent my sons each a watch as a remembrance of Christmas and they have not received them yet, and during the second week of December last I sent my younger son a razor and wool socks and he has not received them yet.

A letter written in France September 22, 1917, was not delivered to me until November 2, 1917. I wrote a reply at once and posted it the same day, November 2; this was not received in France until December 19, 1917, and the reply, dated December 19, was not received here until January 20, which was, of course, a trifle better time. A member of the United States Engineers informs me that he writes every week. I do not receive one letter in three weeks. During the months of October and November I sent by first-class postage, sealed, 10 packages, the contents of each package being worth from \$2 to \$6, and the postage costing from 60 cents to \$1.67. Not one of these packages had been received on the 19th day of December. I also sent 10 Christmas packages, all by first-class postage, some packages costing as much as \$1.64. I, up to this time, have not had one of these packages acknowledged. The Post Office Department refuses absolutely to register any package, so one does not have any recourse whatever, nor any means of tracing. I also gave in October, 1917, \$10 to the American Tobacco Co. to furnish 40 tobacco kits to as many soldiers, but only five have so far been acknowledged. Judging from the gratitude expressed on the 5 cards received, the other 35 could not have been received by any soldiers at the front.

What becomes of these packages? I have been informed by persons who have been in France recently that they are appropriated in France by persons handling the mails, but, of course, have no means of proving this statement. No wonder soldiers are losing their morale. Exposed to danger and hardship and then to feel themselves deserted and neglected by people at home from whom they have every right to expect care and consideration. A terrible injustice is being done. In my personal case, many sacrifices were made to send these packages, and then for them not to reach the person for whom they were intended causes one to become very skeptical to say the least.

There certainly can be no justification of delays in transit of from six to eight weeks. It would seem that parcels-post packages, in many instances, do not reach their destination at all.

HON. JOHN F. MILLER, M. C.,
Washington, D. C.
SEATTLE, January 28, 1918.

MY DEAR FRIEND JOHN: By unanimous request of the auxiliary of the Signal Corps, which is composed of the relatives of the boys of the One hundred and sixteenth Field Battalion, I am directed to ask you if there is any possibility of our being enabled to hear from our boys who are now somewhere in France and who left Camp Mills supposedly on the 25th or 26th of November, except when we pick up a morning paper and read an obituary notice, as we did Saturday morning when we read that Young Austin, with whom you are well acquainted, died of pneumonia. I have taken this matter up with the Secretary of War to see why we could not at least hear how they are but have had no reply.

Mrs. DeHahn, the police matron, with whom you are acquainted, whose only son is in France with my boy, called me up and said if she did not have some word from her boy she would go crazy. The only word we have had was written on the way over and mailed when they landed. On December 22 the auxiliary sent a Christmas cablegram to the commanding officer of the battalion, but we have never heard from it. We have sent the battalion money, knitted goods, and many other useful articles. We do not expect to have them give us their personal opinion of how the war should be operated, but we do not see why we can't have some word as to how they are getting along.

I appreciate that I can talk to you as a friend and as a fraternal brother, and I am going to ask you if you will endeavor to bring some influence to bear or offer some reasonable excuse why we can not have some word. I know I am not exaggerating when I say that I have 10 telephone calls a day from anxious parents. The maddest man in town is C. B. Bagley. His son Cecil commands Company C of the One hundred and sixteenth Battalion, and he has not had a word from him.

G. M. BUTTERWORTH.

Mr. SEARS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. SEARS. Have these letters been called to the attention of the Post Office Department?

Mr. ROGERS. I have sent a copy of the recent letters regularly to the department. Although I have not read the names of the writers, I am willing to give them to the department and to cooperate with any investigation that it may care to make.

Mr. SEARS. Does not the gentleman think it would be well to take this matter up first with the department?

Mr. ROGERS. I have repeatedly done so. Is the gentleman from Florida familiar with the report to the House of the Postmaster General, in which he says that the time required to transmit to France letters is 15 to 30 days? That statement is the basis of my remarks, made upon no less authority than the Postmaster General himself.

Mr. SEARS. The gentleman is aware that the mails are in a congested condition, as we all know.

Mr. ROGERS. I am coming to that now.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I want to submit to the gentleman a letter along the same lines which I have received from a constituent in Seattle.

Mr. ROGERS. I will take that and print it with others without reading. The inquiry of the gentleman from Florida leads us naturally to a consideration of where this delay arises. The journey of a letter or other piece of mail from its place of posting in the United States until it is delivered to the soldier in France consists, roughly speaking, of four steps. First, the transit from the point of posting to the dock in New York or any other port which may be the embarkation point; second, the ocean voyage; third, the journey of the letter from the point of disembarkation in France to the point where it is delivered over to the military authorities somewhere in the American area; fourth, the handling by the military authorities and the delivery by them to the soldier who is the addressee. I want to take up each of the four stages.

The gentleman from Connecticut referred a few moments ago to the conditions prior to the placing of the mail on the ocean steamer. I have not as definite information on that subject as I should like. I desire, however, to read a letter which I recently received from a correspondent whom I do not know. He signs his name and gives his address:

I was employed in the capacity of a temporary clerk in the New York post office, Station W, from December 5 to January 1. During my time in Station W was considered sentimental in regards to my care of soldiers' mail. I attributed this to my care of the packages addressed to them; they would be more cherished than the ordinary. Being transferred to the foreign station, I was surprised to find mail stacked as high as the ceiling for the warships and forces in France, so neglected they were using shovels to make passageway for workers to pass, and conditions were such that we walked upon broken packages—their contents such as puddings, candy, mufflers, handkerchiefs, socks, etc., things which would be almost impossible to replace in their respective packages.

That is substantially all the specific information I have as to conditions before letters are actually put on board the mail-carrying vessel. Of course we know that there is a slowing up of mails in this country. We know, as a gentleman suggested a little while ago, that there is difficulty even in sending mail to soldiers in American camps. And yet I think the delay which is consequent upon handling within the United States is, on the whole, rather slight.

The Postmaster General, as I have pointed out, says that the average time from the sender in the United States to the addressee in France is two to four weeks. I have shown that, if my own experience is at all a criterion, the minimum time is nearer seven weeks than two weeks. I do not think that a very large part of that disparity is to be explained by the situation which prevails on this side of the ocean.

So we come to the second stage of the journey of a letter. I had supposed that the Postmaster General would lay a good deal of emphasis upon the time consumed in the ocean transit, because we all know what conditions are on the Atlantic; that war requirements can not be made subordinate to postal exigencies; and that as long as the war lasts and the submarine is a factor delays in the 3,000 miles of ocean voyage will inevitably exist. Here is what the Postmaster General says on this point in his report:

Mail is dispatched from New York on all available commercial liners and transports. I am informed that letter mail clears entirely with every dispatch, although occasionally, which is exceptional, the lack of space on liners or transports causes parcel post or paper mail to fall back on the next outgoing ship.

In other words, all letter mail goes on the first vessel after its arrival at the port of New York, but occasionally and exceptionally other mail, including newspapers and packages, has to wait one ship, but no more. That, I think, is a very creditable and, to me, a rather surprising state of affairs.

Then the Postmaster General gives a list of the sailings from the port of New York beginning November 1 and ending January 25. I will not read those dates in detail. They appear in his report. There were 10 in November, 5 in December, and 9 in January up to January 25. There was a departure, on an average, every three and a half days, and the maximum time intervening between the departures was seven days. I think, all things considered, that is creditable to the Post Office Department, and it indicates that the fault is not in getting the letters on board of the steamers destined for Europe.

With regard to the time consumed in the ocean transit the Postmaster General says:

The time that elapses between the loading of the mail on a commercial liner and its arrival at a French port varies from 10 to 14 days, according to the speed of the ship or its route across the ocean. Mail on transports is loaded whenever and to the extent that the Army has space available, but it does not follow that transports sail directly for their destination immediately upon being loaded. Mail placed on transports has arrived in France sometimes in 12 days and sometimes as much as 21 days after being loaded in this country.

In other words, the Postmaster General says that sometimes only 10 days and sometimes as much as 3 weeks is consumed in the actual steamer voyage. That statement should be compared with the minimum of 7 weeks which I found in one military post office in France to have elapsed between the posting in the United States and the time when the letter was ready for delivery. It should also be noted that in the 5 weeks between November 3 and December 7, just prior to my visit to that military post office, 10 mail-carrying vessels had left New York. Yet no letter with a United States post mark as late as November 1 was there. So I think, on the whole, that neither the first step nor the second step can explain any considerable part of the delay.

I doubt, as I said a moment ago, whether the delay from the point of posting to the point of embarkation is very serious or can be very greatly reduced—perhaps a day or two at the outside. I doubt if, as long as the submarine continues to be a menace, we can very materially reduce the time at present consumed in crossing the Atlantic.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes more to the gentleman.

Mr. ROGERS. So we come to the third and fourth stages of the journey, from the point of disembarkation in France to the point where the letters are turned over to the military authorities, and then the time consumed in the handling and delivery by the military authorities. I am frank to say that I have not been able to get any very detailed information why the delay to eastbound mail comes in either of those two places, or both. It is only, you will observe, by the process of elimination that I am forced to the conclusion it must be somewhere either in the third or the fourth stage. Letters coming west frequently come in 3 weeks from the time they are posted by the soldier, and sometimes they come in about 2 weeks. Ocean congestion can not be the explanation of the great difference between 2 or 3 weeks and 7 or 8 weeks. It would seem that the explanation—at least in part—is that the task of collecting the letters from the various points where they are posted by the members of the expeditionary forces is very much less than the task of pushing them out to the almost infinite number of points where the letters have to go in order to be distributed to the addressees. I shall come in a moment to what I conceive to be the way to ascertain exactly what the facts are.

I have said more than once in my remarks that we are at war and that we can not expect a smoothness and celerity of service which would be characteristic of peace times. We can not overlook the obstacles which are in the way of perfect service; we can not overlook the paramount things which must be cared for, even prior to the soldiers' mail. But we can fairly compare our military postal service with that of our cobelligerents. Take the case of Great Britain. The very fact that we have an ocean between us and our soldiers is only an additional reason why we should avoid all the avoidable delays. We can not avoid the unavoidable, and ocean transit is one of the unavoidable things. Great Britain, of course, does not have to contend with an ocean. But she has to load every piece of mail upon a cross-channel steamer, carry it across, and unload it at the other end. She has an army on the west front of two or three million men, perhaps twelve or fifteen times the size of ours now in France. One of the members of the British mission who has recently been in this country, and who only a few days ago returned to be surgeon general of the British forces, told me that during the first two years of the war, when he was much of the time in or near the trenches, he habitually received a letter written by his wife in the west of England one morning on the following afternoon—habitually received the letter the day following its posting in Cornwall. That illustrates the wonderful system that has been achieved in the case of Great Britain. While we can not, with an ocean in between which takes from 10 days to 3 weeks to cross, approximate that record, I think we can regard it as our goal, of course making a due allowance for the necessary time for the ocean voyage. The day I sailed home from France,

which was on the 22d day of December, three days before Christmas, the following article appeared in the Paris press. It is a signed letter by Mr. Harold Ashton, with the British Army in France, dated Friday, December 21:

FRIDAY.

Santa Claus has already arrived in the shell holes around the Hindenburg line, and the preliminaries of our fourth Christmas at the front have begun very merrily and in the most seasonable weather. This is, of course, the biggest Christmas of the war for good wishes, good cheer, and good things. It is certainly the best organized, and wonderful things are being performed to this end by the tireless officials of the army post office. It is all sheer wizardry. Regents Park Post Office is linked up with the trench line, where our soldiers lie in their fuzzy coats gazing into the mists of Flanders or watching the grim shadows of Bourlon Wood. Forty-five hours ago a lass in Aberdeen posted a pretty card to her lad at the front, she knew not where. This morning it was delivered to him as he crouched watching the frosted towers of Cambrai rising out of the haze.

THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND BAGS IN A DAY.

The army post office in France has made preparations this Christmas for receiving 200,000 bags above the normal, equalling 25,000 bags per day. This figure has already been exceeded one day this week, 34,000 bags being received from England. Everything is working smoothly, and so well is the machinery running that the whole of the Christmas mail will be delivered to all parts of the battle front before Christmas Day. Normally the Army writes 8,500,000 letters every week. This week the number is doubled, and the lorry service has had to be increased accordingly.

I think we can agree that that was a very remarkable achievement, but I do not think we are willing to agree to that, making due allowance for the geography of our positions, we can not do exactly as well for an Army not one-tenth as large. That is the goal to be sought. We should not content ourselves with the condition which now exists, and which we all know from our correspondence is bringing about so much grief and hardship both to the soldiers and to the fathers and mothers and wives at home.

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly.

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. The gentleman is making a very interesting statement, a part of which unfortunately I have not been able to hear. I believe he has traced the American mail to the point of disembarkation in Europe. After the mail reaches Europe, into the hands of what postal authorities is it distributed, and what suggestion has the gentleman as a remedy as to that?

Mr. ROGERS. Here is what the Postmaster General says upon that point:

The time required for the railways to transport this mail to the camps or stations of the American force is from one to two days, according to the distance or location of the troops.

I am informed that this mail is turned over promptly to the duly designated mail orderlies of the military units to which it is addressed and that no mail for the troops is held at any of the field postal stations. Military orderlies open the lead-sealed sacks and distribute the individual pieces of mail to the soldiers to whom they are addressed, or mail is readdressed by them and forwarded to individual officers or men who may have been transferred to other stations.

That is all that bears on that particular point. Let me repeat this before I yield again: My criticism is not addressed to the Post Office Department or to the Postmaster General or to any other department or individual of the Government. I know what the condition is that exists. I know that the letter of the Postmaster General does not deal with the condition, which I suspect the gentleman from Arkansas and certainly I found to exist on the other side. What I want to find out is how we shall deal with the situation in the light of the facts that we know to exist in order to bring about an improvement. I have stated that in the first and second steps of the journey of a letter to France apparently no great avoidable delay occurs. The Postmaster General says that only one or two days is required to move a letter from the point of disembarkation in France to the point where it is delivered over to the military orderlies. If these statements are all true, the only place that is left for delay is after it reaches the Army in France. Yet a great deal of delay certainly ensues somewhere, because I have proven, I think, that many of these letters, perhaps most of them, take seven weeks as a minimum to reach their destination. If it is the Army that is responsible, let us see how we can help the Army to remedy the defects. If it is the congestion in New York City which is at fault, let us see how we can remedy that. If it is the railroads in France, if it is the handling of the mail by our allies in France or England, let us see what we can do to meet the defect there. But the Postmaster General, and I say this with extreme deference, does not help us very much in his report to know where the fault really is.

My proposal specifically is this: Let us have the Postmaster General or the President or Congress appoint a strong commission, men who are big men in the abstract and men who are big men in postal work. I speak of men of the type of the former First Assistant Postmaster General, Mr. Roper, and

former Postmaster General Hitchcock. I do not know that either of them is available in fact. But let us have men who are strong men, men who can look into this problem from the moment the letter is posted in Arkansas or in Kansas or in Massachusetts, who can trace it all the way to New York, who can follow it across the ocean, who can follow it through its disembarkation processes on the other side, who can trace it on its way to the military authorities who receive it, and can follow every step after it passes into the hands of these military authorities. I submit that nothing tangible is being done at this moment to improve the service, and that something ought to be done, something should be done, not only in fairness to these boys and their families but, as a military measure, in fairness to the United States as a whole. We must demand that everything possible be done in order to keep at the crest the morale of our soldiers in France.

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. I will.

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. To what fact does the gentleman ascribe the fault of the fairly prompt delivery of mail after it reaches France? In other words, to what extent are soldiers being shifted from one camp to another, so as to lose their addresses from time to time?

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman's opinion about that is as good as mine. He, too, has just been in France. Most of the men I happened to encounter, men who are from my neighborhood and whom I know personally, were located at a particular city or town or village, where they remained for a good many weeks or months. At all events, although the Postmaster General properly says that in some cases there are delays arising from the shifting of troops, it does not seem as if the unbroken testimony which my mail and, I suspect, the gentleman's mail reveals can be explained on the theory that the soldiers have been moved. Mr. Chairman, how much time have I remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has about expired; he has but one minute more.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I would like to ask the gentleman if he did not ascertain that the ordinary mail route of mail for the American expeditionary forces was from the port of disembarkation in France to general headquarters in Paris?

Mr. ROGERS. I think that is true.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Did not the gentleman ascertain that considerable delay was occasioned through subdistribution at that point in Paris—the Hotel Mediterranean?

Mr. ROGERS. I repeatedly heard that statement, but I did not hear it, as perhaps the gentleman did, from one who had direct knowledge.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I would like further to ask the gentleman if, while he was at the Hotel Mediterranean, the mail headquarters in Paris, he did not see large quantities of mail there that had not been delivered and had been there for many days and some for many weeks?

Mr. ROGERS. I did not go there. The gentleman is inclined to think, from his experience, that the delay occurs in France?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I certainly am from my investigation, and I think I will be borne out in that by every gentleman that was with the congressional party who went there.

Mr. ROGERS. That, of course, was my own impression.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I yield the gentleman another five minutes.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Of course, it is exceedingly difficult for men of the House, with every desire to be fair and to be acquisitive of information, to know exactly how responsibility should be apportioned. I have preferred in my remarks to-day to deal with the facts that I know exist and with the delays which I know occur between the time the letters are posted and the time they are delivered. I do not think it is our function, however interested we doubtless are, to attempt to try to subdivide the blame for these conditions.

Mr. COX. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. In just a moment. I earnestly hope able men can be appointed to consider this whole matter in an official way, to apportion the responsibility, and to reorganize and readjust as they find necessary. It ought not to be a very difficult matter to obviate all possible delay. If the difficulty arises because of shortage of help, as I heard suggested in France a number of times, that condition can not be tolerated. If the Postmaster General has not enough help for that purpose, or if our military forces have not been assigned enough postal clerks for that purpose, they should only ask Congress for what is needed in order to have it the very next instant. [Applause.]

Mr. COX. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. COX. To what point in France do the military authorities take charge of our mail?

Mr. ROGERS. Of course, our troops are fairly well scattered over France, but I understand that the great bulk of our letters go to Paris for reappportionment among the several postal sectors which our Army occupies.

Mr. COX. Would the gentleman be permitted to tell the ports at which our vessels are permitted to land over there? Then that will lead me up to the other question.

Mr. ROGERS. I should prefer not to mention the name of the ports, although I think it is a matter of common knowledge that the ports in the Bay of Biscay are the ports which are mainly utilized.

Mr. COX. Then all up to that port the civil side of our Government has charge of our mail?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. COX. Then our Government still maintains charge and custody and control of our mail from that port through to Paris, does it?

Mr. ROGERS. That is true.

Mr. COX. It is distributed in the city of Paris still by the civil side of our Government?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. COX. Then it does not reach the military side of our Government until after it passes on through Paris and to the line somewhere, does it?

Mr. ROGERS. As I understand it, that is true provided the letter goes through Paris. For example, a unit stationed at one of the ports would have its mail segregated so that it would not go to Paris and come all the way back. It would be dropped at the point of disembarkation and be delivered there. But, subject to that qualification, I think the gentleman's statement is true.

Mr. COX. I have been told that we had 38 mail stations from the time that our mail landed in the port until it was finally delivered. Now, where is the main distributing point, or center, of our mail? Is it at the port, in the city of Paris, or on the line? Does the gentleman know?

Mr. ROGERS. I do not feel qualified to answer that with certainty. I should say that the main postal center was Paris. Then we have a number of military postal subdivisions or distributing points, and those are scattered about according to the location of the troops at the moment.

Mr. COX. Let me ask this question; I am trying to get information: Did the gentleman run across Mr. John Clark anywhere over there?

Mr. ROGERS. I did not.

Mr. COX. Does anyone here know where he is located there?

A MEMBER. I think he is on a homestead there. [Laughter.]

Mr. COX. A Member says he is on a homestead there, but he is not. He is a mighty big man. He is a man that has been engaged in the mail transportation for the last 20 or 25 years. In looking for a big man I do not know where you could get a bigger one, unless you could get John C. Koons.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Will the gentleman yield for a moment? Our information in Paris was that the mail, generally, for the expeditionary force was sent to Paris, and from Paris distributed to the various military sectors.

Mr. COX. Then our mail never reaches distribution at the hands of the military until it passes out of Paris?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. No. As soon as it leaves Paris it is in the hands of the American military forces. That is what we were informed.

Mr. COX. That is just what I wanted to know.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. COX. I want to ask one more question.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I yield one minute more, in order that the gentleman may answer a question.

Mr. COX. If the fault occurs at the time the mail leaves Paris for the line, the blame attaches to the military and not to the postal department, does it not?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I was told that while in Paris that Paris was the general distributing center. There are a lot of mail clerks detached from service in this country who are sent there in the Postal Service. At the moment they have their headquarters in Paris, and I was told that there was where the congestion occurred; that the number of clerks detached by the Post Office Department in this country was inadequate to take care of the condition there.

Mr. VAN DYKE. Will the gentleman yield for one question?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I will.

Mr. VAN DYKE. Is it not true that the largest part of the congestion is in the city of New York at the present time, at the Chelsea terminal?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I have no information on that.

Mr. VAN DYKE. I think, if the gentleman will look it up, he will find that the greatest congestion is in New York at the present time, because of the inadequate and insufficient force used at that terminal.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. Goodwin] was in Paris at the same time we were, and he may give us the benefit of his inquiries.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SLAYDEN].

Mr. SLAYDEN. Nearly all the world is at war, Mr. Chairman, and quite all the world of importance is talking peace and yearning for it even "as the hart panteth after the water brooks." All the world, absolutely all, is war weary and hardly making an effort to conceal that fact. Even the aggressive, military Empire of Germany, while still boasting itself a conqueror, is not able to deceive the world with a mere camouflage of words, and Austria frankly confesses her anxious longing for peace. In fact, indirect negotiations for peace are on, for the speeches by foreign ministers and chancellors mean nothing less. Gradually Governments seem to be coming together on some important points that must be features of any peace treaty that will be made. Two-sevenths of the President's plan have been accepted unreservedly. When we get Von Hertling's irreducible minimum we will, I believe, be much nearer an agreement, and in the end all the great features of the plan set out in his address on January 8 in 14 specifications will be accepted as the basis of the future relations of Governments.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to venture to use the 20 minutes allotted to me by the courtesy of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to direct attention to an agency for peace known as the Interparliamentary Union. The oldest peace organization in the country, the oldest in the world, so far as I am informed, is the American Peace Society. It has been working since 1815, the year of the Battle of Waterloo, to spare the human race such horrors as are now their daily portion.

But age is not the only measure of service. There was organized in Paris on the 21st day of October, 1888, another society that has the same purpose in view and whose services entitle it to the gratitude of the civilized world. I refer to the Interparliamentary Union for the promotion of arbitration.

It owes its existence to the initiative of William Randal Cremer, a Labor member of the British House of Commons, and to Frederic Passy, a French parliamentarian who had a long, distinguished, and useful life. From the day it was founded the Interparliamentary Union commanded the sympathy and respect of the parliaments of Europe, and it grew rapidly.

I may say in passing, Mr. Chairman, that it has been considered in Europe as of vastly more importance than in this country, due no doubt to the fact that our isolation has put us out of the theater of war. Unless we shall, as a consequence of the present war, throw ourselves into the affairs of Europe and bear a part in the solution of the problems of international boundaries, as, for instance, those of the Balkans, our position will be one of comparative freedom from the dangers that threaten the nations of Europe as it has been heretofore and as I hope to see it continue to be.

The work of the humble Labor member of the British Commons, who was the admitted author of the movement, was so much appreciated that France admitted him to membership in the jealously guarded and restricted Legion of Honor. For the same service that brought him the decoration of the Legion of Honor he was knighted by King Edward of England. Still later he received the highest honor that can come to a worker for peace. In 1903 he was given the Nobel peace prize, which carries with it a money award of about \$37,000.

Although Cremer was a poor man, a carpenter and cabinet-maker, with an income less than a thousand dollars a year, he promptly gave the whole sum to the Arbitration Society of England.

The spirit that controlled the founder is the spirit that has directed the Interparliamentary Union since its foundation. It stands for the arbitration of international disputes. It does not scatter its fire and lessen the value of its work by trying to put over all sorts of reforms. This forethought of the founder has kept the union from wasting its time on Utopian projects. Its members are parliamentarians, and the work to which it is dedicated is the work of parliaments. That fact has kept it wonderfully free from the annoyance of association with some excellent but impractical people who have found nearly every other society with similar aims a happy hunting ground.

Although arbitration alone was the purpose in view when the Interparliamentary Union was organized, it has studied and resolved about the laws of war, neutrality, and kindred subjects. The influence of its more than 3,000 members in Europe has been exercised through legislative bodies and in executive councils. Great international lawyers and practical, constructive statesmen, whose names are on the membership roll of the Union, have devoted years to the effort to find a way for nations to live in amity with one another.

To-day they are studying these questions more earnestly than ever before, for there is greater need. Even those who are citizens of neutral countries are working with tremendous energy and earnestness at the solution of this great problem, for they are among the innocent victims of the barbarities of war. Being innocent and neutral helps very little. Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes have suffered nearly as much from an inadequate supply of food and other necessities as the Germans and Austrians.

It is small wonder, Mr. Chairman, that under such circumstances the statesmen of neutral countries are submitting requests for a central organization to maintain peace throughout the world.

It was the Interparliamentary Union that put the thought of the first Hague conference into the Czar's head. That started a movement that has developed slowly, that at times has even been arrested, but has never gone backward. No country, not even militaristic Germany or Austria, would consent to see The Hague idea abandoned.

Since the union was organized there have been 18 conferences, in each of which hundreds of delegates from about two dozen parliaments sat and discussed world affairs from the point of view of national legislators.

At the seventeenth conference, held in Geneva in 1912, faith in arbitration as the means of settling certain classes of international controversies was reaffirmed and agreed to in a resolution calling for the establishment of a permanent court, presided over by professional judges, to determine judicial questions according to the rules of law and equity, and a special commission to study the question and report at the next conference was appointed.

Among the members of that commission of study was a former associate of ours on the floor of this House. I refer to Theodore Burton, to serve with whom was a privilege and honor. In his long and eminent career here he always stood for the better things in legislation and international matters.

Unfortunately the nineteenth, the conference to which the report was to have been submitted, did not assemble at Stockholm in 1914 for reasons perfectly well known.

As long ago as 1892 the fourth conference of the union, sitting at Berne, demanded international agreements to respect the inviolability of private property at sea and also suggested the neutralization of certain sea routes. As you know, President Wilson, in one of his most notable addresses, has called attention to these same questions.

The tenth conference of the union, at Brussels in 1910, asked through The Hague for reforms in the rules of naval war as follows:

- (a) Abolition of the right of capture.
- (b) Limitation of the right of blockade to fortified ports or places.
- (c) Limitation of contraband to arms, ammunition, and instruments of war addressed to one of the belligerents.
- (d) Prohibiting the destruction of vessels carrying contraband and of goods found on board, except the contraband articles themselves.

The resolution containing these demands called on the British, French, and Russian groups to urge their Governments to change their attitude with relation to this question, and urged a modification of the Declaration of London in that respect.

In 1906, at the conference in London, the union declared for the limitation of armaments. This is the language of the resolution agreed to at that time:

The Interparliamentary Conference, considering that the increase of military and naval expenditure which weighs upon the world is universally held to be intolerable, expresses the formal wish that the question of the limitation of armaments be included in the program of the next conference at The Hague.

The conference decides that each group belonging to the Interparliamentary Union shall without delay place this resolution before the Government of its country and exercise its most pressing action on the parliament to which it belongs, in order that the question of the limitation be the subject of a national study necessary to the ultimate success of the international discussion.

The last conference held, that at The Hague in 1913, was distinguished by the number of eminent men who had a part in its proceedings, the quality of the debate, and the earnestness with which opinions were pressed. The limitation of armaments was most earnestly urged. Distinguished Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, and Germans spoke for disarmament.

I remember well the pathetic earnestness with which representatives from some of the smaller countries pleaded for it. Belgium and delegates from the Balkan countries and Scandinavia spoke as if already in the shadow of the great social crime of 1914.

Dr. L. Quidde, of Bavaria, a member of the Diet in that country, submitted a proposal to reduce the size of the armies and navies of all countries. He presented his views so eloquently that the executive council of the union took up the study of his resolution and appointed a special commission for its consideration, headed by Tydeman, of Holland, one of the finest and wisest men I ever knew, with Erzberger, of Germany, whose name you have been made familiar with recently, and with representatives on the commission from Austria, Great Britain, France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Russia.

The debate in the conference was eloquent and convincing and many distinguished men for the first time declared themselves supporters of the policy.

Prof. Quidde, by the way, has not ceased to work for peace because of the war, and has been so open about it that I fear he may be in trouble with the Kaiser.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken a few paragraphs from the history of the Interparliamentary Union just to give you an idea of what its work has been and what are its aims.

No doubt every Member of this body read the speech of the German chancellor a few days ago and saw with pleasure his declaration that he could accept unreservedly the first 4 of the 14 conditions of peace laid down by Mr. Wilson in his address to the Congress on the 8th of January.

These four demands were:

First. Open covenants of peace and no secret treaties.

And I may say in passing, Mr. Chairman, that any Member of this House who has read the secret treaties that were exposed to the horrified gaze of an amazed world by the Bolshevik group in Russia, no matter what his previous opinion may have been, will agree with that of the President, that there should be no longer covenants of peace of a secret nature or treaties not known to the world at large. Every treaty between two great governments involves the peace and happiness of the rest of mankind as well as of the two parties directly concerned with the contract.

Second. Freedom of the seas, outside territorial waters, in peace and war alike.

Third. Equality of trade conditions for all countries.

Fourth. Reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

These, Mr. Chairman, are all such reasonable conditions that I can not believe they will be rejected by any country with a civilized government. They are very like the terms set out in the great speech of the British premier, David Lloyd-George, and they are strikingly like those of the Bolshevik government of Russia, and not entirely out of harmony with those put forward by France and Austria. In fact, they are conditions of permanent peace on which all can agree in principle and without which nothing worth while can be done. The President's powerful and convincing phrases will force their consideration by all belligerents whether allies or enemies.

The extracts from the history of the Interparliamentary Union that I have given you show that these four peace conditions have been demanded by that organization for years.

In 1913 there were 3,300 members of the union scattered through the parliaments of about two dozen countries. These parliamentarians have labored with their respective governments to have them agreed to.

Shall we not, in the interest of humanity, support our colleagues in other parliaments in a campaign for their acceptance? [Applause.]

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield one hour to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MILLER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota is recognized for one hour.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, I want to talk to such portion of the membership of the House as finds it possible to be here at the present time on what to me is the most important subject connected with the great war. In other words, I propose to direct attention to the question of transportation from the United States to the sea, across the sea to the point of debarkation in France, and across France to the front.

We are apt to direct our attention first to the spectacular features of preparation for war. We like to dream of thousands of aeroplanes flying in the sky, smothering the enemy. We like to think of thousands of massed cannon speeding death and destruction against the enemy. We like to think of embattled millions marching beneath our flag against the foe. These are all interesting and vitally important. But before these aeroplanes can fly, before these cannon can breathe fire and destruc-

tion, before the men can attack, you must get all to the place where the foe is. Were it that Germany is coming to fight us in America the situation would be different. Germany is not coming here. We are going there, and we are going to fight the most powerful nation that has ever existed. Our problem is to mass these instrumentalities of war at the exact point at the right time to defeat Germany in the field. Now, therefore, let me direct your attention to some of the elements of the problem.

In determining to make active war on Germany this country of ours has undertaken the most stupendous military task ever undertaken by any nation. Having regard to the fact that Germany is the most powerful military nation the world has ever known, our task would be of huge proportions, taxing severely our strength, if Germany were at hand so that our Army immediately could strike her. But Germany is not at hand. Germany is not coming here. We are going there. To reach her with a fighting force which, joined with the allies, will accomplish Germany's defeat, is our problem. With due respect to the importance of training camps, proper equipment of guns and munitions, clothing, hospitals, aeroplanes, our greatest problem is transportation. Observe the elements in the problem. First, it is necessary to gather our troops from all sections of the United States and transport them to an Atlantic port. This in itself is a great undertaking.

Many of those men must travel more than 3,000 miles. The railroad transportation system of the United States has before it a severe strain to transport these men, munitions, and supplies. There must be provided at the Atlantic ports abundant docks and terminal facilities, so that men and freight can be transferred to seagoing vessels.

It is then necessary to transport across 3,000 miles of ocean to the French port. The French port must be a suitable place of debarkation, provided with docks, terminal facilities, and railway transportation. From this port transportation must be provided entirely across the country of France to the eastern line or battle front. From the end of the railway system in France there must be provided motor and other transportation right up to the trenches. Every link in this great chain of transportation must be as good as every other link. Every feature of this transportation must be equal to our military needs. A moment's thought respecting this produces a realization that is somewhat staggering. Were our problem to transport across the Atlantic Ocean with a complete control of the sea in our hands, it would still be a tremendous one, but the sea is not exclusively ours and our allies. Our right to use the sea is disputed by the submarine, and our capacity to use it is vastly diminished by the submarine activities.

On the high seas there are hardly sufficient ships to carry on the commercial and industrial traffic essential to maintain England, France, and Italy at a point of efficiency. We must in some way secure ships sufficient to transport our troops to France and carry through all the supplies they need. In addition, we must assist England and France very materially in the production of ships to replace those being sunk by submarines. In order that we may transport our troops and supplies from this country to France with minimum loss, it is necessary that our ships be protected against submarine attacks. Providing this protection necessarily reduces very greatly the efficiency of our ships. Ships can not sail freely. They must move under conditions calculated to preserve them from harm. In no other war has transportation been so vital. In this war it forms more than 60 per cent of the entire problem.

Some officers in France told me both in the British and French Armies that transportation is 90 per cent of the job. It is necessary that we fully realize this in order that our conduct may be shaped accordingly. An army in the battle front to-day, should its supplies be cut off, would perish in 48 hours, probably in much less time. A stream of supplies coming to the men on the fighting front is as vital to the life of that army as the blood that flows through human arteries is vital to human life. Cut these streams of transportation and your army withers and dies immediately. We recall with pride, those of us who live in the North, how Gen. Sherman cut loose from his communications and marched to the sea. Many other armies have done this during the ages that are past. No army can do it to-day. The severance of communication means the immediate destruction of the army. An army in the field to-day is a greedy monster. It requires a great variety of things and in untold quantities. Its voracity is a matter of wonder, even to those accustomed to life on the front. In many sections of the English front the artillery have orders to fire every day 100 rounds. This during a quiet day, so called. During days of attack or defense against attack the number of shots is greatly multiplied. Some French guns at Verdun fired fifteen hundred, and even two thousand, rounds in a single day. These

guns are always consuming ammunition and always hungry. To get this ammunition to them is a tremendous task. One of the most peculiar attacks that has been made since this war began was made by the French in their advance at Malmaison during the early days of November. That advance gave to the French victory over the Germans in a struggle for the Chemin des Dames. The advance did not cover a large area. In fact, it was very, very small. During the artillery preparation that preceded the attack in this restricted area the French fired 2,000,700 shells. Many trains were required to haul this munition to the advance depots. From these depots it had to be conveyed up to the guns. In some of the advances that have been made during the past year as many as six and seven million shells have been fired within a very few days' time. To one who goes to the front perhaps the most striking thing is the inconceivable quantity of this ammunition. There comes to him view after view, and in wonder and amazement he beholds there enormous quantities of ammunition piled up; train after train hauling it in and armies of men piling it up at the end of the railway in a great pile—millions and millions of pieces. At these advance points small dinkey railway tracks lead up as close to the front line as they can go. On these are little cars that are loaded with shells. Sometimes there is a small engine to haul them a distance, but almost always not. They are pushed up by the men, right up to the big guns, and then for a distance on, to get them as near the small guns as possible. But there eventually comes a time when all the shells must be carried up by mules or by hand, as is almost constantly done. This continuous supply of ammunition to the guns at work is absolutely essential to life for a day or a night. Cut it off and your army is paralyzed and destroyed. We have never thought in terms of transportation in America such as is necessary for us to think if we are going to carry on this war in the way that it must be fought to win.

I desire to call attention to the distinction between the conditions in France and England and those in the United States with respect to transportation. All that is necessary in France is to produce the ammunition and transport it a short distance by rail; also that the food and supplies necessary to her army be placed on trains somewhere in France and hurried to the army at the front. The total distance does not exceed three or four hundred miles, probably much less. The problem in England is relatively small. In a single day a person can leave the front trenches of the English Army in Belgium or France and go to the heart of England.

In fact, I accompanied some men who left the trenches at Paschendale at 4 o'clock in the morning, with mud on their persons from their heads to their feet, who had been wallowing in it clear up to their armpits, but to them had come the glorious hour for relief. They left the trenches at 4 o'clock one morning and they were in London that night. This gives you some idea of the small problem that England has faced in transportation compared to the one that confronts us. Across the English Channel there are two great streams of transports from Dover to Calais and from Folkestone to Boulogne.

In fact, these two great lines of commerce are closed to everything except the military needs of Great Britain, and there are those two great streams going back and forth day and night, protected by an abundance of destroyers, so that you have many constantly in view, not only those that are accompanying the boat that you are on but those that are accompanying other boats going or returning. Mine layers and mine sweepers everywhere; aeroplanes frequently at work. Thus does Great Britain adequately protect these two great lines of transports, so essential to her military needs.

Every day 10,000 men go from the front trenches of the English Army in France back to England, and 10,000 return from England to France. This is all in the carrying out of an essential program, to give the men who are living the life at the front frequent opportunity to breathe a different air and to enjoy other surroundings. A large number of ships make the transit each day carrying supplies. The efficiency of this ship transportation is splendid to behold. It has been systematized so that it moves at great speed and with no friction. In fact, this transportation, as well as production in England, has been so perfected that the British Army in its most active days has never lacked for food or munitions.

We in this Congress remember the early days of 1914, when England sent to us the Macedonian cry, "Sell us guns, sell us uniforms, sell us ammunition, shells, everything we must have to build a great army. Time is short. America must come to our relief." England looked to the United States for the great part of those things essential to the building of an army. In the time that has elapsed since then England has made herself

entirely independent of the United States as far as manufactured products are concerned. She needs raw materials. Great Britain has raised and marched into the field over 7,000,000 men and now has an army of approximately 6,000,000 men. And yet as I journeyed among the munition factories of England I found that here and there it was necessary to close parts of them down for a short period of time now and then because their production was even greater than the necessities of her army at the front. That is somewhat illuminating to us while we are in the midst of the early days of our struggle here in this country. In fact, the guns have always more ammunition than they need. It is only a few hours from any part of England and Scotland to Calais, one hour from Dover to Calais, and a very few hours from Calais to the front.

Compared to the American problem, this is a small one, indeed. America's problem has Great Britain's problem multiplied ten times. While we must remember again and again to give thought to the production of rifles, cannon, aeroplanes, clothing, and the like, we must never for a moment lose sight of the greatest problem of all, and that is transportation. This transportation is basic to our success. It is basic to our entire effort. It must be perfected before we can even start to win. It must be kept perfect in order that we may continue our military operations in an effective manner.

He who has studied the military situation during the past year knows that the United States must take the place of Russia among the allies. We must do more than that. We must turn the tide of battle distinctly in favor of the allies, and that means we will have to be stronger than Russia ever was.

At the time Russia collapsed I am reliably informed she had 10,000,000 trained men ready for battle. I do not believe this war will ever be won by the allies unless the United States at the earliest possible date places upon the western front not less than 3,000,000, and we should place there 5,000,000. We will never win the war by a revolution in Germany.

Let us not allow ourselves to be fooled all the time. There is no more chance for a revolution in Germany than there is that the devil will give up his command in hell, and so says every man that speaks with knowledge of conditions in Germany. The German Army is not weak, composed of youths and old men; the German Army is marching 9,000,000 strong, and just as strong as it ever was, to the extent of 9,000,000 men, and the German Nation is back of its army.

We are going to win this war, but it will be won only in one way, and that is by destroying the military power of Germany in the field, and unless we do that we are lost. Unless we can make our plans commensurate with that task we might as well never have started.

Some slight eruptions may occur in that country, but not sufficient to be of any particular value.

There is just one way to beat Germany, and that is to beat her army. Unless Germany is thoroughly beaten, all the men that die, all the money that is spent, will be wasted. Germany has not less than 9,000,000 men, perfectly trained, and splendidly equipped. Let no one think they consist of old men, young men, and half-starved men. I saw hundreds and thousands of prisoners, some as they were freshly taken and others that had been taken years before. They are about all alike—big, strong, husky fellows, in splendid condition. We are in a war, a hard blow-giving and blow-receiving war. We must strike a harder blow than Germany can stand. We can not hope to do it with less than 3,000,000 men. To sustain a man across the sea requires at the lowest 6 tons of shipping each year. To sustain 3,000,000 soldiers, therefore, will require 18,000,000 tons of shipping.

Mr. REAVIS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. REAVIS. I noticed in the Washington Post that they say we require 10½ tons per man. Did the gentleman see that?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I have not seen it. It has been estimated at 9 tons, but I think 6 is the quantity that England is using.

Mr. REAVIS. In the article written by a shipping expert it is stated that it requires 10½ tons.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. That is higher than I ever heard of.

Mr. REAVIS. England uses 7 tons, which is the amount required in crossing the channel.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Between 6 and 7 tons. But I want to put this down in a conservative way.

This must be secured in two ways—by the construction of additional ships and by increasing the efficiency of all our ships. To secure maximum efficiency on the part of shipping during these days of submarine war is extremely difficult, but vital to success.

The question is asked, Where is the port of disembarkation? I am not going to give the name to you, but I will point it out on the map. There is more than one port, but there is one port that 90 per cent of our troops arrive at. The problem, as I tried to state it a little while ago, is to gather throughout the United States soldiers and then supplies and equipment, and transport all to the Atlantic seaboard, and then by ship across the sea. It is, in round numbers, 3,600 miles from New York to the spot in the Bay of Biscay to which I am pointing, and that is the spot at the mouth of an important river where the American troops are landed. It is possible by rail transportation direct from that point to go to the American expeditionary force in the field where it now is without going through Paris. That is a very important and vital matter.

Mr. PLATT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. PLATT. Is it true that that particular port has been partially made over?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I am going to discuss that in a few minutes, and then if I do not answer the gentleman's question he may bring it up again. I want to discuss for a few minutes the question of submarine activity. I stated a while ago that the Government had undertaken the greatest task in its history when it undertook to put 3,000,000 men, or even 1,000,000 men, on the fighting front in France and keep them supplied. We have got to ship them across the sea, a sea that is not ours by a long, long way. The only thing comparable to our problem—and it is not really comparable—is when Great Britain fought the South African war 18 years ago. They had to ship troops about as far or a little farther, but their problem was extremely simple compared with ours. In the first place they controlled the sea, and in the second place sent a highly trained army of organized men against an army not organized, not united, not well led, not well equipped, and of a small number in South Africa.

I do not intend to give away anything of any military value to the enemy and do not believe I will. We can not expect our people in this country to fight this war, long drawn out as it is almost certain to be, entirely on faith. They must have some facts. They must have some information as to how the battle is going. My information has been received from the most trustworthy source, and I consider it absolutely authentic. The high priest of ruthless submarine warfare—in other words, Admiral von Tirpitz—confidently told the Kaiser and his people—told them last January—that if unrestricted submarine warfare should be inaugurated England would be starved within three months and the war ended within that time.

The people of Germany were so elated at the prospect of a great victory and an early end of the war that they gave no heed to the savagery, brutality, and depravity associated with that kind of warfare. You will recall the German Admiralty planned to sink 1,000,000 tons per month. Knowing the number of tons available to the shipping of the world, it was relatively easy to predict how soon starvation must come to England. This warfare was inaugurated almost exactly a year ago. Three times four months have come and gone and the war is still going on. The only thing this year has made certain is that the constant effort and untiring energy of the allies on the sea, if continued, will end in defeat for the submarine, but the battle is a long one and a close one. All told, the Germans have constructed and placed in operation about 265 submarines. Those first sent out were relatively small.

The difficulties of navigation had not then been solved, and many of those submarines sailed away, never to return, having been lost at sea. The number of ships sunk by submarines increased enormously with the beginning of unrestricted warfare a year ago, particularly. The number of submarines destroyed during this past year likewise enormously increased. In fact, during the past 10 months three times as many submarines have been destroyed as were destroyed during the previous two and a half years of war. All told, there have been destroyed to a certainty about an even hundred submarines. A dozen more probably have been destroyed; definite figures are not obtainable; but it is hoped, and fairly probable, that submarines are just now being destroyed as fast as they are being manufactured by the Germans. We know that during the months of April and May last year the submarine sank 1,700,000 tons of English shipping alone. During these months the Germans practically made good their boast. Increased skill and effort in combating the submarine have greatly reduced the sinkings, until now it can be said the situation is fairly well in hand. These sinkings each month have gone down through 600,000 tons to 400,000 tons and for a time down to 260,000 or 270,000 tons. During the last month there has been a marked decrease in the number of

ships sunk. We do not want to be deceived by this and think the war is over. The British and the American admiralty are not deceived. The submarines can operate only with great difficulty during the long nights and stormy weather of the winter season. Most of the merchant ships are now armed, so the days have passed when the submarine can open up a combat with a merchant ship firing shells from the surface. The truth is the only ships now being sunk, or practically the only ones, are being sunk by submarines that are never seen at all. In a heavy sea a submarine that is all submerged excepting its periscope can only see a very short distance and in a very uncertain manner. Ideal weather for the submarine to operate exists when the sea is calm and the days are long. When spring returns increased sinkings will recur. It is a matter now of quite common knowledge that the moments of grave danger are just about sunrise in the morning and sunset at night, especially if the sea is calm. Why? Because during that twilight period, which is long, especially during the summer, there is that uncertainty of light which makes it, first, difficult to discover the periscope of a submarine, but, on the other hand, makes it easy for the submarine to see the hulk of the ship in bold relief and to send in a deadly shot.

The beginning of successful resistance to the submarine was coincident with the coming of the first American destroyers into the war zone. Mind you, I do not say that successful operation against the submarine only began by and was exclusively confined to the Americans that went over with the destroyers, but I say the coming of the American destroyers was coincident with the beginning of successful operation against the submarine. [Applause.] The Americans were not the sole cause of the successful warfare, not by any means, but they made a marked contribution to it. Admiral Sims at an early date insisted upon the convoy system; first, to secure protection to the ships; and second, to bring the submarine where the destroyer can get at him. The submarine is of no value unless it seeks and tries to destroy ships. If the enemy of the submarine is in the vicinity of the ships, then it finds itself in the vicinity of the submarine, where it wants to be. That was the logic of Admiral Sims in May of last year. He said, "What is the use of sending destroyers and ships of your navy scouring the seas, hunting for the submarines? The seas are vast and the submarine is small. They may seek for days and weeks and find not their quarry, but you group your ships together and put your destroyers about your ships, and you are bound to have your destroyers meet the submarine. The submarine must find the ships, and in finding the ships he meets his deadly enemy." [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I myself think, layman as I am, that that was the most important contribution to the successful combating of the submarine that has been made. Its significance soon became apparent to the British Admiralty, because they adopted it and have followed it, and while I may be stepping possibly to one side and digressing, I can not refrain from making this remark: Of all the able men who are now working for the United States day and night, with brain and energy and skill, we have not a better one or a more successful one than Admiral Sims across the sea [applause]; and it is the duty of this Congress and it should be the duty of the Navy of this country—and I think I am speaking in such a way as meets their approval—to give him absolute carte blanche. Whatever he recommends, carry that out.

Our naval officers when they first went over naturally received from the English the many important lessons the English had learned from experience. Admiral Sims insisted upon the value of the convoy system and in addition our destroyers put unusual pep and ginger into their work. The minute a submarine was located the American destroyers were out and made for it at full speed. No quicker is a dog of prey to scent and follow the scent with lightning speed to the quarry than the destroyer when a submarine is sighted to dive full blast at the spot where the submarine is. The convoy system has certain disadvantages, however. It decreases the efficiency of shipping for the reason that it is necessary for a ship to wait until it can be joined by other ships going to the same port and the whole supported by the convoy. The problem is to make these delays as small as possible. The essential feature is to have a liberal supply of convoying ships. The destroyer is the natural enemy of the submarine, consequently we must have many destroyers for convoy purposes. Experience has shown that raiders are not infrequently met with on the high seas during this war. I am going to go a step further and I think I will put something with that sentence after the revelations that have been coming out. Thirteen ships convoyed by two destroyers from Norway going to England were sunk and the two destroyers were themselves

destroyed and sunk in a few moments' time. Why? Why, everyone knows it was not because the Germans sent the ordinary submarine or destroyer after them. The admiralities of Great Britain, America, and France know that the Germans have constructed a lot of raiders of terrific speed, probably 25 knots, mounted with large or relatively large cannon. You can draw your own conclusions as to what happened on the North Sea when they started out. At least three of them got out into the ocean. I do not know what has happened to them since. I do not know whether they have been destroyed or whether they are still afloat, but they got out and it was expected during the winter months more would come out, a real menace and peril. Protection against craft of this character must be provided for groups of ships carrying soldiers. This protection can only come from the cruiser or the battleship. For a long time Admiral Sims was compelled to patrol that part of the ocean beginning west of the coast of Ireland, extending down across Ireland, down across the western entrance of the English Channel, clear across the western coast of France and Ireland, the coast of Spain, down to the Azores Islands.

The most important thing for us to do is to furnish protection by convoy of destroyers to the ships coming from the United States carrying troops and munitions across to France. And how many destroyers do you think Sims had with which to do the whole job? I can tell you, because it is not the number now. It was just 36—not one-fifth enough—and the success that accompanied the work of Admiral Sims and the splendid officers and men under him testify to their capacity to use such instrumentalities as they are provided with to do splendid and gigantic work. That is not the number of destroyers we now have over there. I can give that without giving aid to the enemy. This number was grossly insufficient. Fortunately our Navy realized the mistake made in failing to increase the destroyer building program in large proportions at the very outbreak of the war, and some months ago started upon a very vigorous program that will produce any needed destroyers at a day I hope not too far away. Some of these new destroyers are being delivered. Permit me to insist that the first duty of our Navy is to protect the line of communication from France to America. Disaster has been narrowly averted more than once. We can not expect Providence to be with us all the time. We must fight our own battles part of the time. We must be prepared to give full protection to our ships going to France and returning from France. We have a few cruisers engaged in this work of convoying. It is most unfortunate we have not several times their number; but we have them not, and we can not get them. We have a substitute that I submit should be used. We are congratulating ourselves in this country that our Navy has manifested such a high efficiency. The Naval Committee of this House is purring sweetly in splendid satisfaction of the Navy in the war. I do not say that in any disrespectful sense. It has been rather sweetly delicious, however, to note its self-congratulation constantly. Far be it from me to take away any of that pride or any of that satisfaction. Let me suggest this Navy will never help win the war if it is locked up and hermetically sealed in some safe harbor of the United States. We have many old battleships not considered first class. They have sufficient speed and seaworthiness that they could and should be used in the place of cruisers for this convoy work. It is the duty of the Navy to send them abroad immediately and to keep them there. What I have just said is not exclusively my views. I am the mouthpiece of many men in the Navy who are doing this work. I hope somebody will hear these words and heed them. I can speak where they can not. Transportation across the Atlantic is the neck of our military bottle—

Mr. MADDEN. I suppose it would not be any secret to disclose the number of these ships that are not being used, for it would not help the enemy any.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Not the slightest; and we can turn to any report of the Secretary of the Navy and find the entire list. They are now in Philadelphia; they are now in New York; they are now at Hampton Roads; and God knows they ought to be on the high seas.

Mr. MADDEN. It seems to me it might be well enough for the enemy to know that we have discontinued locking them up, but have put them in the water where they can do some destruction.

Mr. HICKS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. HICKS. Does the gentleman know how many first-class battleships of ours are on the other side now?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes, sir. I was informed at the time the request was made over there that they be sent over, and, frankly, I was afraid our Navy would not do it, but I made par-

ticular inquiry and followed it up and found that they have been sent, and some day they may write a glorious chapter into American history.

Mr. HICKS. We have first-class battleships abroad and—
Mr. MILLER of Washington. And no better battleships ever floated on a sea. I am here speaking of the second-class battleships now at home that have no place in the first line.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Would the gentleman include any of the old monitors that he has referred to, that now happen to be in the Philadelphia Navy Yard, in the cross-seas service?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I do not think so. England might want them to go up against the shore batteries on the North Sea. I am not speaking of all the ships that are not now on the high seas. I am speaking of a single class, and that alone, and the job that is just hungry for them out there on the high seas.

I submit that some radical reforms are necessary if we are going to secure reasonable military efficiency. Certain transports now operating across the Atlantic are under control of the Army and operating strictly under the War Department. I hope you will bear this analysis in mind. Others, and a greater number of transports, are being operated by the Navy. And it is no secret that these transports are those interned German ships that we took over, a splendid fleet of boats. The Shipping Board, in addition, is operating some merchant ships and desires to operate all the transport ships.

Now, what is it we have? We have the Army operating one line of transports, the Navy operating another line of transports, the Shipping Board operating certain merchant ships carrying supplies, and trying to get the job of operating all the transports and all the merchant ships. In other words, they wish to have charge of all this most important branch of our military service.

Now, let us just face the truth. The reason the desire exists that the Shipping Board shall operate all these ships is that it will necessitate the taking off of the American sailors that are working for \$30 a month and put in their places other sailors that will be getting \$90 to \$125 a month. Now, you and I might possibly be willing to go the length necessary to accomplish that if we are helping American citizens. I was on the high seas a year ago, on two ships under the American flag, and I went through those ships from time to time, and there was not an American citizen in the entire crew. On this trip which I took lately across the water I went on one kind of a transport over and I came back on another. The one going over had a crew that had been picked up in New York, the best they could do, but I could not find an American citizen in the outfit below the officers. And they are getting fabulous sums. They were West Indians and Portuguese and South Americans, a rag-tag crowd from everywhere under the sun.

So, whenever anybody writes you or asks you to support a bill that will put all our transports and shipping on the high seas under our Shipping Board, do not let them fool you by stating that by so doing you are going to give some American citizen a job. You will be simply giving to some South American or some West Indian in one month more money than he or any of his ancestors earned in a year's time.

Mr. TOWNER. I would like to ask the gentleman if it is not his judgment that they should be put under one control?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. It is. These three systems do not work in harmony, and, doing the best they can, they only result in decreasing the efficiency of our ships to a very low point. They can not work in harmony. With the different heads and different systems and different personnel, they can not work well together, and they do not. The Army has been running transports to Hawaii, to the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Panama for 20 years now and have acquired a system and operatives that make these Army transports the best handled and most efficient that we have now. All these ships should be placed under one authority, run by one man, and under one system. We can not afford to lose a single day in making this change.

I would say that the Army should be the department having exclusive charge of all this transport system were it not for one thing, namely, that going across the Atlantic is a part of fighting the battle with the submarines, and the Navy alone can do that work. [Applause.] I do not care what kind of a master you have on your ship, whether he is an Army officer or a civilian; I do not care what you pay him; the master mind that guides that ship from the time it leaves New York until it finds a safe refuge in a harbor in France is a naval officer, as he should be, because the crossing of the sea to-day is 1 per cent navigation and 99 per cent fighting the submarine.

Mr. LONGWORTH. While the gentleman is on that subject, can he state what is the speed of the latest type of the German submarine?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I can tell the gentleman what our best authority on the submarine told me, and I presume it is correct. On the surface it is not to exceed 16 knots; under the surface they can make from 8 knots down, with capacity to move very slowly under the sea, from probably $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 knots. In other words, they have a wide range, from the slowest under the sea to their highest speed on the surface.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Can the gentleman tell me how many torpedoes the submarine can carry?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. They carry from 20 to 24.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Can the gentleman state, they now being able to carry 20 torpedoes, how long they can stay on the voyage from their base of supplies?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I will be pleased to answer. The main base is at Zeebrugge on the North Sea. The main area of operation is across the northern part of Scotland and the upper part of Ireland and then the English Channel. Continuing, their field is the Bay of Biscay, then along the coasts of Spain and Portugal, and then out to the Azores. All trade routes from South America going to the north of Europe really converge through the Bay of Biscay. For the submarine to get into this area of operations or the western entrance to the English Channel it is necessary to make the trip from Zeebrugge around Scotland, which I am informed takes 10 days. They have a period of activity which depends somewhat upon how active they are. That is, if they fire many torpedoes and meet many ships, or fire many torpedoes at one, as soon as they have used up their 20 torpedoes they have got to stop and go home. Or if they see few ships and conserve their ammunition they have a period of activity limited by fuel and food, probably about 20 days on the average. It then takes them 10 days to go back. It then takes them about 10 days to refit at Zeebrugge. So that you have a period of activity of about two to three, or 20 days activity to 30 days of preparation. That is the latest type and their best submarine.

Mr. PLATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Minnesota yield to the gentleman from New York?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Certainly.

Mr. PLATT. I wish to ask a question on the point the gentleman was just speaking of a few minutes ago. I crossed a part of the Pacific Ocean a few weeks ago from Honolulu to San Francisco in a ship that was making its last trip and which was about to go into service as an Atlantic transport. The captain of that ship told me he was a Naval Reserve officer and that all the other officers of the ship were Naval Reserve officers, and that none of the crew had been enlisted in the Naval Reserve. He said he did not know whether he was to be subjected to the Shipping Board or to the Navy, and he was going into the Federal service under those circumstances.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. He will be lucky if he finds out. He will probably be amenable to the Army. I think that transport has been chartered by the Army and not by the Navy.

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREYS. Going back to the point the gentleman just left, about the length of time a submarine can remain away from its base, is it true that they have ships like the *Deutschland* and that character of submarine to carry supplies out on the sea for the submarines, or is it necessary for the submarine to return to base for its supplies?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I imagine it is necessary for the submarine frequently to return to its depots. There is some question as to whether there are mother submarines or not. It is thought that the *Deutschland* and one or two more may be engaged in that work, but their capacity is so limited that it makes no perceptible effect on the situation. There are very many submarine-mine layers in all this field whose sphere of activity is, of course, determined entirely on the amount of fuel they have and supplies.

Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. Do these recently commissioned submarines carry other means of offense and defense than these torpedoes that the gentleman was speaking of? That is, do they carry guns?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes. Heretofore a 3-inch gun has been considered a pretty formidable weapon against the submarine. The larger submarines now have probably 4 and possibly 5-inch guns; anyhow 4-inch.

It is ridiculous to have a ship with two captains, one for the ship and the other a naval officer, who really has complete control. We can not do without the Navy. The Navy must

have charge of the operations of these ships so far as the defense against the submarine is concerned. I believe the Navy can develop efficiency in the pure transportation feature of the problem. The Shipping Board has no business to inject itself into this problem at all. [Applause.] This is a military matter, and should be handled in a strictly military fashion. Let the Shipping Board run those merchant ships that are engaged in commercial business. Consequently I am strongly of the opinion that there should be turned over to the Navy all the ships crossing the Atlantic engaged in military work, and the Navy should be put in charge. There should very likely be some one in charge of the movements of the ships—by that I mean their dispatch from port to port—one man, a civilian, selected by the President, who will operate under the Navy and who is himself skilled in transportation.

The Navy does not understand the transportation of ships to save time. Naval officers have never developed that faculty; but men whose business it has been to make money or lose money in accordance with whether their ships load or unload rapidly and move speedily or not are qualified for this kind of work, and that class of men should be utilized as the directing force for the management generally of the big fleet. But Navy officers can take charge of the actual operation of the ships on the sea. Therefore from the minute one of these ships leaves port until it arrives in the next port it would be exclusively under the control of naval officers. What we want is a master mind, accustomed to weigh the value of his ship's time and to drive that ship to its highest efficiency all the time. The Army can loan to the Navy its personnel developed in transportation work.

This one change will increase the efficiency of our ships many, many times.

The delays that now occur are sufficient to fill one with serious alarm. The Army loads its boats. The Navy loads its boats, and then they have to get the two groups together, somewhere, if they can, and then they start out. It may be that the Army has loaded such boats as it has on hand, but they are insufficient to constitute a convoy. Therefore they hold those boats until more Army boats come in and there is a sufficient number to send them across. In the meantime the Navy boats are going through the same program. If you had all the chickens under one hen they could all be looked after by the same superior power. Days and even weeks pass in assembling a sufficient number of ships to be convoyed, whereas as a fact not more than a day or two at most should ever be lost.

I wish to emphasize the necessity of these ships being placed in charge of a civilian skilled in transportation, for the reason that naval officers do not appreciate the value of time and the necessity of keeping the cargoes moving.

I wrote this a week ago, and when I picked up the paper last night I was interested to see that this view which I have here expressed is that of a very distinguished retired admiral of the Navy, who wrote an article on it and published it yesterday.

Let me illustrate. Two ships were ready to start across the Atlantic on the homeward voyage, and sailed from a port in France a distance of 40 or 50 miles. This is an actual illustration that I know of personally. They were told to stop for some additional boats that were coming, and they received this order after they had got out 40 miles; not on the high seas exactly, but up the coast and to leeward of an island, but with all communication between them and the shore shut off. The minute a boat leaves its base and goes on the high seas to-day it is lost to the world. Its wireless can not operate. If it does, its location is made known to submarines. The ship sets sail in silence and in darkness, lost to humanity and the world until next it reaches a port. Now, these two boats stayed there day after day, being joined at the end of the third day by the other boats. On the fifth day the destroyers that were to escort them through the submarine zone appeared. For some unaccountable reason the ships did not sail even then. The destroyers fooled around, going back and forth for further orders for two more days. On the eighth day, under the most unfavorable conditions that at any time existed as far as submarines are concerned, this group set forth. Why, submarines had been for a week spotting exactly where they were.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman 10 minutes more.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Submarines knew exactly the channel out of which they had to come; and is it any wonder that they were attacked twice before they got through the zone? These were all very large ships, among the very biggest and best in our Navy at the present time. I made a computation one day to see what the loss of the United States was on this delay, which nobody could explain or account for. The loss

amounted to about \$300,000. This is but one of many others that I could cite. This delay of eight days was due first, to the fact that two different authorities were in charge of two different classes of ships; second, it was due to an insufficient number of destroyers and to slow action on the part of those destroyers that finally were available. You remember that in this transportation business we can not afford to lose a minute. Every hour is precious. If our shipping is run at 50 per cent efficiency, it is exactly the same as though a submarine had sunk one-half of our entire tonnage. We must not only keep our ships afloat, but we must keep them moving with all possible speed. Then, too, we must build an enormous fleet of cargo ships. We made a bad start in this work. It now looks as if we were going ahead under high pressure, and yet we hear constantly that the efficiency of the shipyards here in the United States is very low, due to labor troubles. A vigorous policy is fundamentally essential in this crisis. Every man at work building a ship in this country is as much a soldier for Uncle Sam as though he stood in a front trench with a rifle and bayonet in his hand. If he fails in the performance of his work, the loss to our country is as great as though a soldier turned yellow on the firing line. Good working conditions and good pay should be given these workmen. In return they should give the utmost effort in their power to the construction of these ships. We need literally hundreds of ships to carry our supplies to France. We must have them. We have in the United States several hundred thousand troops ready to go to France. We can not send them on account of the lack of equipment and lack of ships. The great reason is lack of ships. Our attention must be focused on these vitally essential factors of our military situation if we are going to win. We have made very respectable progress in the construction of appropriate docks, warehouses, and the securing of terminal facilities at seaports in the United States. This part of the problem was right here under our eyes, and we recognized all of its elements and of its importance. It is singular that we did not have the same vision respecting the problem of debarkation in France. We got off on the left foot in France as far as port facilities are concerned, and we are still hobbling around on that one foot. What I am about to say of conditions of transportation in France I say with the utmost reluctance. As a matter of fact these ideas were forced on me against my will. These deductions are impelled by what any man can see who follows this line of transportation as I did with our troops from this country to the firing line in France.

The port of debarkation, as I stated a time ago, is where I have my pointer now on the map. That is the large port assigned to us for our use. You will observe that railway transportation must cross France almost directly to the front line. My pointer is now on the exact spot where the American boys are in the trenches, near the fortress of Toul, not far from Nancy, and I am mighty glad that at last the authorities have the good judgment to tell the truth to the American people where these men are. The Germans naturally learned early. They learned while I was there, because they pulled off a raid that captured some of the Americans. So the Germans have known it for weeks and months. The American people ought to know, and it will be satisfying to them to know exactly where their men are.

We must not be too critical of those in charge of the administration of this war program, and I hope that will be distinctly understood. We had to set sail on an unknown sea. We had to block out our way amidst difficulties and conditions that had never confronted us before. You can not expect perfection to be attained at the first jump. If we are working toward it rapidly, that is all we can expect.

Mr. KNUTSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Certainly.

Mr. KNUTSON. Does not the gentleman think we have needlessly repeated blunders made by our allies in the first years of the war?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I am not convinced that perhaps we have been inexcusable in many of our blunders, but I prefer not to discuss that feature of it now.

Many of the things we are now trying to do have unexpectedly arisen as the situation has evolved. In the first place, when the war started we did not expect to send any troops to France at all until the middle of the summer 1918, when we expected to send a huge army. We changed our plan by sending a division for inspirational effect. We are now trying to get into France at the earliest possible date as large a fighting force as we can. In the first days, therefore, we failed to recognize some of the needs that would arise when the big movement was on. This matter of a port in France is one of them. We have largely for our use an important port in France. It, however, is grossly inadequate for our needs. In the first place, dock facilities were

constructed for a commerce not more than one-third of that we are pouring into the place now. Fearful congestion immediately resulted when we began to send many ships across. These ships have to lie there awaiting a chance to unload. Many of them have been there for weeks before they could be unloaded. In fact, while I was there there was one ship that had been at the dock 50 days trying to unload steel billets consigned to the French. It had got some off, but in despair of ever getting it unloaded it took the balance away, carrying them back to this country, a part of its cargo.

A vastly greater dock space is needed, and I am glad to say a very considerable development in this regard is now taking place. Terminal facilities, including warehouses, railway tracks, and the like are seriously needed. Men have been doing the best they can and considerable development has occurred, but the facilities still are grossly inadequate, even for existing needs. One hesitates to contemplate a picture of conditions there should no additional facilities be provided when we have 3,000,000 men in France. The truth is we simply never can get 3,000,000 men in France, and we could not keep them there a week unless we have different port facilities. Difficulties have arisen because the French do not understand us and we do not understand the French. Their ways are not our ways. It is the height of absurdity for us to continue to use this port and have the port completely under the control of the French.

I want to repeat that for emphasis. We might as well stop now and decide on one or two things that have got to be done. This port is not our port at all. We are permitted to use it by the French Government. We are going with such a force and such a purpose that we must have a port exclusively for ourselves, under our control, one we can develop, one where we can increase the docking facilities and where we can increase the channel depth. We want one that will accommodate the largest ships, one where we can build docks and terminal facilities and not be compelled to use the antiquated, out of date, inadequate facilities provided by the French Government at this time.

This port should be turned over to us absolutely and be exclusively under our control with full permission to make all needed changes. Enormous charges are now being made because American ships are using the facilities of this port. We should make it a condition precedent to sending another ship to France that that port be turned over to us. And what I say reflects the settled conviction of the men upon whose shoulders rests the responsibility of making this war a success in the field.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. This is very important, indeed, and I should like to know whether the United States is at all responsible for the congestion prevailing at the French port.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes, partly; but they have been trying to do the best they could with a system that is wrong.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Then it is not our fault.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Well, it is partly our fault. Gen. Pershing has tried man after man, trying to clear up and get these supplies moving, and as man after man has tried he has been removed. Gen. Pershing gives a man one chance, and if he does not succeed out he goes. And that is the way it ought to be. But these men were up against conditions beyond their control, and the greatest transportation expert in the world could not bring order out of chaos. An Army officer who is one of the most skilled transportation experts our Army has developed, with high rank in the Army, went over on the same boat that I did to take care of the transportation inland when the time arrived that he was needed. He was not quite needed at the time on the inland transportation, and he stopped at this port. Having nothing to do, he spent his time voluntarily working night and day trying to bring order out of chaos, and when I saw him at the end of the month he said, "My God, it is hopeless unless the Americans are in full and absolute control of this port and all the facilities here."

Mr. AUSTIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. AUSTIN. Let me ask the gentleman, Has it not been decided upon to open three ports to be used exclusively for the Americans?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I am quite confident that that is not so. Three ports are not necessary, but one is absolutely necessary, with part use of another, as circumstances require.

Now, I want to let that sink in with some insistence. The French Government is making heavy charges for the use of this port. These charges in some instances are positively fabulous.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Has any effort been made by any member of the Government of the United States to get the French authorities to turn this port over to the United States?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I have no way of knowing, but I hope that some one is taking that course. If they have not done so, it should have been a condition precedent to sending an Army over there in the first place.

Mr. MADDEN. It seems to me that all we would have to do would be to ask for it. The Government of France certainly could not refuse to grant that request.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I would say to the gentleman—

Mr. MADDEN. If we have not asked for it, I think we are very derelict.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I will say to the gentleman that I think we have asked for it, and I can not put it any stronger than that. The men operating the ships are not able to understand why many of these charges are made, but they are made, and up to date there seems to be no disposition other than to pay them. There could not be any other disposition. If necessary, let us pay France a reasonable rental for the use of this port—a good rental.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Will the gentleman please tell us what those charges are for?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I do not like to, but inasmuch as the gentleman has asked it I shall do so.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. If there is anything that ought not to be said, do not do so.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I do not want to injure the feelings of any of our friends.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Then I would not mention it.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. That is the only reason I refrain from giving them; but I will say to my friend that I have a list which I shall be very glad to show him privately.

Mr. MADDEN. They are the usual charges for docking—

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. And other things.

Mr. MADDEN. And port fees and pilot fees and all that.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. And other things.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Yes.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Is it not true that we ourselves built a large number of those docks?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. We have built some extensions to those already there.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I happened to hear the Secretary of War the other day before a committee of another body devote a great deal of time to showing what magnificent work this Government had done, and the enormous amount of docks it had built, and the enormous amount of lumber necessary to transport, and the number of forests had to be cut down in France to provide lumber with which to build the docks.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has again expired.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Mr. Chairman, I have been an awful transgressor, but I will state to the gentleman from Wisconsin that I think I can finish in 10 minutes.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I yield the gentleman 10 minutes more.

Mr. GOODWIN of Arkansas. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Does the gentleman contend that we should have the exclusive use of the port to which he refers?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Absolutely we should have control of it. We could permit French use of it as needed; but I will say that there is mighty little need that the French have for this port. What I mean is that we must have it under our absolute control.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Does the gentleman know what arrangements are made between the British and the French regarding the port of Calais?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I do not. I did not get interested in this port business until after I had been to England and to the English front or I should have made some inquiry in respect to it.

Mr. ROSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know the answer of the gentleman to the question of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LONGWORTH].

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I know they have been doing the best they can, but I sincerely trust the Secretary of War will find time to go over there and make a personal investigation of many things in France.

This brings me to the next step: There are not proper facilities for unloading the kind of cargo that certain ships carry. In the third place, stevedores could not be readily found for the work. In our anxiety to secure a force of stevedores to send

to this port in France, we seemed to think it was unnecessary to secure skill or experience. I do not know where these stevedores came from, but as near as I could make out they were recruited from various sections of the South—all of them colored—their main qualifications having been that at some time in their early youth they had sat on a dock and seen a steamboat pass by. Army officers who are working themselves down to skeleton form in a frantic effort to bring order out of this chaos at this port told me that in unloading ships these stevedores, by their carelessness and lack of experience, have destroyed 20 per cent of the cargoes that have been sent over. They would drop sugar and flour into the sea. They were clumsy, awkward, slow, inefficient.

I am inclined to think that conditions have improved since I left there the middle of November. God knows, I hope so, but I am speaking of it as I saw it during that period of two months and a half. I watched these men for many hours. I have never seen such inefficiency in my life on any kind of a job. Furthermore, there did not seem to be any desire to improve their efficiency. I am speaking now of the men themselves. Never was greater contrast noted than when I left this port and a few days later stood in another French port under the control of the English, and observed how the English handled their shipping and unloaded their boats. It was most humiliating to me as an American. To unload a boat does not require military training or skill. It is just plain, ordinary industrial work. Then, too, there were nowhere enough of these negro stevedores. An efficient corps of workmen of this class should be recruited in this country and sent over under military discipline and operated as a military unit. They began that just as I was leaving. If we have to pay high wages, let us pay them, but let us get efficiency. Why, I saw men there at the front, I saw the boys as they were putting their packs on their backs, getting ready to step into the trenches, and some of them did not have the kind of hats they should have—the kind adopted for the trenches. This hat was a new thing. They had not yet had a chance to get these hats, and perhaps could not have gotten them had they stayed there two weeks. Transportation from the port was pretty nearly blocked. Oh, if I could, if I felt at liberty to give you details of transportation from this port, even after it gets out of this congestion, then you would understand that we need to direct our attention to transportation in France.

This brings me to another thing. In order to get our men to the front and supplies to them, we have to ship all by a French railroad. The railroad we are using is exclusively under French control. The equipment is under French control; the trains are operated by the French. The cars that we are using are such as the French from time to time let us have.

And, by the way, our needs have to be supplied by the French. They take care of their own needs, and they are pretty certain to take care of their own needs first. It is no secret to the world, but every country in Europe is short of transportation on railways for their own needs. The cars that we use are such as the French from time to time let us have. Here again is manifested the unfortunate situation of our working in a strange land among strange people.

Mr. BLAND. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. Let me finish this; then if I can I will yield to the gentleman. The ways of the French and the Americans are not the same. The French Government should be required, as a condition precedent to our sending an army to France, to turn over to us not only this port but also a line of railroad from the port to the army in the field. This can be done, having a regard to the railway system in France. If it can not be done, we should build a railroad and build it at once; but it can be done, because from this particular port the railway facilities are such that one railroad system can be turned over to us. The condition is absolutely intolerable and prohibitive of success. We know that the German railways have been allowed to decline in efficiency to a very marked degree. Rolling stock and the roadbeds have not been kept up. The heavy wear and tear during these war years have seriously impaired the whole railway system. To a degree this has also occurred in France and England, particularly in France. The French railroad tracks are in good shape. The rolling stock is inadequate and out of repair. The gauge of the railroad is such that American rolling stock can be utilized. The United States should send to France for the use of our troops and of our Army at the earliest possible minute upward of a thousand locomotives, and many, many thousand cars. Efforts to supply the locomotives have been going on for many months, but we should have the direction and control of this railway system in our own hands. We can afford to pay the French Government liberally for the use of

this railway system, and the French people must see that our exclusive control over this system is essential to our military success.

Why, at one time—it is no great secret now—15,000 of our choice troops, the Rainbow Division, if you please, put on the finest ships in our Navy, the fastest, the biggest, the grandest and best, the cream of those that Germany so kindly let us have—against their will—went to a certain port in France. When it got there the rolling stock which had been promised to unload those troops and take them to the front had been obliged to be diverted to haul French and English soldiers, more than 200,000 of them, down to the Italian front, and those men were practically cut off, were practically obliged to stay on board their ships for two weeks, lying out there at sea, short of water, short of food, and short of everything. That was not the fault of anybody on earth but the system under which we are trying to work.

In the matter of motor trucks we have not made a practical start. I say this with deliberation, notwithstanding what some gentlemen recently have said. The type of motor truck first sent over was not the one best adapted to the roads of France. The British and the French use a truck that is several times larger than the one we first sent over, and they use an enormous number of them. Back of the British lines one seems to see nothing but endless streams of motor trucks. It is hard to believe there are so many motor trucks in the world. As yet we have an insufficient number of motor trucks over there. Visiting the various camps where the American troops are located, I was everywhere met with the concern about the need of motor transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. MILLER of Minnesota. I will not ask for further time.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HAMLIN].

Mr. HAMLIN. Mr. Chairman, I hardly think I will occupy all the time that the gentleman from Virginia has so generously yielded me. We have just listened to a very interesting address, one that I think it would be well for us all to consider and ponder carefully because it is this first-hand information that is most valuable in these times when we ought to be careful not to make mistakes.

I was very much interested in the address delivered this morning by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs outlining somewhat the history and the work of the State Department. I think we will all agree with him that it is one of the greatest departments of the Government. In one sense it is both the eyes and the ears of the President—it is through that department that he both sees and hears what is going on throughout the world and he is thus enabled to protect the rights of all the people of the United States. I sometimes think, and I have some knowledge of that department, that people fail to realize the tremendous importance of that particular department of government. I have not the slightest doubt that wars have more than once been averted by the activities of the State Department. Great questions have been settled through that department in a few days that bid fair to cost the people in treasure immense sums of money and cause rivers of blood to flow. Sometimes we are inclined to be a little niggardly when they ask for appropriations to carry on their work. Nothing that I shall say this afternoon must be construed as a criticism of the present administration of that department.

I had not thought of saying anything at all in relation to a matter that arose during the time the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Flood] was addressing the House this morning. I refer to the matter raised by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Fess] in regard to the work of Col. House. I have heard the question asked frequently, and usually put in the nature of a criticism, as to the status of Col. House on his missions to Europe. I hold no brief for him. I do not even know him; if I ever saw him I do not remember it, and I shall not attempt to say anything either for or against him. The fact that President Wilson trusts him gives me confidence in the man. I am surprised at anybody who would question the right or the expediency of the President in these critical times to select whomsoever he might choose to go any place or anywhere at any time to ascertain for him and through him for the people of the United States vital information, first hand, that is necessary for him to have in the proper management of the affairs of this Government. That has been the practice, if I read the history of my country correctly, throughout all of its history. Other Presidents have done it. I called attention this morning when that question was raised to the fact that President Roosevelt in 1905 had designated or selected a man by the name of Jacob Hollander to

go as his special representative to Santo Domingo on a certain mission. That this designation was made by President Roosevelt appeared in a hearing had by the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department a few years ago when that committee was investigating the State Department. I have looked up that record briefly, and I find Mr. Hollander when he was before that committee stated:

The President of the United States asked me to go to Santo Domingo in March, 1905, as his agent to ascertain just what conditions were and to report to him as to the advisability of sending a mission to make a full study and a written report.

This question was asked Dr. Hollander:

You speak of this trip to Europe. Did you make more than one trip to Europe?

Dr. HOLLANDER. I made two. The first trip of investigation was made in June, 1905, while I was the representative of the President.

And then he went on to tell for what purpose he made the trip. Again he said in the course of that examination, when his attention was called to a date that the committee thought he was mistaken about:

Dr. HOLLANDER. I moved it one year later; it should have been "until I was again invited in June, 1906"; that is to say, I was sent by the President in March, 1905; I made a verbal report to him in May, 1905; I went to Europe and on my return from Europe I was sent in a cruiser to the West Indies and given this proper dignity, and when I returned I submitted my report, in September, and remained subject to the orders of the President until December 31, 1905, after which my compensation and connection terminated, and I was not employed in any wise until the conference of which I spoke in June, 1906.

There was no criticism of that. I might doubt the necessity for that appointment, but I do not doubt President Roosevelt's right to make it.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Does not the gentleman recognize the difference between that mission and the mission upon which Col. House last went to Europe, when he went to meet the chief statesmen of the belligerent countries allied with us—the premier of England, the premier of France, and the premier of Italy?

Mr. HAMLIN. I do not.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. They being officially recognized and Col. House being an unofficial representative of the President and not of the country?

Mr. HAMLIN. When Col. House represented the President, he represented the whole country, and I do not think the United States suffered any by reason of the fact that he may not have gone there with his pockets full of commissions or his breast decorated with all sorts of jewels and insignia.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. He was well known.

Mr. HAMLIN. He is certainly becoming well known.

Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas. Would it not be in keeping with the dignity of this country to have had a representative of this country occupying an official position equal to those of other countries?

Mr. HAMLIN. The dignity of the United States undoubtedly has not suffered. The approval placed upon Col. House by President Wilson, by intrusting him with a great mission, is sufficient dignity to give him standing in any country and among any people or dignitaries on the face of the earth, and he needed nothing more. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. HARDY. I will ask the gentleman if the treatment accorded to Col. House did not show that he was fully recognized?

Mr. HAMLIN. Absolutely. There is no question about it.

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. FESS. As I understand from the hearings, the gentleman was paid out of what fund?

Mr. HAMLIN. Now, I am coming to that—I am leading right up to it. You mean Dr. Hollander?

Mr. FESS. Yes. I was about to say I did not raise that question this morning, and it is a question that was pertinent.

Mr. HAMLIN. And the question I rose to discuss was the expenditure of certain moneys by the State Department, and my reference to this matter at all was occasioned by the question raised this morning by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Fess].

Mr. FESS. However, the gentleman will remember I did not raise the question of money matters.

Mr. HAMLIN. Not at all.

I hardly feel it is necessary to go into the question of the compensation of this man Hollander inasmuch as that is past history. Since the gentleman has asked me, however, it did develop that this fellow Hollander was paid something like \$50,000 by our Government for his services and \$100,000 by the Santo Domingo Government, the propriety of which transaction our committee questioned.

I do not think there was ever a time, even in times of peace, when it is not necessary for the President to have a fund from

which he can pay through the State Department certain expenses incident to a certain class of official duties that it would not be policy to make public to the world. We all recognize that, and we have recognized it ever since the organization of the Government. Every other Government in the world does the same thing. The reason for it is perfectly apparent. It frequently becomes necessary, in addition to all the information the President can gather through the ordinary sources—the ambassadors, consuls, and so forth—for him to select some man in whom he has absolute confidence, as to his integrity, intelligence, and his judgment, to go on a mission and obtain first-hand facts so that when the President acts he can know that he has the actual facts. The importance of this is apparent, I think, to everyone of us. Of course, this work cost something and must be paid out of some fund. It would not do perhaps to make public the purpose of this expenditure, because if published to the world just what had been done international complications would in all probability arise from such publication. Therefore in this bill and in every other similar bill there is carried a lump sum of money—\$700,000 in this bill, I see—out of which the President may pay these kind of expenses, and then report the expenditure to the Treasury Department under section 291 of the Revised Statutes by what is called a secret certificate, without specifying, without itemizing, and without disclosing the vouchers showing for what this money has been expended.

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. FESS. I think the gentleman does not want that statement to go into the Record at this place, to the effect that the \$700,000 in this bill is intended to pay expenses of this sort.

Mr. HAMLIN. Oh, no. I say there is carried in this bill, under the item of emergencies, and so forth, \$700,000—

Mr. FESS. Which may arise out of the war and which nobody can foresee.

Mr. HAMLIN. I do not mean to say that the entire \$700,000 will be thus expended, but under that emergency item of the bill there is carried the sum of \$700,000.

Mr. FESS. But specifically because under the war there are situations developing in various parts of the world that we can not foresee now.

Mr. HAMLIN. There is no question about that. In ordinary peace times the appropriations under that item averaged only about \$90,000, and at times, I think, it has been cut down to \$50,000.

There is another thing I wish to refer to. At the time my committee made the investigation of the State Department a few years ago it went into these matters very carefully. There was then no war; there was not even a war cloud in sight; and we recommended that the amount carried under this particular item which we have been discussing in the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill be cut down below \$90,000. But I realize that conditions have radically changed since this administration went into power in 1913. At that time there was trouble brewing in Mexico. There was an ugly situation down there. Then, in August, 1914, this awful war broke out in Europe, multiplying many times over the necessity for the performance of just such services as would be paid for out of a fund of this kind and not to be specifically reported to the Treasury Department. Under the general law every dollar that the different executive departments expend must be represented by a voucher, and all may be made public, excepting this particular kind of expenditure that I am now speaking of.

And that brings me to the real point in the case: There has been a tendency to take advantage, it seems to me, of the fact that the Secretary of State or the State Department has the right, under section 291 of the Revised Statutes, to expend money out of this fund, and then, in settlement with the Treasury, cover the purpose of the expenditure by a blanket certificate of secrecy and forever foreclose the world from a knowledge of the purpose for which this money was expended. This statement in nowise refers to the conduct of the State Department under the Wilson administration, for I have no information covering that point.

Mr. LONDON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there for an inquiry?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. LONDON. Has not a fund of \$100,000,000 been put at the disposal of the President out of which such expenses could be paid?

Mr. HAMLIN. That is a different fund entirely. That is purely a war emergency fund. I am talking now about the fund that is carried in all of these Diplomatic appropriation bills, either in time of war or in time of peace.

Now, I want to call the attention of the committee to what appears to be a discrepancy in the report as compared to cer-

tain data which I have. The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the frank and fair way in which he always deals with the House, has published in the report filed with this bill a tabulated statement, on page 9, which was undoubtedly furnished him by the State Department, showing the amount of money appropriated during the different years, running from 1905 to 1918, inclusive, and the amount expended out of that appropriation during each of these years, and which expenditures were undoubtedly covered by secret certificates in the Treasury such as I have been talking about. I have here with me some of these so-called secret certificates. I will call your attention to one, so that you may understand it. They read like this:

By direction of the President and in pursuance of section 291 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, I hereby certify that _____, the disbursing officer, has expended the sum of \$_____ during the period from _____ to _____, 19____, from the appropriation for emergencies arising in the Diplomatic and Consular Service, 19____, for expenses incurred during the fiscal year 19____, NATURE AND OBJECT OF WHICH EXPENDITURE IT IS DEEMED INEXPEDIENT TO MAKE KNOWN, and I hereby request the accounting officers of the Treasury, in the settlement of the accounts of the said _____, to allow him in the amount above named \$_____.

That is what we call the secret certificate which they are permitted to file with the Treasury Department under section 291 of the Revised Statutes. That is perfectly all right. I have no criticism to make of that at all, provided that expenditure is limited to things that should really be kept secret.

But let me give you an illustration of the practice which seemed prevalent in the department several years ago. We make an appropriation in this bill each year of a certain amount of money for bringing home criminals. There is no secrecy about this item. The amount is specified always; and yet I have certificates on file in the committee room, such as the one I have read, showing that for money expended in bringing home criminals they solemnly certified that the expenditure was of a nature and for a purpose that ought not to be disclosed and covered it into the Treasury by secret certificate. We appropriated some years ago \$20,000, with no secrecy about it in the world, to enable this Government to participate in the celebration of the tercentennial at Lake Champlain. That amount of money was expended and the report of it was covered by one of these secret certificates in the Treasury; and yet there was absolutely no reason for it to be kept secret.

I can name 15 or 20 different expenditures covered by secret certificates in the Treasury as to which there could be possibly no kind of reason for it. The truth is, if a Secretary of State were disposed to do it, he could go out here on the street and buy an automobile for \$5,000 and pay for it out of this fund and then solemnly declare that the purpose of that expenditure was of such character and nature that it ought not to be made public, and put the certificate in the Treasury and absolutely foreclose any knowledge on the part of the public as to the purpose for which that money was expended.

Now, I am not accusing anybody of doing that. I am simply pointing out the danger. I do know that this fund has been utilized for purposes which ought not to be kept secret, but in settlement was covered by a secret certificate.

Let me point out here what seems to be misleading. I have not got the report up to date. I have tried to get it, but so far it has not come to me. In 1911 my committee made a very exhaustive examination of conditions in the State Department. At that time I wrote the Secretary of the Treasury and asked him to send me, among other things, a statement of all the money paid out of this emergency fund and covered in settlement by so-called secret certificates under section 291, Revised Statutes.

Here is his reply:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 2, 1911.

Hon. C. W. HAMLIN,
Chairman Committee on Expenditures in State Department,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

SIR: In compliance with the request contained in your letter of July 18, 1911, there is submitted below a statement prepared by the Auditor for the State and Other Departments showing all moneys disbursed by the Department of State and accounted for by certificates of the Secretary of State under section 291, Revised Statutes of the United States, from July 1, 1905, to March 31, 1911:

July, 1905	\$2,589.84
August, 1905	4,226.01
September, 1905	11,078.47
October, 1905	14,019.77
November, 1905	16,924.24
December, 1905	7,716.85
January, 1906	8,690.08
February, 1906	4,680.94
March, 1906	11,739.26
April, 1906	10,570.36
May, 1906	10,871.40
June, 1906	14,389.41
Quarter ended Sept. 30, 1906	29,304.72

Quarter ended Dec. 31, 1906	\$16,131.98
Quarter ended Mar. 31, 1907	33,629.94
Quarter ended June 30, 1907	29,667.34
Quarter ended Sept. 30, 1907	32,677.79
Quarter ended Dec. 31, 1907	29,896.06
Period from Jan. 1 to Apr. 6, 1908	18,063.92
Period from Apr. 17 to June 30, 1908	21,682.36
Quarter ended Sept. 30, 1908	27,195.00
Quarter ended Dec. 31, 1908	21,958.25
Quarter ended Mar. 31, 1909	49,876.00
Quarter ended June 30, 1909	27,602.73
Quarter ended Sept. 30, 1909	26,561.45
Quarter ended Dec. 31, 1909	29,596.71
Quarter ended Mar. 31, 1910	32,806.40
Quarter ended June 30, 1910	15,611.16
Quarter ended Sept. 30, 1910	43,272.60
Quarter ended Dec. 31, 1910	100,081.96
Quarter ended Mar. 31, 1911	16,991.15

Respectfully,

FRANKLIN MACVEAGH, Secretary.

You will observe that this letter only brings it up to March 31, 1911. Recently I asked the Secretary to give me a statement of the disbursement from April 1, 1911, to June 30, 1911, so as to complete the statement for the full six fiscal years—from July 1, 1905, to June 30, 1911:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 28, 1911.

Hon. C. W. HAMLIN,
Chairman Committee on Expenditures in State Department,
House of Representatives.

SIR: Replying to your letter of October 24, 1911, I have the honor to inform you that the sum of \$13,505.72 was expended by the Department of State and accounted for by certificates of the Secretary of State under section 291, Revised Statutes of the United States, for the period April 1 to June 30, 1911, as shown by the files of this department.

Respectfully,

J. F. CURTIS, Acting Secretary.

Mr. KNUTSON. Has the gentleman any figures available since 1913?

Mr. HAMLIN. I prefer not to stop to answer that now, but if the gentleman will remind me of it I will do so a little later on. You will observe, if you have the report on this bill before you, that they say that for the fiscal year 1906 there was expended under section 291, Revised Statutes, \$112,080.78. As a matter of fact, unless I made a mistake in addition, and I do not think I did, there was expended \$117,496.72, as that much was reported to the Treasury by secret certificates under section 291, Revised Statutes.

For 1907 they say there was expended \$76,925.12. As a matter of fact there was expended, covered by these secret certificates, \$108,133.98.

In 1908 they say there was expended \$80,620.52. There was actually expended \$102,321.03.

In 1909 they say there was expended \$47,865.67. There was actually expended \$126,632.58.

In 1910 they say there was \$79,744.20 expended. There was actually expended \$104,545.81.

For 1911 they say there was expended \$89,466.63. As a matter of fact there was actually expended \$173,851.43.

Mr. FLOOD. Will the gentleman permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman stated that these figures were furnished to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the State Department. The gentleman is right about that?

Mr. HAMLIN. I said I supposed they were furnished by the State Department.

Mr. FLOOD. I should like to know how the Secretary of State could expend as much money as the gentleman said in 1911, something over \$173,000, when the appropriation was \$90,000 and the unexpended balance \$10,000, a total of \$100,000?

Mr. HAMLIN. The Secretary of the Treasury in 1911 stated that they spent \$173,851.43. I think I can explain it. I am not criticizing, but trying to call attention to a dangerous situation that ought to be regulated.

Mr. FESS. How was the difference made up?

Mr. HAMLIN. In a moment I will answer the questions of both the gentleman from Virginia and the gentleman from Ohio. Let me give you the total first, though. The sum total for these six years, as shown by the report of the committee, aggregates \$157,419.79, whereas by the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury for the same years there was expended \$615,485.23, or a difference of \$458,065.44. You ask how I explain it. I will tell you how I explain it, and yet I may be wrong. There can be no kind of mistake about the figures furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury, because there came along at about the same time, or at least I have them, certified copies of the secret certificates filed by the Secretary of State with the Treasury Department covering those amounts. Now I will tell you where I think the discrepancy comes in. I take it for granted that the amount printed in the report by the committee and furnished by the State Department is in all human probability actually and truly the amount expended for secret

work that ought not to be made public. I am not saying that is not true. I apprehend that is true. But covered in the same way in the Treasury Department by these secret certificates were items aggregating \$458,065.44 that were not secret and ought not to have been reported under secrecy.

Mr. FLOOD. Does the gentleman think that the Comptroller of the Treasury would permit the payment of a warrant on that fund when all the fund had been exhausted? An appropriation was made for that fund in 1911 of \$90,000; there was an unexpended balance of \$10,000, making \$100,000. Does the gentleman think the Treasury Department would pay warrants aggregating \$173,000 on that fund? Surely the gentleman does not think that there could be spent of that fund a larger amount than the fund itself.

Mr. HAMLIN. They have a system of bookkeeping down there by which in some way they borrow from one fund and pay it back out of another, and switch around until it takes a better bookkeeper than I am to know how it is done. But it is like the fellow that said a rabbit could not climb a tree; but the other fellow said that it did climb a tree, because it had to. Here is the report of the Treasury Department, with the certificates.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. HAMLIN. May I have five minutes more?

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman five minutes more.

Mr. HAMLIN. I have the certificates for those years, and here are the figures. Any gentlemen can take them. I will print them in the RECORD. Any gentleman can figure it out for himself. This amount of money was solemnly certified to by the then Secretary of State. He said that the purposes of the expenditures ought not to be made known, and it aggregates the amount that I give you. Now, whether the fund was there or not—

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman has just said that at times the department borrows from this fund for other funds and subsequently reimburses the fund. That seems to be the explanation.

Mr. HAMLIN. The gentleman has listened indifferently to me, or else he knows that that is not the only explanation I suggested. I do not attempt to explain. It is up to the department to make the explanation. I give the facts as they were given me by the Treasury Department.

Mr. FLOOD. Does the gentleman think that since 1912 a better system has been inaugurated?

Mr. HAMLIN. I certainly hope so. There is absolutely no partisanship in this with me. I have not yet got a report from the Secretary of State. I wrote him as soon as I got the report of the committee and saw the figures published therein. You know that under the law the executive departments must report their expenditures annually, and these reports are referred to the Committee on Expenditures for the different departments. When the Secretary of State's report came in and was referred to my committee I failed to find the usual report of the amount of money expended from the emergency fund. I called the department up on the telephone and they assured me that they would furnish me that information. I got busy and forgot it, and I presume they did. Nothing more was said about it until I got hold of the report published by the committee on this bill, and I immediately wrote the Secretary of State, asking him to kindly furnish me the amount of money spent out of the emergency fund for the years 1912-1918 covered by secret certificates in settlement with the Treasury. I told him I wanted this information, if possible, by last Saturday. On yesterday I received the following letter from him:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 2, 1918.

The Hon. COURTNEY W. HAMLIN, Chairman,
Committee on Expenditures in the State Department,
House of Representatives,

MY DEAR MR. HAMLIN: I have received your letter of January 29, 1917, requesting a statement of the amount of money which this department has expended, under the provisions of section 291 of the Revised Statutes, from the appropriation designated as "Emergencies arising in the Diplomatic and Consular Service" for the fiscal years 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917.

In view of the fact that there is an Executive order providing that no information of any kind shall be furnished by the Secretary of State in regard to money expended and accounted for by certificate, in pursuance of section 291 of the Revised Statutes, except upon due direction in writing from the President, I have submitted your request to the President for his direction and will take pleasure in communicating with you further as soon as his reply shall have been received.

I am, my dear Mr. Hamlin,
Very sincerely, yours,

ROBERT LANSING.

Now, then the Executive order referred to I suppose is an order issued by President Taft some years ago when we were making an examination of the State Department.

I think that it is only fair to state that I on yesterday replied to the Secretary as follows:

FEBRUARY 4, 1918.

HON. ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am somewhat surprised at the statement in the first paragraph of your letter of date the 2d instant, in view of the fact that what purports to be information asked for by me, and which you declined to furnish without special permission from the President, has been made public in the report on the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill now on the Calendar of the House. Certainly if they have been furnished with the information, then I see no reason why the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department, whose duty it is to look into the expenditures of money in that department, should be denied this information.

I will state very frankly that the immediate cause of my preferring the request for this information contained in my letter of January 29, 1918, was that I had seen the report filed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs covering the expenditures made by the Department of State under section 291, Revised Statutes, for the years 1905 to 1918, and from information which I have covering a portion of this time I am led to conclude that that statement, to say the least, is misleading. However, the information which I have does not cover all the years mentioned in that report, and I was anxious to get direct information from the department so as to compare it with the statement published.

I trust that you will not hesitate to furnish it and would be glad to have it at the earliest possible time.

Very respectfully,

Mr. PLATT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. PLATT. Did I understand the gentleman to say that \$20,000 of an appropriation openly made was put in under one of these certificates?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. PLATT. Then that did not come out of this fund.

Mr. HAMLIN. No; it did not come out of this fund, and that may explain somewhat how they seemed to have expended more than was appropriated. Twenty thousand dollars was a special appropriation, but it was covered by a secret certificate in settlement with the Treasury. Why it went in under that and finally got over, I do not know. We found that about \$5,000 was paid out on a banquet, hack hire, telephone, sleeping berths on the train, railroad fare, and so forth.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I thought it was for rope and other refreshments. That is the way it is generally charged.

Mr. HAMLIN. No; they gave us the hotel bill itemized. There was plenty of wine in it.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. There is always a great reluctance to tell of the good times we have had when they spend the public money in having it.

Mr. HAMLIN. Now I am not seeking to criticize only. I want to try to correct an evil.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I think the gentleman is doing his full duty.

Mr. PLATT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. PLATT. Under what law could a secret certificate be issued for a fund made by an open appropriation?

Mr. HAMLIN. There is no law for it. I could give you another instance, but I rather hesitate to do it because I have spoken of it here so often. We discovered that a portrait of Justice Day, as ex-Secretary of State, was painted at public expense as was customary. Mr. Rosenthal, of Philadelphia, was the artist. The chief clerk of the State Department called on the disbursing officer for \$2,500, telling him it was to pay for painting Justice Day's portrait. The disbursing officer turned the money over to the chief clerk. Eight hundred and fifty dollars was paid to Rosenthal, he having signed a blank receipt in advance, and over his signature they filled in \$2,450, but \$850 only was given to Rosenthal. Where the balance of the money went we have never been able to say.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Was that before or after we made the appropriation for the Shipping Board? [Laughter.]

Mr. PLATT. That was paid out of the emergency fund.

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes; out of the emergency fund.

Mr. KNUTSON. What year did that take place?

Mr. HAMLIN. In 1907, I believe. This is the point I am trying to make, that we ought to safeguard in every way we can the expenditure of this money. The practice to which I have referred opens the floodgates, gentlemen, and there is no question about that in the world. Mr. Knox was Secretary of State when we made this investigation. He came before our committee and was defending in a way the practice under section 291, Revised Statutes—not defending this particular thing of which I spoke a while ago, of course, but insisting that the Secretary of State should have full leeway in these matters. He said they were bound to have this fund and bound to have this leeway, but I put this question to him: "Mr. Secretary, under your construction of that statute could you not go down town and buy you a span of matched horses and a fine carriage

and equipment out of this fund and then cover it with a secret certificate in the Treasury by saying that the purpose of this expenditure ought not to be made known?" And he answered yes, that there was no question in the world about that. I say that is not right, and there ought to be some kind of a brake or safeguard thrown around this fund.

I expect that the department will need all the money that is carried in this bill for emergency purposes, but I hope that the President and the Secretary of State will be more careful than some of their predecessors; and I ought to say for Mr. Knox that after we made this exposé he came before our committee and granted that we had rendered the country a real service, and he said that he had issued an order that not one dollar should be drawn out of this fund until the items for which the money is to be paid out shall have been stated and laid on his desk and his attention had been specifically called to it. I applauded him for that. Then when Mr. Bryan came along as Secretary of State I went down to his office and spent an afternoon with him, and called his attention to all of these things, and I said: "I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will hold a tight hand upon the expenditure of this money that may be covered by secret certificates in the Treasury." He assured me that he would. I have not said anything to the present Secretary of State, but I am hoping—and I have no reason to think otherwise—that he is following the rule established by Mr. Knox and followed by Mr. Bryan.

Mr. PLATT. Is it not true that all of the unexpended balance are carried right along in this fund?

Mr. HAMLIN. Only during the past few years is that true. That was not the early practice. I think in 1911 or 1912 was the first time the unexpended balance was reappropriated. Before that time what was not expended went back into the Treasury, but I am inclined to think that there never was any not unexpended.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. As I understand the gentleman's statement and his reading of this letter, he rather indicates the present Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, is holding to the secrecy method, just as it has been held to heretofore.

Mr. HAMLIN. Mr. Lansing evidently felt that he was bound by that Executive order that was issued, I presume, by Mr. Taft.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. That is to say, he was hiding behind the error that had been previously made.

Mr. HAMLIN. I have not said that it was an error, although I think it was.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I do not understand the gentleman that way, and I put the question to him. It seems to me, from the letters the gentleman has read, that Mr. Lansing rather referred the gentleman's inquiry to the President, thinking perhaps he ought not to tell the chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department how the money had been expended until he had consulted the President.

Mr. FLOOD. I think that is not a fair statement as to Mr. Lansing.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The letter so states.

Mr. HAMLIN. The letter just simply stated that, on account of the Executive order on file in the department requiring the Secretary of State to refer these matters to the President, he had done so.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Exactly; and I think the gentleman was extremely diligent in trying to obtain information about these secret expenditures. He has not yet obtained the information, owing to the conditions that prevail.

Mr. HAMLIN. I do not claim credit for myself for extreme diligence. Some time ago I called up the department, and they promised me the information. I presume they forgot it; I know I did, and never thought of it until a few days ago, when I read this report. Then I sent the letter to Mr. Lansing and, if he had to refer the matter to the President, he has not had time yet to get the information to me.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I think the gentleman has done his duty in calling the attention of the House to the fact.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has again expired.

Mr. FLOOD. I yield five minutes more to the gentleman.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Moore] will recall that the letter from the Secretary of State to the gentleman from Missouri was dated last Saturday. The gentleman from Missouri replied to that letter yesterday, and the Secretary of State has not had time to reply to that letter. I will say, in connection with this fund, in justice to the present occupant of that position, that last year he requested—it was, of course, before we were engaged in this war—that that fund be reduced from \$200,000, which it has been for some years or prior to that time, to \$150,000, and I know from statements he has made to the Committee on Foreign Affairs that he would not object in the

least, beyond the fact that he is bound by the order issued by President Taft, to make any of these disclosures to the gentleman from Missouri, who is chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in the Department of State. He has invited members of the Foreign Affairs Committee to visit the State Department and go over the vouchers with him.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. But he declined to give the gentleman who is chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department information at the present time. He stated that he is bound by a law issued by President Taft some seven years ago.

Mr. FLOOD. That order has not been rescinded.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. If there is an improper practice prevailing, the gentleman who is chairman of the committee which ought to have the information is denied the information.

Mr. FLOOD. I think the Secretary of State surely would be bound by the order directed by the President to him until that order was rescinded.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. My point is the President has been conducting affairs now at least five years, and he has had opportunity to observe whether this order was a good or a bad one, and he has permitted it to prevail, and when the authorized committee asks for information the Secretary of State falls behind this order to the extent of declining the information.

Mr. FLOOD. And during these five years there has been no request made of the Secretary of State that would draw this order into question or call his or the President's attention to it.

Mr. HAMLIN. That is true. I was just going to say no criticism can be inferred from that, because I, as chairman of that committee, have not from that time until now made this request. Perhaps the Secretary's attention was never directed to this Executive order until he got my letter the other day. Now, I want to say this in conclusion, as I do not wish to trespass upon the patience of the committee.

Mr. DYER. Does the gentleman know the Executive order was that of President Taft and not that of the present President?

Mr. HAMLIN. The present President, I am satisfied, has made no such order. President Taft did make such an order, and I was served with a copy of it.

Mr. PLATT. This table covers the expenditures from 1905 until 1918?

Mr. HAMLIN. Yes.

Mr. PLATT. And each year shows the balances subtracted, the expenditures made, and the appropriations made? If these balances are carried on they are available for expenditures—that is, if they have been available only from 1911, there must be \$300,000 more in the fund than appears on the surface.

Mr. HAMLIN. That was not true until 1911 or 1912. Prior to that time the unexpended money, if there was any, was automatically turned back into the Treasury.

Mr. PLATT. Are these balances added to the appropriation?

Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman does not understand that all these amounts should be added together.

Mr. PLATT. I understand these balances on the right hand had to be added to the appropriations.

Mr. FLOOD. One balance each time. The whole balance for all the year is added to the appropriation.

Mr. PLATT. Is the balance of each year carried in the appropriation of the next year? It does not show balances carried.

Mr. HAMLIN. If there were any.

Mr. PLATT. Then the balances are available to be expended in that year?

Mr. FLOOD. No; we appropriate a certain amount and the unexpended balance.

Mr. PLATT. This is carried in the table of the expenditures and the balance is to be added in each time?

Mr. FLOOD. For instance, in 1917 \$200,000 and the unexpended balance was appropriated. This unexpended balance was \$31,830.85 left over from the preceding year. That is to be added to the \$200,000, and that is the case as to all these amounts.

Mr. WHEELER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAMLIN. I will.

Mr. WHEELER. I inferred from what the gentleman said that an order issued by former President Taft has been directed by President Wilson to be still carried out?

Mr. HAMLIN. Oh, no; I said nothing like that. We went over that a few moments ago. Perhaps the gentleman was not in the Chamber at the time.

President Taft issued an Executive order years ago to the effect that the Secretary of State could not furnish—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. FLOOD. I yield to the gentleman five minutes more.

Mr. HAMLIN (continuing). That the Secretary of State should not furnish our committee with any further information unless first submitted to him and permission granted. And that order, of course, went into the archives of the department, and that is evidently the order referred to by Mr. Lansing.

I introduced a bill and kept introducing it for a year or two, but I could not seemingly interest anybody especially. My bill provided that there should be a permanent standing joint committee of the House and Senate, composed of three men from each House, to whom should be submitted each year all the items for which this money had been expended. If, in their judgment, some of this money was expended for something not necessary to keep secret, they could make it public. Otherwise they could keep it secret. I believed that three men in the House and three men in the Senate could be selected who would be loyal and true and patriotic, and would go over these things and never disclose anything that ought not to be disclosed. I believe something of that kind ought to be done in order that this privilege can not be abused.

I thank you very much. [Applause.]

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Hicks].

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Speaker and gentlemen of the Congress, I am going to speak directly during the time allotted me on the question of manning the merchant ships of the United States, those under Government control as well as those traversing the war zone, with Navy crews. I have obtained permission to use here to-day some of the testimony that was given before the Navy investigating committee. The permission was given me by Secretary Daniels, by Admiral Palmer, and by the chairman of our committee, and, with the permission of the House, I will insert that testimony in my remarks.

Ocean transportation is to-day one of the prime factors in the successful prosecution of the war. Every vessel carrying supplies across the Atlantic is in actual war service, for this over-seas traffic is a part of the line of communication from the base—the American ports—to the front and should be operated just as efficiently as any other part of our war activities. The lives of our men on the battle line and the lives of those en route depend upon the quick, safe, and certain operation of our ships. Our entrance into the great conflict has brought to America both a great responsibility and a great opportunity. We shall not shirk the one and should not fail to take advantage of the other. Our responsibility is to build and operate a merchant marine of sufficient tonnage to transport our troops to France, with the supplies of munitions and food to maintain them at the front, as well as to carry a large percentage of the foodstuffs needed by our allies. Our opportunity is to place this mercantile fleet on a permanent footing and make it American in personnel as well as in ownership and operation.

Let me quote from Commodore Miller:

In the days before the Civil War the United States had a merchant marine which was the envy of the greatest commercial nations of the Old World. The great mass of the population lived within a few miles of the coast and the desire of nearly every small boy was to run away and become a sailor. Among a seafaring people it was not difficult to find good crews for all the ships that could be built. But for the last few decades our development has been landward. We were, as a people, devoted to the mighty task of conquering a continent for civilization. We permitted a good part of our foreign trade and most of our shipping tonnage to be captured by our European rivals. It is now of no avail to lament this long neglect of the world's great waterways. In fact, it was not wholly an evil, for by concentrating on the development of the inland States we have created a remarkable railroad system, and this made possible the opening of the great agricultural region of the Mississippi.

The great question which confronts us now and which with increasing force will confront us as we augment the number of our ships is the personnel of the crews operating them. The Navy Department has no controversy with the Shipping Board in this matter. It is their desire and aim to cooperate, not combat; to assist, not retard. Only as a part, though a very important part, of the great national organization charged with the duty of carrying forward America's purposes are they concerned in the manning of merchant ships not directly under the control of the Navy. But the Navy Department, ever alert to the exigencies of every situation, stands ready to enlist and train men for this service. With the same foresight that prompted them to order supplies and contract for munitions in anticipation of their immediate needs at the outbreak of hostilities, they suggested as long ago as last summer the advisability of manning the ships to be built by the Shipping Board by naval crews. In this connection let me offer this letter from the Secretary of the Navy:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 30, 1917.

DEAR MR. HURLEY: With reference to your letter of November 23, 1917, the principal question involved, relating to the placing of men trained by the Navy on the inactive list in order that they might enter

the merchant marine in a civilian status, has been discussed in a conference of representatives of the Navy Department and of the Shipping Board with the result that it was mutually agreed that such plan was impracticable.

As was brought out in the conversation on Wednesday, the chief question at the present time is, of course, the efficient conduct of the war. In other words, the handling of ships crossing the war zone in the most efficient manner possible. This is, of course, the principal desire, not only of the Navy Department but of the Shipping Board and the country as a whole. The question, therefore, resolves itself into a consideration of what method shall be arrived at in order to carry out this purpose. It seems to us essential that all ships crossing the war zone should be officered and manned by men who are subject to naval discipline.

Merchant ships in the war zone are almost as vital a factor in naval operation as the regular vessels of the Navy, and it is of the highest importance that the officers and crews of these merchant ships have such training as will fit them for these military duties and be subject to naval control and discipline.

I know you will understand that the Navy is interested solely in the military and naval work ahead of us in getting troops, munitions, and supplies of all kinds across the Atlantic, and that in cooperating with the Shipping Board toward this end we want to do so in such a way as to assist the Shipping Board, not only in this work but in helping it to build up an American merchant marine for the future.

Limiting the question, therefore, to vessels crossing the Atlantic, as suggested at the recent conference, crews can be specially qualified for this work and be under the necessary discipline and control if recruited and trained as Naval Reservists. Under existing laws members of the Naval Reserve must be either American citizens or citizens of friendly nations who have taken out their first papers. We realize, of course, that a large percentage of the crews of American ships are now foreigners who do not come within this category, but it is probable that with the increasing number of ships these men would find ready employment on vessels not engaged in trans-Atlantic voyages.

In regard to those now serving in the merchant marine, who would be eligible for the Naval Reserve, it is hoped that a large percentage of them, both officers and men, will be willing voluntarily to be enrolled in the Naval Reserve and some satisfactory arrangements can undoubtedly be made between the Navy Department and the Shipping Board for the enrollment of a large proportion of them.

In regard to the officers who are now on American merchant vessels, short courses of training can be established in order to instruct them more fully in the procedure necessary to make the voyages safe through the war zone.

If given ample notice in advance as to the numbers and types of vessels for this trans-Atlantic trade, with the dates of readiness, we believe that the Navy Department can obtain sufficient men under present laws governing the Naval Reserves. While the Navy has already increased its training facilities, an additional call of this nature will require certain extensions of our stations which should be taken up at once. The manning of these vessels by Naval Reserve officers and crews should not in any way interfere with any plans of the Shipping Board to have the operation of these vessels while in port conducted by private companies or by the Shipping Board.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

Let me also include this letter from Admiral Palmer, of the Bureau of Navigation:

DECEMBER 18, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Personnel preparation for taking over merchant ships.

1. It is recommended that the following proposed letter be sent to the chairman of the Shipping Board. It is important that the chairman of the Shipping Board fully understand that in case the Navy is to be called on to man ships that several months' notice will be necessary:

"MY DEAR MR. HURLEY: It appears that the Shipping Board has issued the following statement to the public press:

"The bulk of vessels under the American flag, whether engaged in trans-Atlantic trade or elsewhere, so long as they retain their character as merchantment, will continue to be manned by merchant sailors. Troopships and vessels carrying whole cargoes of munitions or supplies for the Army and Navy, however, for military reasons, will be manned by naval crews."

"It is requested that this be verified.

"I am of the opinion that the personnel difficulties are going to be much greater than contemplated. From our own military history, where large forces have been called on for short-time enlistments, it has been impossible to have a properly trained force. For example, during the War of 1812 over half a million men were enlisted in the Army, practically all being short-time enlistments. This force was never able to effectively oppose the 16,000 British on this continent. For inexperienced men the life at sea is a greater hardship than life in the Army, and at the present time the war-zone dangers are much greater than has been the danger of our troops in previous wars.

"I believe the only method by which men of the merchant marine can be held until they become efficient, and afterwards held and detailed to the best advantage of the service, is to make enlistments in a military service for this duty for the duration of the war. This plan also conserves man power, in as much as an armed guard in addition to the regular crew would be unnecessary. I hope the plan you have decided upon will prove successful, but I think I should point out that if the Shipping Board finds it necessary to change its policy the Navy will be unable to properly take over any large increase along the line of manning and officering additional ships in less than six months, as the length of time required to build the necessary additional training stations must be added to the time required to train the first detail of crews, and there will be constantly increasing difficulties encountered in re-recruiting the personnel.

"Very sincerely, yours,

"(Signed) L. C. PALMER."

I understand no answer to these communications has been received.

Let me emphasize the point raised by both Mr. Daniels and Admiral Palmer, that of the necessity of knowing in advance what will be expected and required of the Navy Department, for the recruiting and training of a large number of men will take time, and time is all essential in our military program. I think it fair to assume that the Army will need all the ships

launched by the Shipping Board, and that they will naturally ask the Navy Department to man and operate them. Without, however, knowing the requirements in advance, the Navy can not supply the men when needed.

It is not my purpose to build up an argument which may safeguard the Navy from any just criticism or to relieve it of responsibility. The Navy will do its part. My purpose rather is to show that the war forces of the Nation can best be concentrated on the task by having a definite program announced in advance which will be steadfastly adhered to. I feel that all vessels traversing the war zone and all vessels operated by the Government should be manned by naval crews.

Briefly, the advantages to be derived from naval crews would embrace:

1. The enlistment of American seamen.
2. Continuous service for the war.
3. Creation of a marine service that would continue after the war.
4. Military control, training, and discipline.
5. Permanency of crews on particular ships, thereby insuring familiarity with the vessel, with time for drills and the establishing of cooperation between officers and crews.
6. Certainty of departures from ports.
7. Safety of ship and passengers in the war zone, due to discipline and practice.
8. Increased speed of ship.
9. Saving of fuel, due to better handling.
10. Coordination between ships and convoys.

It may be asked, Can the Navy secure a sufficient number of men for this service? Admiral Palmer says "yes," if given time to recruit and train them. Will they enlist for this service as readily as for battleship service? Those best qualified to answer, with whom I have talked, are of the opinion that they will, for to-day every merchant ship mounting guns and carrying a gun crew is in reality a battleship. Will men enlist for this merchant service knowing that the men they supplant were receiving a higher compensation? The answer to this is that the Navy has no difficulty in enlisting men now in competition with the mercantile marine. It must be remembered that this service will be on the same footing as that of the regular Navy.

It will be a different class who will come forward, men actuated by patriotic motives. It is no experiment that is being advocated—merely an enlargement of the present system, with the sailors and soldiers on the same footing as to pay, rations, allowances, and benefits.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman a question. How many of these ships have been sunk?

Mr. HICKS. I have a record of them here, which I shall be very glad to give to the gentleman if he will allow me to do so privately.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Well, I have a list of those that have been sunk.

Mr. HICKS. If the gentleman cares to make that public, he is at perfect liberty to do so, of course; but I do not want to do it, because I have been asked not to make it public.

Vessels of the merchant marine taken over by the Navy will be held for the duration of the war. They are taken over, wherever possible, with the officers who have been running them, and these officers are not transferred out of them, except for cause. It should be the endeavor to place on them a crew of reservists, rather than regular Navy men, in order that at the expiration of the war the ship, its officers, and its crew may be released from service simultaneously and no hiatus occur in the smooth operation of the vessel. This will create such a splendidly trained and disciplined body of men in the merchant marine as would not be possible to create in any other way.

Merchant crews are shifted each trip. They are in many instances untrained to seamanship and poorly qualified for the duties and indifferent to their own safety or that of the ship. Probably 70 per cent of our merchant crews are aliens, many of whom can not speak English, and are therefore unable to understand the orders given them. Owing to the above reasons and the fact that they shift after each trip it is impossible to bring them to any state of proficiency. A Navy crew would be permanent, and would improve each trip. The ship would steam faster, load more quickly, be more certain in departures, and be handled more efficiently and with greater safety given a permanent crew. Each additional knot in speed is not only a defense against the submarine but a distinct gain for the allied armies, for by cutting down the running time between ports a greater number of round trips could be made, thereby increasing to an appreciable extent the annual tonnage carried. Time saved on a voyage is tonnage added to transportation. A fundamental military maxim is "not to advance unless the train of

supplies is assured." The Army can not place more men in France than it can be assured will be supplied by munitions and food as well as supported by reinforcements. No positive assurance can be given with civilian crews. They are under no definite enlistment or military authority, and could not be compelled to remain throughout the war. They could leave the service at any time, no matter how critical the situation.

Mr. PLATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HICKS. Certainly.

Mr. PLATT. What prevents a little corrective discipline? Is it the provisions of the seamen's act?

Mr. HICKS. They are not enlisted men.

Mr. PLATT. Why can not a sailor at sea get drunk, whether he is an enlisted man or not?

Mr. HARDY. I think I know about the seamen's act. It does not affect it at all; not one bit.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Under the war-risk insurance act are not these civilian seamen insured by the Government?

Mr. HICKS. Yes; my friend from Pennsylvania is correct; but instead of the Government insuring them the owners of the ships on which they serve are required to do it at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. I will insert the provisions of the law:

SEC. 3a. That whenever it shall appear to the Secretary of the Treasury that the effecting of such insurance is desirable in the national interest in the case of vessels engaged in any trade, the owner of every American merchant vessel engaged in such trade shall insure the master, officers, and crew of such vessel against loss of life or personal injury from war risks as well as for compensation during detention by an enemy of the United States following capture.

Such insurance shall be effected either with the Bureau of War Risk Insurance or in insurance companies, and on terms satisfactory to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Any attempt to man ships without regularly enlisting the crews would be similar to trying to fill a bottomless pit. Men would be signed on, but there would be no certainty that they would remain with the ship after the first trip. Even if they continued in the service, many of them would not be ready to go back on the return trip, which would mean the shipping of new men unaccustomed to the ship. Regardless of the great factors of discipline and control, the above condition is inefficiency in its worst form.

It can not be pointed out too strongly or too often that personnel, with all that it implies—training, discipline, and control—is always the vital element in military operations. We will undoubtedly be able to build ships, but an efficient merchant marine is far more than a fleet of vessels. The men who man them are vital factors in their successful operation. The objects desired are to put the maximum shipping into service, to make the maximum number of trips with that shipping, and to lose the fewest ships, and also to destroy as many enemy submarines as possible. The transportation of supplies is an arm of the service, just as much as the Army autotruck and mule team which accompany the army at the front. The existence, maintenance, and efficiency of this branch of the service is immediately essential to our most effective carrying on of this war, to the success of our cause. With civilian crews the highest degree of efficiency can not be attained, for in most instances crews gathered in a haphazard manner can not become familiar with the ship, and there is no time for drills and practice. Discipline and training are both essential factors in the safe and speedy operation of a ship, and these can not be secured under civilian seamen.

Let me quote from a speech delivered by Secretary Redfield before a conference of shipping interests August 1, 1917:

The most serious factor that this country faces is that of merchant ships. There are other serious factors, but that is the most serious factor. Every call to duty comes most loudly to him who can move a ship quickly. The man who delays a ship over a day for any cause whatever, however personal or intimate to himself, does wrong to his country now. It is altogether within reason to say that a single day's delay in this war, that which causes it to last another day longer than it otherwise would, may readily mean to this country 1,500 of her sons and \$15,000,000 of her money wasted.

Let me also quote from Mr. Andrew Furuseth, president of the International Seamen's Union of America:

According to a census which we have taken there are about 5,000 Germans sailing under the American flag in different capacities. It may be said that they are among the highest skilled men, whether they sail in the forecabin, in the fireroom, or in the galley. Of these men, about 5,000 all told, 3,721 are in the organizations of the seamen, and figuring it up on the same basis of those outside the organization there should be at least 5,000.

For the sake of argument let us assume that 95 per cent of the Germans on our merchant ships are friendly to the United States, or at least indifferent to their native country, what about the other 5 per cent who are dangerous? How can they be weeded out of the service under the existing system of securing crews? It is suicidal for any Government knowingly to place

itself above a volcano merely because that volcano has been quiescent for a few weeks or months. Under any civilian status, after men enroll, there is no hold on them, they may leave at any time, and will not remain on the same ship. On board the vessel these men are not under naval discipline, they work only when they choose. On each watch there are men who decide not to work, and the engineer must find volunteers from other members of the crew. This reduces the speed of the ship to a great extent when speed is a vital factor in the war zone.

Every officer and every member of a crew navigating a ship in the war zone under the American flag should be an American citizen and all of them should wear the uniform of their country's service.

Testimony of Admiral Palmer, Bureau of Navigation, before the Navy investigating committee, January 8 and 9, 1918, on the subject of naval auxiliary crews.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take up the matter of Naval Reserves in relation to the manning of merchant ships. Admiral, I understand from newspaper reports and from other sources that there is to be a distinction drawn—a classification made, as it were—between ships doing commercial work and those performing military duties, with the former manned by civilian crews and the latter by naval crews. Can you give us any information on this subject?

Admiral PALMER. I have heard that that is to be the case, but we have not received any definite information on the subject. Admiral Benson in the Advisory Council of the Navy Department some weeks ago stated that a representative of the Shipping Board—I think it was Commissioner Donnell—that the representative of the Shipping Board had said to him they did not want the Navy to man the merchant ships, and that there was no probability of them ever doing so. Admiral Benson made that statement in the Advisory Council the other day.

I might explain that the subject was brought up by my asking for some information as to whether any steps had been taken for the Navy to take over the vessels of the merchant marine. And that inquiry was made by me for the reason that if there was anything in the air along that line we wanted to know it, because provision must be made for it immediately. It is just another case of preparation, and without preparing for it, of course, we would not be able to take care of it. As I see it, the merchant marine, if manned by the Navy, and if it includes all new ships being turned out, will require a great deal of preparation on our part in getting quarters in which to house the men and additional places and ships and instructors to train them.

Mr. HICKS. Admiral, do you think such a classification would be satisfactory, having merchant ships engaged in commercial work manned by civilians while those ships doing military service would be manned by Naval Reserves?

Admiral PALMER. I will answer that in my opinion it would be most unsatisfactory.

Mr. HICKS. It is reported that about 60,000 men will be required to man these ships. Is it possible to supply these men through the Navy Department by increasing the present authorized strength? In other words, would you be able to get enough men to man these ships?

Admiral PALMER. I can get enough from the reserves, but it would take time, and I must get definite information about it well in advance.

Mr. HICKS. But can you do it?

Admiral PALMER. Yes; the Navy can do it better than any other organization.

Mr. HICKS. Do you think that the same patriotic impulse would prompt our boys to enlist for merchant service that causes them to enlist in battleship service?

Admiral PALMER. Yes; we haven't the merchant service at present, but it is just as important as the battleship service. They are eager to get on these ships, for they are going into the war zone.

Mr. HICKS. Would you recommend that all merchant ships, whether coastwise or going into the war zone, should be manned by naval officers?

Admiral PALMER. I think that is a little beyond my province. I think more of carrying on this war, and am only thinking of vessels going to the war zone.

Mr. HICKS. All Government-owned vessels should be manned by naval officers?

Admiral PALMER. Yes.

Mr. HICKS. No matter where they ply?

Admiral PALMER. Yes.

Mr. HICKS. Now, Admiral, I wish to ask: If we could man all our ships with naval reserves, we would have more efficient crews, would we not?

Admiral PALMER. We would, undoubtedly. We would also have additional men in every ship for armed guards, whose pay would be in addition to that of the regular crew. The additional trained men will put the vessel through the zone. In peace times they would come down to whatever was the regular crew.

Mr. HICKS. Ships manned by naval reserves would have larger crews than if manned by civilian crews, would they not?

Admiral PALMER. No; even if civilian crews were put on ships, we would increase them to a number sufficient to handle the ship. That is the trouble now; they haven't sufficient men. They go off port 10, 12, and in some cases 25 men shy. They can not make the speed. We would not be thinking only about saving money for the company in expense of upkeep and in manning the ships, but mainly about the final delivery of goods safely through the war zone.

Mr. HICKS. I agree with you that efficiency is the main consideration. I think some of the seamen's unions claim that the larger number of crews required under Government service would make up the difference in wages of civilian crews.

Admiral PALMER. I do not know what they claim. They made some claim of that kind the other day to the Secretary of the Navy. In fact, the head of the seamen's union was in to see him, and Mr. Daniels told this representative of the union, after he had stated that we needed so many more men to man these ships in order to make them safe, that the cost would be approximately the same, or words to that effect. I asked Mr. Daniels to get that statement from them so that we might answer it intelligently, but so far we have never gotten any statement.

Mr. HICKS. In your opinion it does not seem reasonable, does it?

Admiral PALMER. I do not know how many they have.

Mr. HICKS. To train 60,000 officers and men, the facilities of the Navy, with a system already in operation, must be far better than it is possible for any other organization to establish?

Admiral PALMER. Oh, yes.

Mr. HICKS. Would it not conduce to the safety of convoyed fleets to have all ships, whether merchant or war, officered and manned by naval reservists, thereby establishing a closer community of interest?

Admiral PALMER. Undoubtedly. We have a great many officers in the merchant marine now who are naval reservists. They are not on active duty, because their ships have not been taken over, but we know that there are some fine officers in the merchant marine. We have a great many of them enrolled in the reserves now at a dollar a month. We would take them over bodily and put them right in the positions they have now, and then all the officers and all the crews would be reservists, with the discipline that goes with the service.

Mr. HICKS. I would like to read a letter, and put it in the record, which was given me by an officer of a big liner I met in Liverpool. I talked to a number of merchant officers when abroad, and they were all of the same opinion, but this officer put his views in writing for me. With the permission of the committee, I will read it: "If all the officers and men in the merchant marine were enrolled into the Naval Reserve, the Government then would have full control of their services, where it would do most good. For instance, Navy men who are competent ocean navigators are doing coastwise work when their services are urgently needed in the vessels trading to the war zone with troops and supplies. Then, again, the officers and men, who are actually in the merchant ships going to the war zone, are in an awkward position. In all fights with submarines the merchant crews on these ships take an active part in the manning of the guns. In this case, should they be captured, they would take on the status of a noncombatant attacking a war vessel and according to the rules of warfare, lay themselves liable to execution."

Admiral PALMER. That is right.

Mr. BRITTEN. Mr. Hicks, may I interrupt you right there?

Mr. HICKS. Certainly.

Mr. BRITTEN. Admiral, what part does a merchant crew take in the manning of the guns in case of attack by submarine?

Mr. HICKS. They might help pass ammunition for one thing.

Admiral PALMER. Yes; they could help pass ammunition and they would help with the lookouts, but they are not qualified as lookouts and are not qualified as gun crews.

Mr. HICKS. Proceeding with the letter: "Under the laws of war a civilian may never engage in hostilities. Another thing, should any member of the crew of these ships lose an arm or a leg in one of these engagements, his career at sea is ended. In this case he can not look to the Government for any help, and shipowners are under no obligations to look after the crews of their ships injured in this way. Now, the ships running through the war zone change nearly all the members of their crews, except officers, every trip. This is not very serious in cargo ships, where man, more or less, has only himself to look after. But this takes on another aspect when taking passenger ships into consideration. There is the crew, who number 400 to 500 men, which may be 500 to 700 passengers, a total of 1,000 to 1,200 men, women, and children. Not much imagination is required to know what would happen in a ship, with that number of people on board, when torpedoed, with a new crew unfamiliar with the ship, her life-saving equipment and the means of getting to the different parts of the ship in the quickest manner. Should a Naval Reserve crew be on board, they would be attached to one ship permanently, and in an instance where the ship was in port, a good deal of time could be given to drilling the crews thoroughly in the use of life-saving appliances and in different parts of the ship. Then in case of an accident of any kind, every man would know his place without any confusion and the quickest way to get there."

Admiral PALMER. When you are speaking about Naval Reserves, the thing to keep in mind is that they all belong to the Navy and it is the discipline that counts in the Navy.

Mr. HICKS. Let me conclude the letter now: "Another thing, as things are at present, the officers in the merchant service haven't the power over the crews they should have to maintain discipline. An occurrence that happens often is this: When leaving a European or English port it is only a matter of two or three hours from the dock to the sea or war zone where the submarines are operating, often as much as half the crew are drunk lying in their bunks unfit for duty and absolutely of no use in work of any kind much less an accident. The only punishment that can be inflicted on these men for this offense is a fine of two days' pay. As these men get \$2 a day and a bonus of \$1 a day, in all \$3 a day, and as the bonus can not be touched by fine, the man only loses \$4 for this offense. Needless to say, this does not impress him very much. For a similar offense committed by a man in the Naval Reserve the punishment may be as much as two years' imprisonment, which would be something to think of."

This concludes the letter, which expresses, it seems to me, very conclusive arguments in favor of manning merchant ships engaged in trans-Atlantic trade by naval crews. There can be no question of the importance of transportation in this great conflict, and the officers who command these ships are doing war service and are entitled to have those services recognized. Naval rank would also give them the standing on shore commensurate with the duty performed. Ocean traffic is vital to the winning of the war, we must not minimize its direct or positive relation to the success of our arms, and all vessels carrying cargoes across the seas are in war service, an extremely dangerous war service. There should be no chance of a breakdown in the line of communication. It seems unwise in the extreme to man ships carrying to the fronts men as well as supplies with haphazard crews that can desert with impunity or without fear of severe punishment or render themselves unfit for service.

Mr. PETERS. Is that a hypothetical case?

Mr. HICKS. No; it is a statement of my opinion and I want to see if the admirals agree with it in a large measure.

Admiral PALMER. I agree with it, absolutely.

Mr. HICKS. What would you do, Admiral, in order to make provisions for the manning of ships in case the Army desired the Navy to operate transports and supply ships? Suppose you were called upon to furnish, say, 10,000 men, what would you do at once? You would have to build barracks, training quarters, etc., wouldn't you?

Admiral PALMER. We would have to have barracks in which to house the men, and we would have to train them.

(In reply to inquiries in reference to the probability of being called upon to furnish a large number of men to man Army transports and supply ships the admiral said: "We must have immediate notice. I made it perfectly clear that we must have a prompt and definite statement from the War Department, if that is their intention, so that we may make arrangements and know when ships will probably be turned over so we may secure and train the men.")

Mr. OLIVER. Has the service which you have been called upon to perform, in supplying armed guards for the many ships engaged in transporting munitions and provisions, been altogether satisfactory from the Navy standards; and if not, why not?

Admiral PALMER. Previous to the United States entering the present war it was decided to put armed guards on certain merchant vessels. The Navy, when called upon for this duty, immediately furnished trained gun crews from the battleship fleet. In the beginning a few ships were armed, especially the fast United States mail steamers of the American Line, and very shortly afterwards other vessels. This initial step was gradually increased until at the present time about 186 ships have been armed and furnished with an armed guard, consisting of approximately 20 men, in command of a chief petty officer.

The important duty of command of the naval armed guards has been put in the hands of trained and experienced officers, warrant officers, and chief petty officers, who have lived up to the best traditions of the service in the performance of their difficult duties. How well these men have done is amply testified to in the numerous reports of engagements with enemy submarines and of their rise to emergency when the merchant crews, through panic or insubordination in many cases, left their stations. As a typical example of the foregoing, the case of the steamship — is cited. In this case, upon fire being opened upon an enemy submarine, some member of the merchant personnel passed the word to "abandon ship," and all of the engineer's force came up from below. Through the fact that the chief petty officer, Mr. —, promptly rose to the emergency and drove the men below to their stations at the point of a revolver was due the fact that the vessel was enabled to proceed and thus escape. I will cite the case of the steamship —. This ship, loaded with a cargo of gasoline, was attacked by gunfire by an enemy submarine. Shortly after the engagement opened bursting shells of the submarine set the ship on fire. Notwithstanding this, and with the fire burning fiercely, the armed guard fought for one and one-half hours, until the men who were passing the ammunition from forward to aft were driven from their stations by the flames. They then fought with the one remaining gun as long as it was serviceable. In the meantime the merchant crew, with the exception of the master, abandoned the ship. The master remained until the last, and it was not until the last remaining boat was actually on fire and the ship a mass of flames that the ship was abandoned by the guns' crews. They were later calmed alongside the submarine and the commanding officer thereof congratulated them upon the fight they put up, which he stated was the best fight he had ever seen a merchant ship give. These accounts are but a brief outline of a large number of efficient and brave performances of the dangerous duty, and are such as the country and the Navy has the right to expect from its men. In numerous instances, particularly in the first part of the war, there have been cases of friction between the merchant personnel and the armed guard. Every case of friction has been carefully investigated by a board of naval officers. In practically every instance the friction arose from the failure of the merchant personnel to carry out the orders for the safety of the ship which the Navy Department considers essential while in the war zone, and which the Navy Department has instructed the commanding officer of the armed guard to carry out. The orders of the commanding officer of the armed guard are clear and explicit.

From various steamships came the reports in particular relative to the attempt to instruct the merchant crews in gunnery: "One drawback to this instruction is that upon arrival in port the majority of the ship's force is discharged and fail to come back to the ship, and in most cases they have to teach them American before they are able to understand the orders given. As the merchant crews generally make but one trip, and as they are mostly of foreign nationality, it is difficult to train them to handle a gun." You will understand that I am quoting the language of the reports. The question of the low quality of the merchant crews is repeatedly commented on in the reports of the fast American mail liners, where, owing to the inexperience or poor quality of the firemen, they are unable to make proper speed. Not only is this most serious from the point of view of larger exposure in the danger zone but it also adds in a large degree to the amount of fuel consumed, which in these days of fuel scarcity is most important. More and more as time goes on reports come in stating that a fine spirit of co-operation exists between the merchant personnel and the members of the armed guard. One of the early causes of friction between the ship operators and the Navy Department and masters was due to the fact that the living quarters of the merchant crews were of much lower standard than those which the Navy provides for its enlisted men, and the Navy Department insisted, and correctly, that proper sanitary and cleaner accommodations should be provided for its men. The men of the Navy are of an entirely different standard from the men in the merchant marine. On the one hand, the crews of the merchant marine are mostly foreigners of a low class collected from the seven seas, about 70 per cent of whom are aliens. On the other hand, the men of the Navy are clean, well-disciplined young Americans from good American homes. In conclusion it is confidently stated that the 6,000 men of the Navy now at sea performing armed guard duty have performed this duty to the entire satisfaction of the Navy Department and have arisen to every emergency, adding to the effectiveness of the merchant marine, undoubtedly saving many ships by their presence, judgment, skill, and quick action.

Admiral Palmer, after citing numerous instances of heroism and efficient discipline on the part of gun crews, many of them thrilling in the extreme, then referred to a report made by the president of the International Seamen's Union of America.

He (the president of the seamen's union) ascertained the nationality of those who were members of the union and then arrived at the nationality of the merchant sailors who had not joined the union. Those of American nationality were 12,219 out of a total of 42,407, or less than 30 per cent. In another part of the report he states:

The number of Spaniards found in the total is 1,369. It is, however, a matter of common knowledge that Spaniards and Spanish-speaking South Americans constituted more than 50 per cent of the total number

of firemen on the Atlantic Ocean. They object to the language clause of the seaman's act, and are to a large extent organized under the I. W. W. Comparatively few of them can understand any English and they make no effort to learn.

Admiral PALMER (continuing statement made up from the combined reports of the armed guard officers). Merchant crews are shifted each trip. Many of the crew are untrained, not qualified, ignorant, degenerate, drunken, totally careless as to their own safety or that of the ship. Owing to the above reasons and the fact that they shift after each trip, it is impossible to bring them to any state of efficiency. A Navy crew would be permanent and would increase in efficiency with each trip, coal faster, load more quickly, and be handled more efficiently, given a permanent crew. Each additional knot in speed is not only a defense against the submarine, but a distinct gain for the allied armies, as it, with the cutting down of running time to port, operates to permit a greater number of round trips to be made and thereby increased the amount of tonnage carried to as appreciable an extent as though additional ships were added to the merchant marine. A fundamental military maxim is not to advance unless the train of supplies is assured. The Army can not under any circumstances place more men in France than it can be assured will be supplied. It is impossible to give any assurance under present conditions. A strike might occur at any time. Only with crews of the vessels under military control can it be guaranteed that the vessels will run properly. Military control may be Army, Navy, or some military organization established by the Shipping Board. Of the three, the Navy alone is equipped to handle the situation.

Admiral PALMER. After conference between the Navy Department and the Shipping Board on November 30, 1917, Mr. Daniels, in a letter to Mr. Hurley, said in part [read letter already quoted].

Admiral Palmer stated that up to January 8 no reply had been received to this letter.

Mr. HICKS. Does it not seem from the fact that the Shipping Board has not replied to your letters, and also that they have made statements without consulting the Navy Department, that there is not very much cooperation between the department and the board?

Admiral PALMER. Well, I understand, as the chairman of the subcommittee mentioned here a little while ago, that Mr. Hurley is in favor of the Navy taking this work over, but the Shipping Board is evidently not a unit on that.

Mr. HICKS. May I ask you as to the radio men in the merchant service? On the merchant ships that are manned by naval gun crews, I understand at the present time that the wireless operators are not enlisted men. You contemplate, I understand, taking them over into the Navy or having the radio department at least under naval control?

Admiral PALMER. We contemplate having all the men that go through the war zone regular naval radio men. We were asked by Gen. Goethals, when he was in the Shipping Board, to arrange for a supply of radio men for all the new merchant shipping, and we started a school for that purpose. We now have about 3,000 men at this school at Harvard College, Massachusetts, training for this very work.

Mr. HICKS. How many months does it take to perfect a man in that service?

Admiral PALMER. They are enlisted or enrolled in the regular service or in the reserves in any district, and are then selected by the commandant on account of their special qualifications and are sent to the school at Harvard.

Admiral PALMER (continuing about Naval Reserves). I sent three officers from our bureau over in charge of armed guards, so that I would have first-hand information as to what was good and what was not good and what to do in order to increase the efficiency of the service. When they returned they made a few notes, and one of them says: "On sailing from New York the storekeeper, lampfighter, boatswain, and boatswain's mate were drunk. The forecabin crew of this particular ship (and I understand it is not different from any other; in fact, much better than some) being made up almost entirely of foreigners who could not even speak broken English. There was no one available to talk to them in their own language until the second day out from New York. I personally saw a great many of the crew under the influence of liquor; in fact, to such an extent as to be incapacitated for duty. No disciplinary action can be taken in these cases; the only recourse for the captain of this ship is to log these men for a day's pay while they are unfit for duty." Then he proceeds further on in his report: "On one occasion it was necessary to partly lower the lifeboats while in the war zone and hold 'abandon ship' drill as required by law and also by the Bureau of War-Risk Insurance. It so happened that the vessel entered the war zone on Sunday, and, although the vessel was holding abandon ship drill for the safety of the passengers and crew, it was necessary to pay the crew while standing by this drill 40 cents per hour overtime. On several occasions while passing through the war zone it was necessary for me to go below, at the request of the corporal of the guard, in order to stop members of the engineer's force from smoking on exposed decks, this being against the law in the war zone. These people in every case were foreigners and could not understand a word of English, and in order for me to make them understand it was necessary for me to forcibly extinguish the cigarettes. All in all, they were the most illiterate and unkempt bunch of human beings it was ever my duty to deal with. The first hour of the watch the speed of the ship was reduced from one-half to a full knot per hour. This is very dangerous in the war zone, speed being the main factor of safety. The reason for this reduction of speed is explained as follows: If any members of the engineer force decide that they do not care to go on watch they can not be made to do so. The only recourse in this case is for the engineer officer to send a representative among other watches and obtain volunteers to stand the watch of these men. The pay of the men who do not go on watch is then checked, and the men who take their watches are paid from such funds as are checked against the former. As the watches always relieve at the meal hour, after volunteers have been secured they then go below and get their meal, and this usually takes them about an hour. As a result they get pay for a four-hour watch, while actually they stand a three-hour watch, the first hour of their watch being short of men.

To the best of my knowledge this happened with every watch on the particular ship in question from New York to Liverpool, and on the return trip. I saw as many as eight names reported to the captain of the ship in one watch for this reason, the engineer officer being required to inform the captain of the number of men absent from every watch

without leave, in order that their pay may be checked. On sailing from New York the vessel was short about 12 or 15 men of the complement, it being impossible to get men before sailing. The captain of the ship stated to me that this happened on every voyage, and in many cases he sailed with as many as 20 or 25 vacancies in the ship's complement. It is a known fact that speed is the greatest factor of safety to the merchant vessel passing through the war zone, and the impaired efficiency in the engine-room force results in reduced speed. The class of personnel in the forecabin that composed the deck force was most illiterate, and the majority of them foreigners, although a great many of them had affidavits, etc., to the effect that they were citizens of the United States. One man we called on the bridge and questioned stated that he secured his affidavit from a "Dutchman," who kept a boarding house, with whom he was living. This man spoke very poor English; in fact, it was very hard to understand him at all at times. Apparently he was a Greek. The second factor of safety in the war zone is efficient lookouts. These can not be had from the crew of a vessel, as was clearly demonstrated to me. On one occasion when it was necessary to remove the passengers from this vessel after she had struck a mine, the passengers were being lowered and removed to another vessel, one of the crew of a boat transferring the passengers on coming alongside the relief ship jumped out of the boat and went aboard the relief vessel, refusing to return to his ship in order to assist in bringing off the remaining passengers. This man was declared a deserter. However, the Seaman's Union took the case up with the steamship company, and the decision that the man was a deserter was overruled. The officers of this vessel stated that almost an entire new crew took the vessel to sea on every voyage, and that there never was an opportunity to instruct any of them properly before sailing, as they reported on board at the last minute before sailing, and then many of them under the influence of liquor, and some very drunk.

Admiral PALMER. Now, gentlemen of the committee, I have just a few more cases. These are specific instances of faulty conduct of personnel, United States and allied merchant vessels, illustrating the necessity for all tonnage trading through submarine areas being manned and operated by the Navy:

Steamship *Navajo*, August 1, 1917, 800 miles west of Ireland, shelled by submarine. Ship caught fire. Five minutes after alarm of fire crew abandoned ship. No effort made to put out flames. Boats lowered without stopping engines. Captain left ship. Third engineer took wheel and kept ship into wind. Later crew returned on board. Flames then beyond control, so captain alleged. Reabandoned her. She was adrift next morning.

Steamship *Wico*, August 6, 1917, near Isle of Gurnsey. Ship conveyed by British destroyer. Submarine sighted 500 yards distant. One shot fired immediately and submarine submerged. Captain, immediately on sighting submarine, gave orders to "abandon ship." Engines stopped as soon as alarm was sounded and deportment abandoned. Armed guard prevented ship being abandoned and at point of pistol drove the engineer force, including chief, below. Engines were started and ship resumed her voyage uninjured. Her escape undoubtedly due to presence of British destroyer. Merchant complement did everything possible to lose her. This captain did not zigzag, did not properly darken ship, did not maintain maximum speed when convoy left him; allowed unidentified vessel to close him.

Steamship *Campania*, August 6, 1917, after four-hour engagement captain stopped, turned broadside to submarine, and surrendered, abandoning vessel. He stated he was afraid there might be casualties. Submarine approached ship on surface within 500 yards before she was abandoned. Ship sunk by Germans going aboard and placing bombs in various places.

Steamship *Finland*, October 27, 1917. Torpedoed in convoy. Did not see torpedo or periscope. Did not see torpedo. Greatest confusion of merchant complement. Started to abandon ship immediately. Only loss of life caused by boat falling while lowering, spilling people into water. When manifest ship would float, people returned aboard and she made her way to port under own steam.

Steamship *Luckenbach*, October 11, 1917, in convoy. Sighted submarine 3 miles ahead of ship at 5.15 p. m. Thought it a buoy. At 5.55 sighted periscope distant 200 yards ahead. Captain avoided attack and proceeded at maximum speed. Got ahead of convoy; at dark slowed from 10 to 7 knots. Did not zigzag. Continued to show screened wake light. At 8 p. m. ship torpedoed. Submarine evidently trailed along, guided by screened wake light and assisted by slow speed without zigzag. Submarine appeared close 10 minutes after firing torpedo; could probably have been destroyed had the crew stuck to their station.

Admiral PALMER. In this statement of the president of the International Seamen's Union of America it is stated that approximately 3,300 Germans are in the merchant marine now, and I do not know how many men from the central powers.

Steamship *J. D. Archibald*, June 16, 1917, 4 p. m. Making passage from Brest to New York. Had been warned by radio that a certain locality was infested by submarines. Persisted in course through that area. Sighted submarine disguised as a fishing vessel, sail set, at 3.15 p. m., distant 7 miles. Closed it, though it was well known that submarines frequently adopted this disguise. Did not zigzag until 4.15 p. m., when submarine submerged. When ship was torpedoed crew abandoned her at once. Said they were afraid of another torpedo. This was a gross disregard of warnings and ordinary precautions.

British steamship *Idemonus*, September 15, 1917, 3 p. m., torpedoed near land, all hands immediately abandoned ship. Ship floated. British patrol vessels arrived and towed ship where she could be beached. Otherwise would have been lost through hasty abandonment.

French steamship *Mississippi*, from Havre to New Orleans, not in convoy, but a convoy and escort in sight within distance. Torpedoed and submarine made off immediately, undoubtedly on account of convoy escort. Crew abandoned ship at once. Later a British patrol vessel happened by, put a crew aboard and brought her in. This is a typical case of hasty abandonment and only by luck was she saved.

Italian steamship *Edo*, attacked by gun fire middle of night and struck by a shell. Master and crew abandoned her at once. Next morning ship discovered by British patrol, totally abandoned. She was manned and brought into Queenstown. Crew was picked up later. Otherwise she would have been lost. If crew had stuck by ship there is not one chance in a million of that particular submarine capturing or destroying her.

Mr. HICKS. Admiral, the whole trend of your statement here shows, in fact proves, that naval men are more efficient than the ordinary merchant crews?

Admiral PALMER. Unquestionably. The outstanding fact apparent to anyone who goes thoroughly into the history of submarine sinkings is the great number of ships that have been literally thrown away by

incompetent and ignorant management. Lloyd's investigations lead to the conclusion that of all ships mined or torpedoed and subsequently lost, 15 per cent could have been saved had proper use been made of the means existing on ships to keep them afloat. The percentage of vessels that never ought to have been captured or destroyed had they been manned by competent people who observed fundamental precautions must be much higher. In conclusion, I must give one more example, that while no harm resulted, most clearly illustrates present unsatisfactory conditions.

American mail steamer, first night out of Liverpool, about 10 p. m., British patrol signaled "You have bright light on port bow." Armed guard commander and chief officer investigated. They found a member of crew reading in his berth, port wide open, high-power incandescent light tied up squarely in open port. Man said he wanted to read and was entitled to fresh air, anyway. He had jeopardized lives of 800-odd people. Was not at all impressed with enormity of his crime. Only punishment he could be made to suffer was a fine of four days' pay. It is understood that even this was remitted by the shipping commissioner on arrival of vessel in an American port. The law must be strengthened to cover such cases.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. DYER].

Mr. DYER. Mr. Chairman, this bill carries an appropriation of some \$8,000,000. During this session we have already passed the Indian appropriation bill, carrying about \$12,000,000; the Post Office appropriation bill, carrying \$332,000,000; and the Agricultural appropriation bill, carrying \$27,000,000. These figures are in round numbers. The debate during to-day upon the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill, while most interesting and informing, has touched upon many other subjects besides the bill in question. This is so practically with all of the appropriation bills, so far as the general debate is concerned. This, to my mind, is an evidence that the Members of Congress generally do not and can not fully acquaint themselves with the necessities of the large amounts of money that they annually vote from the revenues of the United States. We have yet to consider some nine other appropriation bills, all of them carrying large amounts. In the last session of this Congress we appropriated about \$21,000,000,000. It is quite evident that this session will appropriate an equally large amount. In view of these very large appropriations, covering a multitude of items, I feel that the present system of having so many committees dealing with appropriations is wrong, and that we ought to resort to the more up-to-date and scientific method now in use mostly in other countries, of having one committee on appropriations. To such a committee ought to be given the responsibility of making recommendations to the House for all needed money for the operation of the Government. To such a committee also ought to be sent all estimates. Such a committee should also be given authority to employ all needed assistance in the way of experts in finance and operations of government. Such a system, in my judgment, would result in saving vast sums of money that are now needlessly appropriated and uselessly expended. The budget system, Mr. Chairman, that I suggest is not a new one. It has been urged for many years. The present chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY], has been an urgent advocate of it. On February 28, 1913, he delivered an able address in this House in advocacy of it. The former chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the Hon. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, was another one who favored a budget system. His address on June 24, 1913, in the House was a most convincing argument as to its need. Both of these addresses discussed the question from a constitutional, historical, and necessity standpoint. I commend the careful reading of both of these addresses to the Members of the House. Another distinguished former chairman of the Committee on Appropriations as well as former Speaker of this House, and present Member, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON], is another strong supporter of this proposition. In fact, it is my judgment that all who have given careful study of the question agree that it is most important and necessary. The opposition that comes to it is from the committees that now have to do with appropriations. Let me suggest to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY], that he could hasten the actual consideration of this matter in the House by calling together the chairmen of all the committees that have to do with appropriations and see if they can not get together upon a resolution to provide that all appropriations shall originate in and be reported from a single committee. Other governments have been using the budget system for years and with success. It seems time for the United States to take similar action, and especially so during the war, when our appropriations are so large.

Mr. LITTLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DYER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LITTLE. Does the gentleman think a budget system would be serviceable and practicable if there were not on the floor a responsible ministry to present the budget and answer questions in regard to it?

Mr. DYER. I take it that the members of the committee themselves would in that instance be able to answer the questions of Members. Of course, the gentleman is referring to the system in the English Parliament; but if we had the budget system here, and had a substantial committee charged with this great work, they would be able to give to the Members of the House information gathered from the best experts in finance, as well as a careful study of the subject and of the estimates which would have to be submitted to them and concerning which they could make diligent inquiry before reporting the bills. Mr. Chairman, this matter has been given consideration by the people of this country as well as by Members of Congress. It is my judgment that the people generally want a budget system adopted, which is well proven by many indorsements which I have here and which I include in my remarks:

SHALL WE CONSERVE REVENUE?

[From The West at Work. Paul W. Brown. St. Louis, June 21, 1917.]

The Government is very properly conserving man power, food, ships, iron, and steel. Why not conserve revenue as well? The need of the hour is for a national budget system. Every successful private business cuts its coat according to its cloth and proportions its expenditures to each other in full view of both its means and its needs. For 50 years our Government has had no machinery to do this. Now is the time to supply it. It is easier than food conservation and just as needful.

WANTED—A NATIONAL BUDGET.

[From The West at Work. Paul W. Brown. St. Louis, June 21, 1917.]

Shall the American people, at a time when they are introducing new order and new system into the distribution of grain, meat, iron, and steel fail to follow the same common-sense procedure with respect to the distribution of Government revenue?

For many years we have had every ordinary reason which consideration of economy and good sense could urge for adopting a budget system. To these the war has added two extraordinary reasons of the first importance—one touching us as individuals, the other as citizens of the Nation.

The demand for a budget system is much more than the demand of the taxpayer that he be not taxed unnecessarily in a time of special difficulty in the carrying on of business; it is the demand of the patriotic business man that every dollar thrown into the war chest be made to yield its utmost to add to the offensive power of the armies of democracy.

The business men of America should enlist the support of every public-spirited citizen in a demand that a budget system be immediately put in operation in the Federal Government, so that expenditures may be intelligently and economically made in this time of extraordinary demands on the resources of Government, and our economic power be used with maximum effectiveness in a world war for democracy.

WOULD INCREASE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE.

[By J. Lionberger Davis, president St. Louis Chamber of Commerce.]

The magnitude of the tasks which confront our Government makes it important to systematize its expenditures of money. A budget system, if adopted, will not only conserve the financial resources of the Government, but will have a tendency to increase the confidence of the people, who will feel that every dollar raised by taxes will purchase a dollar's worth of service to the Nation.

THE NEED FOR A BUDGET.

[By Charles Nagel, former Secretary of Commerce and Labor.]

* * * The time is most appropriate for the painstaking study of a budget system. More than that, such consideration has become imperative. If our political system is not adapted to such a scheme, then that system will have to yield, as it is being made to yield at every other point. The Executive is being charged with powers and obligations that are very foreign to Democratic conception. Combinations of industries which our courts denounced six months ago our Executive now invites, both acting in the name of public interest. In times of such tremendous peaceful revolution it can not be possible that mere inadaptability of political machinery will stand in the way of the employment of a system which every housewife is admonished to respect. The problem is to make ends meet—as simple as that; and hard as may be the lesson, perhaps no greater benefit has ever come to us than this awakening to the responsibilities of our task.

ESSENTIAL TO JUDICIOUS EXPENDITURES.

[By B. F. Bush, president Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.]

I believe it is essential to judicious expenditure, prudential economy, and wise taxation that a budget system should be inaugurated by the Government. The experience for many years back of the business world unerringly points to the wisdom of the Government adopting the budget system, whereby its anticipated requirements and expenditures for a given period are properly classified and conditioned commensurate with the income to be derived from a conservative taxation.

It is highly important that a wise economy should govern at all times in Government affairs but more particularly so under the conditions which now obtain, when enormous disbursements are being made.

All large and important business enterprises, as well as other Governments, have established the budget system and find it a safe and reliable guide under which to conduct their operations, and with this record before us I fail to see any good reason why business principles of tried and known worth, such as underlie this system, should not be adopted and applied by our Federal Government in its important operations with regard to expenditures and collection of revenue.

NEVER NEEDED AS SORELY AS NOW.

[By John F. Shepley, president St. Louis Union Trust Co.]

* * * I consider this an opportune time for the adoption by the Federal Government of the budget system; I have no hesitation in saying that I do. * * * Our Government is making and contemplating the expenditure of sums of enormous size for purposes extraordi-

narily diverse and has never needed as sorely as now the aid of this system, without which the economical and judicious use of these funds is practically impossible. It is curious that a people so progressive and enlightened as our own should suffer its affairs to be administered in so haphazard and unscientific a manner.

HAPHAZARD METHODS INTOLERABLE.

[By J. F. Downing, president New England National Bank, Kansas City.]

I think it is high time that the people of the United States were demanding a budget system for the business of our Government. The haphazard methods now employed in making appropriations would not be tolerated in any well-organized business house in the United States.

This plan will never be adopted unless the people demand it insistently, and I am sure every business man in the country feels that the time has arrived when there should be economy in the expenditures of the Government and business methods employed the same as for individuals and corporations.

TIME FOR ACTION.

[By Philip B. Fouke, president Funston Bros. & Co.]

With respect to the question of a national budget the time for discussion is past—the time for action has arrived. Under the pressure of war the business of the Government is being enormously expanded. While we were at peace to do without a budget was merely disgracefully wasteful. Now, when every dollar should be made to do its utmost toward the winning of the war, our carelessness becomes peril and our wastefulness a crime.

THE PRIVILEGE OF SPECIAL APPROPRIATION.

[By Jackson Johnson, chairman International Shoe Co.]

* * * In order to provide means for the payment of the enormous liability incurred by the Government for war purposes the necessity of economy in expenditures for other purposes becomes vital and makes it imperative that the Government's expenditures be handled under a budget system. Otherwise burdens of taxation will be imposed which will seriously impair business progress and development.

The disinclination of our national lawmakers to surrender their present unrestricted privilege of special appropriations for their States and districts is the only reason which will stand in the way of this so very necessary reform in our Government's system of expending its income.

HARD TO REDUCE EXCESSIVE TAXATION.

[By W. G. Lackey, vice president Mississippi Valley Trust Co.]

It has long been a matter of amazement to business men that the greatest and wealthiest business institution of the world, the United States Government, should administer its finances without a definite and prearranged budget.

* * * The time was never more opportune, I think, than now to emphasize the need of greatest scrutiny of Government expenditures, and to this end the establishment of the budget system.

If we are not thoroughly systematic in handling these expenditures, the prospects of our tax burden being materially lightened after the war are not encouraging.

WHEN EVERY CITIZEN ECONOMIZES.

[By Luther Ely Smith, attorney.]

A national budget system should be established without delay. Every citizen in the land is economizing and conserving and practicing rigid self-denial to furnish the Nation with the sinews of war. Should not the Nation adopt every device possible to conserve the sinews thus furnished? Immediate installation of the most approved methods of budget making adapted to our national needs should be insisted upon earnestly and emphatically by every organ of public opinion and every citizen, to the end that all opposition and indifference may be completely dispelled.

SHOULD COMMAND GENERAL SUPPORT.

[By Frederick N. Judson, attorney.]

I certainly agree that there is an urgent need for the adoption of a budget system in the administration of the financial affairs of the Federal Government. * * * The need is urgent, especially now that the Federal Government is going into such enormous expenditures and is searching out ways and means for a tremendous expansion of the Federal power of taxation.

Now is the time when such a measure should receive the support of all who are interested in the wise conduct of our governmental affairs.

DUPLICATION CREATES JOBS.

[By Sam D. Capen, former president St. Louis Business Men's League.]

The measure introduced by Senator KENTON, of Iowa, providing for a national budget should be unanimously supported. Every business man would support the measure actively if it were not for the fact that the average business man works as an individual, is not nationally organized, and the politicians know this.

When we, as citizens of the United States, begin to realize—and heavy taxation will bring it close home—that we must plan our expenditures according to our income, then we will interest ourselves in forcing the politician to coordinate the work that is done by the Government in several departments in one department, and the budget system will then have a beginning.

SPECIALLY NECESSARY.

[By George W. Simmons, vice president Simmons Hardware Co.]

I am very heartily in favor of a budget system for the United States Government, and the present emergency emphasizes its need at this time to a greater extent than ever before in our history. There is so much more money now going into the hands of the Government than ever before that the average man has less of an idea than under normal conditions of how much it is going to spend. He is entitled to know in general terms how much it is to be spent.

THE MINIMUM OF INEFFICIENCY.

[By C. E. Schaff, receiver, M., K. & T. Ry.]

Aside from the business considerations which have always suggested a budget system for the Federal Government, special conditions urge the adoption of such a system now that we are engaged in a war which

imposes heavy burdens. Government expenditures are certain to be tremendous during the war, and the load of taxation will be correspondingly heavy. The public is prepared to bear whatever burdens national necessities impose, but there is a special reason now that every department of Government be so organized as to discharge its functions with a minimum waste and inefficiency. A heavy burden of taxation speedily becomes irksome if public funds are not expended with practical economy. It therefore seems to me that the time is opportune for the establishment of a Federal budget system.

THE MOST EXTRAVAGANT GOVERNMENT.

[By S. E. Ragland, president, Central State National Bank, Memphis, Tenn.]

* * * This Government is in no way responsible for the holocaust that is bleeding Europe white, but since it has been forced to take a hand it has pledged its entire resources to an enterprise, the proportions of which are staggering to contemplate. The ultimate end of this enterprise is a democracy in which men, women, and little children may be free in the pursuit of happiness, but let no man deceive himself about the burdens of taxation that he will have to shoulder in the future. It, therefore, is imperative that every citizen demand that his Representative in Congress immediately start the machinery for retrenchment in the expenses of the Government. Congress should at once provide for a Government budget.

We are ready and willing to be taxed to attain our great aims, but there must from now on be no lost motion in the application of these funds. Let us immediately adopt the budget system.

[From Yale Review. The task before the country, by MEDILL MCCORMICK. July, 1917.]

The present structure of government—whether of the Nation, the States, or their subdivisions—was not built for such responsibilities, nor can the country bear the cost of the new activities, unless its Government be so reorganized as to secure a greater return to the public in proportion to the cost of public administration. During the decade preceding our entrance into the war the cost of the National Government had doubled, while the cost of government in the great industrial States had increased threefold. The ratio of taxation to the national income was so small and direct taxes formed so small a part of the sum of taxation that there was very little interest in public finance or in the efficiency of public administration. Bureaus multiplied at Washington and commissions at the State capitals. There have been no budgets, no careful and scientific methods of estimate and appropriation. With the growth of direct taxation there has come a sudden and inevitable interest in both. * * * The National Government must follow this road, and quickly; they must adopt necessary accounting and fiscal reforms, no less than a rational coordination of public administration. * * * At Washington there is no budget, no coordinated method of appropriation, no modern and uniform system of accounting, no homogeneous division of departmental responsibilities.

[From the New Republic, July 14, 1917.]

* * * The inability of the House to preserve intact its power as sole originator of financial legislation is not, to be sure, a product of the war. It is an inability which has been in existence for some time, but which has for the most part been screened by parliamentary procedure. Where the House has not initiated a financial measure it has at least derived a modest satisfaction in giving to it a mock legality.

With the revision now made in the revenue bill, there is not an important piece of financial war legislation which has not to a great degree been initiated in the Senate.

This development, given such impetus in the three first months of the war, has not been disadvantageous in the matter of securing funds for an American offensive, but it has revealed unmistakably that present practices completely disappoint the expectation of checks and balances which the designers of the Constitution had in mind. In the *Federalist*, No. 58, Madison declared: "The House of Representatives can not only refuse but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of the Government. They, in a word, hold the purse." Such a theory is no longer tenable. The House of Representatives does not hold the purse; it has fallen between the House, the Senate, and the administrative leaders, whose influence is wielded from the outside, until it is no longer held by anyone. At best, the lodging in the House of powers to initiate financial measures is an only partly responsible device, less accurate and less adjustable than a budget system. Opponents of such a system have heretofore demanded further proof of the need of resorting to an innovation, and that proof the war is rapidly furnishing them.—Charles Merz.

ECONOMY AND A NATIONAL BUDGET.

[From the Republican platform, 1916.]

The increasing cost of the National Government and the need for the greatest economy of its resources, in order to meet the growing demands of the people for Government service, call for the severest condemnation of the wasteful appropriations of this Democratic administration, of its shameless raids on the Treasury, and of its opposition to and rejection of President Taft's oft-repeated proposals and earnest efforts to secure economy and efficiency through the establishment of a simple, businesslike budget system, to which we pledge our support, and which we hold to be necessary to effect a needed reform in the administration of national finances.

ECONOMY AND THE BUDGET.

[From the Democratic platform, 1916.]

We demand careful economy in all expenditures for the support of the Government, and to that end favor a return by the House of Representatives to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee chosen from its membership, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditure standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication in the public service as much as possible avoided. We favor this as a practicable first step toward a budget system.

WOODROW WILSON.

[From a letter to Senator TILLMAN, Jan. 30, 1913, in CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 63d Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 17, 1913.]

Ever since I was a boy I have been deeply interested in our methods of financial legislation. Ever since then I have insisted upon the absolute necessity of a carefully considered and wisely planned budget, and

one of the objects I shall have most in mind when I get to Washington will be conferences with my legislative colleagues there with a view to bringing some budget system into existence. This business of building up the expenses of the Nation piece by piece will certainly lead us to error and perhaps embarrassment.

I was very much pleased by your reelection and shall look forward to the greatest interest to being associated with you in counsel. Again thanking you for your splendid letter,

Cordially, yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

CHARLES E. HUGHES'S ACCEPTANCE SPEECH.

[From Republican Campaign Textbook, 1916.]

* * * It is time that we had fiscal reform. We demand a simple, businesslike budget. I believe it is only through a responsible budget, proposed by the Executive, that we shall avoid financial waste and secure proper administrative efficiency and a well-balanced consideration of new administrative proposals. * * *

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT—THE BUDGET.

[From message to Congress, Jan. 17, 1912.]

The United States is the only great Nation whose Government is operated without a budget. This fact seems to be more striking when it is considered that budgets and budget procedures are the outgrowth of democratic doctrines and have had an important part in the development of modern constitutional rights. The American Commonwealth has suffered much from irresponsibility on the part of its governing agencies. The constitutional purpose of a budget is to make government responsive to public opinion and responsible for its acts.

THE BUDGET AS AN ANNUAL PROGRAM.

A budget should be the means for getting before the legislative branch, before the press, and before the people a definite annual program of business to be financed; it should be in the nature of a prospectus both of revenues and expenditures; it should comprehend every relation of the government to the people, whether with reference to the raising of revenues or the rendering of service.

In many foreign countries the annual budget program is discussed with special reference to the revenue to be raised, the thought being that the raising of revenue bears more direct relation to welfare than does government expenditure. Around questions of source of revenue political parties have been organized, and on such questions voters in the United States have taken sides since the first revenue law was proposed.

WILLIAM G. M'ADOO.

[From the Outlook, Mar. 7, 1917.]

Writing to The Outlook concerning the importance of a national budget Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, says:

"I am distinctly of the opinion that it would be well for Congress to consider the establishment of a budgetary or other fiscal plan for the purpose of more scientific treatment of the problem of Government expenditure in relation to Government income, and in this connection permit me to say that I recently submitted to the chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, for the consideration of that committee, a suggestion of the appointment of a joint committee of the two Houses of Congress with direction to cooperate with the Secretary of the Treasury in studying and evolving such a plan for the consideration of Congress."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

[From the Nation's Business, Oct. 15, 1915.]

WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDITOR OF THE NATION'S BUSINESS: The financial methods of the Federal Government must be reorganized. The present manner of making appropriations can never be made a part of an efficient system for handling the finances of our Government. One of the greatest weaknesses of democracy is lack of responsibility and tendency to extravagant and ill-advised expenditures. We now are seeking greater efficiency in all our daily problems, and the Government needs particularly to have a body whose responsibility it shall be to consider the sources of revenue and estimate them for a result, and then itself to set a limit on the appropriations which shall be available from the estimated income to be received. The ever-increasing expenditures of the Government make most urgent demand for a budget committee.

ANDREW J. PETERS.

PRESIDENT HADLEY, OF YALE.

[From the World's Work, December, 1915, p. 198.]

"We are the only civilized Nation of importance," he says, "that attempts to carry on its public business without a budget. The result is waste, lack of coordination of expenditures, and opportunity for pushing unimportant or transient things into the foreground to the exclusion of more important or more permanent ones."

DR. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, PRESIDENT OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, AN ADVOCATE OF SCIENTIFIC BUDGET MAKING.

[From the World's Work, December, 1915, p. 198.]

Congress at present "dissolves itself into nine little legislatures," each of which has almost autocratic control over expenditures and independently "appropriates money with no reference to the ability of the Government to spend."

A. L. LOWELL, PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

[From the New York Constitutional Convention, 1915.]

DR. LOWELL. My feeling is simply this, that the budget is a public matter. It is not a collection of private matters. It is a public matter; therefore it would be wiser to have it originate by public officials and not by a lot of people who represent private and local interests. That is really the argument I wish to make upon it, that what the public wants is somebody who represents the public. As a friend of mine said once, and I think there is some truth in it, and I think it explains a great deal of the movements in our Government, that the characteristic defect of democracy is that there is nobody whose business it is to represent the public, and to some extent that is true. That is, people represent fractions of the public. The reason for having our budget originate in our State with the governor is that he is the one

official who represents the whole public, whereas the members of the house are, in each instance, representing small sections of the public; therefore, as a body, their combined good sense is very well, but if you give each of them a chance to originate the budget you are putting that in the hands of a lot of people who represent individual interests and not the public interests. I believe myself that the reason that the power of the Government and the President, etc., has increased so much in the last 50 years is because they come nearer representing the public than a representative assembly does. If you can get the representative assembly to work as a whole, or representing all the public, on questions affecting the whole country, that would be admirable, but when you get them looking at points which affect fractions of the public they cease to represent the public and they only represent a lot of scattered interests.

Mr. CULLINAN. Our legislature and our Congress impose the tax.

Dr. LOWELL. Yes.

Mr. CULLINAN. Ought they not to say something, or have something to say, about how the tax should be appropriated in the different phases of governmental activities?

Dr. LOWELL. Perfectly so, and they do. That is, if your Government proposes an appropriation which they do not like they ought to have the right to reject it. In other words, there is no doubt they ought to have the right to refuse to vote any tax which they do not believe to be right or do not favor, but that is a very different thing from giving individual members the right to propose an expenditure which a man may think in the interests of the whole public when, in fact, it is not.

Mr. CULLINAN. You would eliminate the log-rolling feature?

Dr. LOWELL. Yes, sir; I would eliminate the log-rolling features. As it is now, we have said that each individual member shall have the right to initiate, but the governor may veto. I think the governor should initiate and the legislature should veto, so far as appropriations are concerned.

FRANK J. GOODNOW, PRESIDENT OF JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

[From New York State Constitutional Convention, 1915.]

* * * Each head of department wants to extend his department, and naturally is apt to overestimate the importance of that particular branch of their work, and his check, through an efficient and effective administrative supervision, has been of value in keeping the estimates down, and also in keeping them within the revenue which is available.

There is another reason why it seems to me that there ought to be a provision for an administrative supervision of the estimates, and that is to prevent a thing that a popular government seems to be liable to, wherever you find it, and particularly where, as is usually the case, the representatives in the legislature represent local districts. That is, there is an irresistible tendency, which is to my mind one of the most dangerous tendencies of popular government, toward useless expenditures in localities for the purpose of influencing locally the influence and standing of the representatives in the legislature. There is not any use enlarging upon it. Any of you men who have been members of the legislature know what pressure is brought to bear, and how difficult it is to resist; but if you are looking at the general question of popular government, as you are, and you must in the constitutional convention, from the point of view of necessity, if popular government is to continue, as it has, as to the guarding against the evils which are apparently inevitable, it seems to me that it is necessary to provide some offset to this tendency, and that can be secured, it seems to me, only by having the estimates determined upon before they are submitted to the legislature by somebody who is representative not of this locality or of that locality but who is representative of the State as a whole. And therefore it seems to be an absolute necessity, if we are to keep down the expenditures of the State government, which are increasing at such a tremendous rapid rate, we must provide, in the first place, to check the tendency of administrative bodies toward magnifying their importance, and, secondly, to check the tendency of localities to demand the expenditure of State money for local purposes, and purposes which are not consistent with the interests of the general State as a whole.

JOHN J. FITZGERALD, CHAIRMAN HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS.

[From New York State Constitutional Convention, 1915.]

Our great trouble is this: That as long as times are good and money is easy and revenues are plentiful nobody cares particularly what the legislative body does in expending money, but as soon as the expenditures increase so that taxation becomes burdensome there is a general controversy as to who is at fault and who should be held responsible for the condition that embarrasses the public by levy of taxes.

We ought to have some way in the system of our Government to fix direct responsibility, and you can not fix responsibility if the power is too greatly scattered. We must concentrate the power and concentrate the responsibility. We must have some one to whom the people can go. If you have it too diffuse, while the agitation may be great, you never reach anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. And where do you suggest that concentration be put in the way of initiating these estimates?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I would put it in the executive. I would make him responsible at the outset.

* * * If the House of Representatives and the Senate had been operating under a provision that they could not have included, except by a two-thirds vote, an item that had not been requested by the Executive, there would have been a very great difference. Mr. Gladstone, in one of his great budget speeches, laid down the principle to which I referred in this speech. He said that the proper functions of a legislative chamber—here, I will find it—is not to augment but to decrease expenditures. Of course, he was speaking largely, with the view largely in mind of their peculiar system of government.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what it means to hold the purse strings, generally, to shut them, and not to open them.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Some persons object that we should not deprive the Representatives of the people of this right to loosen up the purse strings, but the universal condition in this country to-day is not that we must safeguard the rights of the people to get money for things. The whole

curse of our condition is that everybody is doing their utmost to get it, and succeeds, and the evil that must be corrected—the evil that must be corrected is the evil of excessive expenditure.

* * * Now, if there were some way by which that could be stopped—and it is difficult to stop it; I don't think I am immune from any of these vices or evils; I am just as human as anybody else in Congress, and I don't particularly criticize the man who does resort to these things—but we must in some way eliminate the temptation of the possibility of this kind of action; and when a man is unable to do things of that character, along that line, when he can not force up appropriations, why, then his only interest is in seeing that they appropriate properly, and it does this: It would do what is done in the governments where they had a responsible government with the budget system. If my constituents are keenly interested in some matter that requires an expenditure of public money, I would be compelled to present that matter to the department that had charge of it. They would make their investigation. And they would determine whether it was one of those things that should be included, and they would have to take the responsibility for requesting it. They could not say John Smith forces that on us. And then the total of these submissions would be contrasted, and the administration should be compelled, to save time, to make definite and concrete recommendations as to how the money should be obtained to meet these drafts on the Treasury.

* * * Mr. PARSONS. As far as the Federal Government is concerned, would you have the budget made up by the Executive in connection with the river and harbor improvements and public buildings, and so on, all those things?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Well, I would very radically change our method of public buildings. We don't provide public buildings for the public service. [Laughter.]

In the great mass of cases we provide them to meet certain political exigencies of a locality. You might as well be perfectly frank about this. Congress has authorized public buildings that can not be completed within six years. Some can not be completed within four or five years after they are authorized, unless we very greatly augment the capacity of the Supervising Architect's office to turn out public buildings. Now, we spend about \$20,000,000 a year for public buildings. The Supervising Architect's office is geared to turn out about \$12,000,000 a year, it claims. Up to about 1900 we had authorized from the beginning of the Government about four hundred and some odd public buildings, I think. Since that time we have authorized about five hundred.

The CHAIRMAN. I saw a statement that in 1909 Congress appropriated \$20,000,000 for post offices which the Postmaster General had not recommended.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Well, of course, he never recommends post offices at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, which he stated were unnecessary.

Mr. FITZGERALD. But I say the Postmaster General does not recommend. But I don't think there is any serious question; they have been doing that ever since I have had any knowledge of it. This is what happens on public buildings in the Federal Government: Suppose I suppress a community or district which has no large city; perhaps the largest town in it may be twenty or fifteen thousand. I may have one or two communications like that. And none of them has a public building, but across the line in some other district the town of equal size has a public building that costs \$50,000 or \$75,000. Now, I am a candidate for office, and I go to that town, and in my speech I announce that I propose to have a public building put there. In most of these places, unless you have a good-size city, a thousand dollars furnishes ample for postal facilities, and then they have an authorization to buy a site. And they pay New York prices out in the sagebrush country for lots, and the Government buys post offices. And then, in a community of eight or nine hundred, based upon the theory that there is a tremendous postal business, they will authorize a building of \$50,000—nothing less than \$50,000 and up. Then, in order to get a better building, a Member of Congress will pass a bill providing that there shall be a term of court held in this town, and maybe the court—the Federal court—will sit there three terms a year, and maybe it will take two days each term to do all the Federal court business in the town; and then, because a Federal court is to sit in that town, they need a court room and additional facilities, and they increase the amount to be expended in the building, and some other governmental activity will be provided, and the result is that you can go all over the United States and find buildings costing from \$75,000 to \$150,000 in communities ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 people.

JOHN J. FITZGERALD.

[From CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 63d Cong., 1st sess., June 24, 1913.]

If the principle enunciated by Mr. Gladstone be accepted as sound, that the constitutional duty of a legislative chamber is not to augment but to decrease expenditure, the solution of all problems confronting us may readily be solved. A few simple changes in our system will completely establish the system of responsible executive control of our budget while retaining complete control of the Treasury in the representatives of the people.

To bring about this result two things are necessary: The duty should be imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury to revise the various estimates to be submitted to Congress, and Congress should be deprived of the power to augment any request for money or to originate legislation imposing obligations upon the Treasury. Such is the rule in Great Britain, as well as in Switzerland, where this system has been developed to its highest perfection.

These suggestions are radical, but not shots at random. When the Democratic members of the Committee on Rules had been selected for the Sixty-second Congress, I proposed a rule prohibiting amendments to appropriation bills which would increase the committee recommendations above the departmental estimates or which proposed appropriations for which no estimates had been submitted. It was a suggestion along lines that reform in the House must eventually follow; but it was not adopted, as the committee was unwilling to recommend a rule that would have deprived the individual Member or the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union of rights enjoyed by committees which prepare appropriation bills. I should have supported such a rule if it extended to the committees, and I am convinced that in time even more radical changes will be imperative, even though the individual Member be deprived of many privileges which he now enjoys.

[From "Constitutional Aspects of a National Budget System," by Charles Wallace Collins, in the Yale Law Journal, March, 1916.]

The provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to public finance are as follows:

"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. (Art. I, sec. 7.)

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States * * *; to borrow money on the credit of the United States; to raise and support armies, but no appropriation to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a Navy. (Art. I, sec. 8.)

"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. (Art. I, sec. 9.)

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. (Art. XVI.)

As bearing indirectly on the subject of public finance the following provisions may also be cited:

"The Congress shall have power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all the powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or any department or officer thereof.' (Art. I, sec. 8.)

"Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. (Art. I, sec. 5.)

"The President 'shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; * * * he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' (Art. II, sec. 3.)"

NEW YORK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON NEED FOR CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES.

[From the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1917.]

"The following resolution, reiterating the conviction of the New York Chamber of Commerce 'that there is need of a sound economic control of public expenditures based on an authoritative examination in advance of the actual needs of each department of the Government,' was adopted at Thursday's meeting of the chamber:

"* * * In February, 1916, this chamber unanimously adopted the report of the Committee on Finance and Currency in favor of a budget policy in public financing, whereby proposed expenditures should be subordinated to the limitations of previously determined sources of income.

"* * * Therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York reiterates its conviction that there is need of a sound economic control of public expenditures with due regard to established sources of revenue, including a uniform system of public expenditure based on an authoritative examination in advance of the actual needs of each department of the Government.

"Resolved, That copies of this preamble and resolution be forwarded to the Federal officials and to members of congressional committees immediately concerned."

FRANK A. VANDERLIP (Chairman),
WILLIAM SLOANE,
JAMES S. ALEXANDER,
For the Committee on Finance and Currency.

A BUDGET SYSTEM.

[From the Outlook, Mar. 7, 1917.]

The need of a national budget system was never more clearly demonstrated than in the final days of the Sixty-fourth Congress. At this writing, only a few days before the session of Congress expires by legal limitation, there are several enormous and highly important appropriation bills waiting to be passed. If they are not passed there will probably have to be an extra session of Congress in order to obtain the necessary money to run the Government during the ensuing fiscal year. It is now the 28th of February and Congress must adjourn on March 4, and yet no man knows just what appropriation bills Congress will pass, if any.

* * * The only way in which Government finances can be managed in a businesslike way is by the establishment of a budget system.

* * * That this is not a visionary idea is proved by the fact that not long ago the United States Chamber of Commerce held a referendum on the question of its plan for a national budget. One hundred and fifty-two boards of trade, chambers of commerce, and similar organizations of business men in 34 States took part in the referendum. There were 573 votes in favor of and only 10 votes opposed to the budget plan. We are not here discussing the details but only the general principle of a national budget. The executive and legislative method of putting it in operation should be determined by experts, following the analogy of the Federal reserve law.

A NATIONAL BUDGET.

[From the Outlook, Mar. 14, 1917.]

It was only a few years ago when the Sixty-second Congress appropriated for the annual expenditures of the Government over a billion dollars. The country was so astounded that the Congress was called in the newspapers "the billion-dollar Congress." We have now passed in our national expenditures the two-billion-dollar mark. Few citizens understand how this enormous growth in our expenditures and the enforced income from taxation has come about. We imagine that few Members of Congress quite understand. This is the main reason why there should be introduced into our Federal Government a budget system. * * *

A LEGISLATIVE BUDGET.

[From the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Mar. 3, 1917.]

* * * A financial budget has often been proposed, and if we shall ever be able to introduce modern business "system" into the processes of government this will work a vast advantage and economy in public affairs.

* * * Well, "Congress is to blame," we often say. And it is true that it could practice more, and vastly more, economy than it does. But the blame rests also on the people, and heavily, too, who make and

are the Government, that system, irrespective of parties and Congresses, is not introduced into public affairs. It may be, it is, a tremendous task, but unless it is accomplished the time will not be long in coming when the "poor o'erburdened wight" will rebel. No free people can make bricks without straw, and no people can remain free who allow their own Government to oppress them. Labor alone pays the cost of Government. And for all its wealth of resources, a prodigal nation will at some stage become bankrupt. If a spendthrift is one who buys anything and everything that comes in sight, a thrifty man is one who measures his need by what he can earn and what he can save.

The most significant fact of to-day in relation to government is that we have reached the limit of fair and just taxation without ever relating national need to national income.

NEED OF A NATIONAL BUDGET.

[From Journal of Commerce, Feb. 8, 1916.]

Nothing could more forcibly emphasize the need of a national budget system in this country than the condition brought about by the war in Europe. It puts in a striking light the contrast between the Government of the United States in this respect and that of other civilized nations.

* * * * *
This Nation has grown from its small beginning as a union of States on a margin of the continent, with a few million inhabitants and little wealth or power, to the imperial domain from ocean to ocean and a hundred million people, without any system of responsibility for estimating the financial needs of government and proposing measures for meeting them. Every other nation of any standing has a system which requires those responsible for the administration of different branches of the Government to submit to the legislative body intelligent and intelligible statements of their needs for revenue and the purposes to which it is to be applied. They must present their estimates and their proposals for raising the revenue to meet them. Appropriation bills and revenue bills must be based upon these estimates and proposals and submitted for action by those responsible for administration, to be considered, modified under fixed rules and duly adjusted and adopted. Individual Members and groups can not bring in a flood of appropriation bills, have them referred to different committees, and logroll them through the processes of legislation by bargains and compromises, exchanging favors, and virtually trading in votes. This American practice, which ought to be particularly un-American, has insidiously grown to monstrous proportions, and it is time it were seized by the throat and strangled.

[From "A national budget and why we need it," in the Nation's Business, Oct. 15, 1915.]

The demand for a systematic accounting of our national revenues and expenditures has grown rapidly. The national chamber has consistently stood for the principle of the budget. Its first referendum (sent out on Nov. 20, 1912), was approved almost unanimously by its members. Since that time the chamber has consistently and upon all appropriate occasions advocated the adoption of a national budget. From time to time the Nation's Business has published articles on the subject, together with opinions by eminent public men in favor of it. As we pointed out in these pages last month, President Wilson has already stated to a committee of the national chamber, who conferred with him late in May on the subject, that he expects the matter will be thoroughly discussed at the opening session of Congress.

WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT A BUDGET.

[From the Nation's Business, Oct. 15, 1915.]

A scientific summary of expenditures and revenues, in short, a national budget, has been heretofore difficult, if not practically impossible, in the United States, because, in the first place, the President, as executive head of the Nation's business, has not been directly responsible to the Nation itself for the efficiency of the departments under him; second, because heads of departments and establishments report estimates direct to Congress through the Secretary of the Treasury, which are thereupon assigned to nine different committees; third, because appropriation bills are not considered at related to each other or to the entire amount of anticipated public income; fourth, because minor officials in departments can approach committees direct for special favors for bureaus or for special legislation in an appropriation bill.

INCREASING EXPENDITURES MAKE AN EFFECTIVE BUDGET PROCEDURE A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NECESSITY.

[From "Budget making and the increased cost of government," in the American Economic Review, March, 1916.]

The political necessity for the adoption of a budget procedure lies in the fact that it is the only effective means which has ever been devised for enforcing accountability and responsibility on an executive who has sufficient power to make him a leader, i. e., to make him effective in the preparation and submission of plans proposed for adoption and to enable him efficiently and economically to execute them after they have been approved and financed. The economic necessity for the adoption of a budget procedure lies in the fact that demands for service by the Government are going to continue to increase and with this the necessity both for careful, intelligent planning by the management, and a strict censorship on the part of those who pay the bills.

FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND.

[From "Creating Government efficiency," in the New Republic, July 29, 1916.]

The people in the States are becoming alive to the need for this sort of thing. As a result of the fact that the States have already reached a condition of deficit financing, there is an increased demand for a budget procedure which will put responsibility on the executive, not only for giving an account of himself but for preparing and submitting to the legislature a well considered finance plan based on the needs of the service. New Jersey has just passed such an executive budget law. The Maryland Legislature has submitted to voters a constitutional amendment that will come before them at the next election. Several States have like measures under consideration. But neither statutes nor constitutional amendments can have force without a militant public opinion which will insist on a procedure requiring finance measures to be considered, criticized, discussed, approved, or

disapproved openly and publicly in the legislature—the established forum of democracy and the only form in which public business can be adequately considered with due regard to all parties in interest.

FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND.

[From the World's Work, December, 1915.]

The public knows that the United States Government wastes money. The promises of economy made by both parties have proved equally valueless. Congressmen of both parties use the Federal Treasury as a "pork barrel" from which to satisfy the desires of their constituents—get the Treasury to pay for public buildings, Army posts, and pensions in the hope of reelection.

The public is becoming heartily sick of the pork barrel, both because of its essential dishonesty and because of its waste and inefficiency. But the pork barrel can not be abolished so long as the present system of making appropriations lasts. It is an integral part of that system. To change the existing wasteful system of appropriations necessitates a change in the Government of the United States—a much needed change from the irresponsible committee system to a system in which the Executive can be held responsible for the expenditures of his administration.—The Editors.

[From the World's Work, December, 1915.]

* * * We should establish the budget system. This would not actually curtail the scope of Congress. That body would still retain control of the purse. It would vote money only in obedience to a request from the administrative branch, but it could grant or refuse this request as conditions justified. Its business would be that of criticism, of investigation, and of veto. This would greatly enhance the character of both chambers. It would weed out those Members whose reelection depends chiefly on their ability to get local appropriations—certainly they would be no loss to the Nation. The more serious Members—and there are plenty of them—who are really interested in the Nation's business and would like to spend their time in it, are now tormented constantly by the importunity of their constituents. The budget system would relieve them of this. They would, therefore, have all their time for serious work. Thus the Nation would not only save millions of wasted money, but would get a higher type of lawmakers. And the patriotism of localities would find more worthy outlets than campaigns to secure a lot of useless and expensive architecture.

[From "Budget making," in American Economic Review, March, 1916.]

The time for action has now come. World events have forced upon our Government the necessity of undertakings with which our appropriation system is totally unable to cope. It is imperative that we disregard the haphazard methods we have followed hitherto and install a budget plan adapted to our governmental machinery. Whether such a change leads us from our Federal form toward the parliamentary one with its responsible ministry, as fiscal reforms in England from Magna Charta to the Lloyd-George budget have introduced the successive development to the parliamentary system of our day, need not alarm us. The truest progress in government has been through the incorporation from time to time of expedients for curing particular evils rather than in the adoption of a large scheme as a conscious experiment. The expedient most needed to-day is a device which will permit careful planning in the raising and expenditure of the public funds. This is the function of the public budget.

[From "Constitutional aspects of a national budget system," by Charles Wallace Collins, in the Yale Law Journal, March, 1916.]

From the foregoing situation it appears quite feasible to adopt a complete national budget system without making any change in our written Constitution. A few amendments to existing statutes and few changes in the rules of the House and Senate would provide the necessary modus operandi. The transition, so far as its legal phases are concerned, could be made easily and quickly.

There are, however, practical difficulties besetting the inauguration of so radical a change in our methods of procedure in financial legislation. We have always clung to the constitutional theory of separate and coordinate governmental powers. The Constitution was framed under that influence. It has been handed down as a tradition. It has made itself felt in the governmental organizations of our States and even in the lesser units of counties and cities. How, then, could we reconcile the apparent giving over to the Executive a part of the legislative power, with our traditional theories of constitutional government?

There is a point of contact in our governmental practice where this tradition may be reexamined and clarified. It lies in the extra legal field of party activity. The development of the political party as a determining factor in national legislation has been considered largely from the practical rather than the philosophical point of view. We have never legally recognized party responsibility for legislation, yet we do hold the party in power responsible, in a loose sort of a way, for whatever legislation is passed. From the party standpoint the President and his Cabinet have one and the same interest with the Members of the majority party in the Congress. The President is recognized as the leader of his party. To his party he has a very definite function and responsibility. In consultation with his Cabinet and other members of his party he formulates the party program. He assumes the responsibility to the country for the work of his party. He does actually participate in the legislation of the Congress by having bills introduced which are regarded as administration bills and by insisting on certain legislative measures to which he considers his party pledged.

Now, here is the point of contact with the budget system. It involves a closer application of party responsibility in the particular field of public finance. Recognize the party as the working unit in legislative legislation and legalize the position of the Executive as party leader in financial legislation. The party in power is already, in fact, held responsible for the taxes it levies and the money it spends. It is only a short step to localize this responsibility on the shoulders of the Executive and give it a definite constitutional status.

In this manner we could effectively adopt the budget system without adopting the so-called parliamentary form of government. The Congress would not lose any of its constitutional powers. It would retain a strict control over the Nation's finances, since no money could pass into or out of the Treasury without its ratification. It would also see that no money was diverted from the purpose for which it was granted. The actual financial program would be given over to the Executive to prepare, to initiate into the Congress, and to execute after the Congress has given its formal approval.

[From Financial Administration of Great Britain. Willoughby. 1917.]

* * * A budget is a definite plan or proposal for financing the business of a future period both with respect to revenues and expenditures. It is usually prepared and submitted by the executive to the legislative branch of the government for its approval, together with such collateral and supporting information as is needed to sustain the conclusions reached. Through a budget the experience of the past is made available to the legislature and to the people as a basis for consideration and arriving at determinations for the future.

It is of the utmost importance that this fundamental character and purpose of the budget should be clearly apprehended. It is the one thing which binds detached operations into a logical and harmonious system and permits consideration of the activities and the cost of the government as a whole. Without it a country can scarcely be said to have a financial system; certainly not a scientific system.

[From Financial Administration of Great Britain. Willoughby. 1917.]

* * * The basic principle underlying the use of a budget as the central instrument for correlating all of the financial transactions of the government so that the whole problem of financing the government may be considered at one and the same time is hardly understood in this country, much less acted upon. Though the Executive is called upon to keep account of receipts and expenditures, to make reports and to submit estimates, the technical problem of having them so kept and submitted as to constitute a comprehensive report of past transactions and a work program for the future has not been satisfactorily worked out. The result is that Congress does not get before it a statement of the financial and work program of the Executive in such a form that it can clearly see its full purport. The fact that Congress does not get the information to which it is entitled is evidenced by the necessity that its committees having the consideration of appropriation bills are under of holding elaborate hearings for the purpose of securing information regarding estimate proposals. Most important of all, Congress, and not the Executive, is deemed to be the body that should formulate the definite program of receipts and expenditures. The reports and estimates that are submitted to it are not looked upon as an Executive program, but rather as data to enable Congress to perform its function as a program-framing body. The audit of accounts, instead of being made by an officer of the body granting the funds, is made by an officer of the branch of the Government whose operations are to be passed upon. Though early provision was made by the House for committees on expenditures in the executive departments, these committees have never attempted to make any thorough or systematic examination of the financial transactions of the Executive as revealed in the audited accounts. Congress thus has no effective machinery for the exercise of supervision and control over the manner in which the Executive performs its duties such as is possessed by the British Parliament in its comptroller and auditor general and its standing committee on public accounts. In respect to the granting of funds, the general principle is followed that all appropriations are morally, if not legally, obligatory; that they represent an order given by Congress to the Executive, and that it is the duty of the latter to act upon such order. The result is that the Executive feels called upon to expend all the funds voted to it, whether it deems such expenditure to be wise or not. Nothing approaching the British system of securing flexibility in the expenditure of funds by distinguishing between appropriation heads and subheads and of permitting of transfers to be effected between subheads is to be found in the American system. Finally, there is totally lacking in the National Government any organ having the duty of exercising a day-to-day supervision and control over the financial transactions of the Government such as the British Government possesses in its treasury department.

[From Financial Administration of Great Britain. Willoughby. 1917.]

To recapitulate, it would therefore seem highly desirable to distinguish clearly between the three basic factors of the budgetary problem: (1) The formulation of a budget; (2) action upon the budget; and (3) the provision of organs and a procedure through which budgetary control may be secured.

As a matter of practical expediency, it would further seem that greater progress in the direction of reform can be anticipated if for the present attention is concentrated upon the first and last of these three factors. To neither of these can the most ardent advocate of the system of legislative determination of appropriations find any objection. So great would be the improvement resulting from proper action in respect to these factors that they may well be regarded as necessary intermediate steps before the American public is prepared to pass judgment on the second, which can only arouse intense opposition, and thus might jeopardize any progress at all. With the principle of an executive formulated budget and the principle of a proper machinery for exercising budgetary control once firmly established, the basis will be laid for a change in procedure in respect to the second—that having to do with action upon the budget—if such change is then deemed to be desirable.

[From Need for a National Budget. H. Doc. No. 854, 62d Cong., 2d sess.]

If we follow the accepted usage of most civilized nations, we must conclude that a budget is a collection of documents assembled by an officer who is at the head of or is responsible for the administration and submitted to the legislative branch of the Government. Whatever else such a budget contains, in every case it carries with it an estimate of expenditures to be made by the Government during the coming financial period. While each nation has a revenue policy, the lack of emphasis which has been laid by nations in their budget upon the revenues and the relation of expenditures thereto has probably been due to the fact that by far the larger part of the revenues have come into the public treasury as the result of the operation of permanent law. No regular periodical action upon the part of the legislative authority has been necessary in order that revenues might be collected. As a consequence, the budget has been regarded primarily as an estimate of expenditures.

Inasmuch, however, as no nation can safely adopt for a long period a policy of expenditures which has no regard to the amount of its revenues, it has been usual in most national governments to fix the amount of the expenditures in view of the expected revenue. Where, as is the case in this country, the estimates have been a matter of legislative rather than executive responsibility, the legislature has imposed upon the treasury the duty of acquainting it with the estimated revenue for the coming budgetary period. It thus is the case

that even in political systems in which revenues are based on permanent law rather than on periodical legislative action the demands of a conservative financial policy require that expenditures shall be estimated in view of revenue possibilities. We may say, therefore, that a budget should consist of estimates of revenue as well as of expenditures.

It has been said that a budget is primarily an estimate of the expenditures made necessary by the operations of the Government. That is, it is assumed that a government already exists which operates in a given way. A budget is based upon the theory that the government for whose operations expenditures must be made is already organized and discharges certain activities whose number and extent have already been determined. The purpose of a budget is thus to finance an existing organization in order that it may successfully prosecute defined lines of work. In case it is thought desirable to have changes made in organization and in number and extent of activities, as compared with the organization and activities financed in the preceding budgetary period, these changes should be indicated at the time the budget is drawn, and in any case the changes must be determined before or at the time that appropriations are granted, since the appropriation is primarily a method of financing the existing organization and predefined activities.

Nevertheless since changes in organization and in number and extent of activities can hardly fail to affect expenditures, a budget, while primarily having to do with the expenditures made necessary by the defined operations of an existing governmental organization, must in the nature of things be concerned secondarily at any rate with questions of governmental organization and activities. It is, of course, to be borne in mind that other financial considerations primarily control the decision of these questions, but it can not be forgotten that no State can enter upon an administrative program, however desirable, the expense of which its financial resources do not admit it to assume. Thus, a comprehensive naval program is entered upon for military and not for financial reasons. But if the resources of the country are insufficient the Nation will have to forego the advantage of such a program, however marked they may be.

In this sense it may be said that a budget is in the nature of a prospectus and that its purpose is to present in summary form the facts necessary to the shaping of the policies of the Government so far as they affect its finances.

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT.

[From message to Congress, June 27, 1912.]

Notwithstanding these specific constitutional requirements there has been relatively little attention given to the working out of an adequate and systematic plan for considering expenditures and estimates for appropriations; for regularly stating these in such form that they may be considered in relation to questions of public policy; and for presenting to the Congress for their consideration each year, when requests are made for funds, any definite plan or proposal for which the administration may hold them responsible.

Regular committees on expenditure have been established by the Congress for the purpose of obtaining knowledge of conditions through special investigations. During the last century over 100 special congressional investigations have been authorized to obtain information which should have been regularly submitted, and much money as well as much time has been spent by the Congress in its effort to obtain information about matters that should be laid before them as an open book; many statutes have been passed governing the manner in which reports of expenditures shall be made; specific rules have been laid down giving the manner in which estimates shall be submitted to the Congress and considered by it. From time to time special investigations have been made by heads of executive departments. During the last century many such investigations have been carried on and much money has been spent in the conduct of those, as well as by the Congress, for the purpose of obtaining facts as a basis for intelligent consideration of methods and procedure of doing business with a view to increasing economy and efficiency. From time to time Executive orders have been issued and reorganizations have taken place.

Generally speaking, however, the only conclusions which may be reached from all of this are that—

No regular or systematic means has been provided for the consideration of the detail and concrete problems of the Government.

A well-defined business or work program for the Government has not been evolved.

The reports of expenditures required by law are unsystematic, lack uniformity of classification, and are incapable of being summarized so as to give to the Congress, to the President, or to the people a picture of what has been done and of cost in terms either of economy of purchase or efficiency of organization in obtaining results.

The summaries of expenditures required by law to be submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, with estimates, not only do not provide the data necessary to the consideration of questions of policy but they are not summarized and classified on the same basis as the estimates.

The report on revenues is not in any direct way related to the expenditures, except as the Secretary of the Treasury estimates a surplus or a deficiency, and this estimate is based on accounts which do not accurately show expenditures or outstanding liabilities to be met.

Instead of the President being made responsible for estimates of expenditures, the heads of departments and establishments are made the ministerial agents of the Congress, the President being called on only to advise the Congress how, in his opinion, expenditures may be reduced or revenues may be increased in case estimated expenditures exceed estimated revenues.

The estimates do not raise for consideration questions which should be decided before appropriations are granted, nor does the form in which estimates are required by the Congress to be presented lay the foundation for the consideration of: Subjects of work to be done; the character of organization best adapted to performing work; the character of expenditures to be made; the best method of financing expenditures.

The present law governing the preparation and submission of estimates, requiring them to be submitted each year in the same form as the year before, was passed without due consideration as to what information should be laid before Congress as a basis for action, the result being that the unsystematic and confused method before in use was made continuous.

The rules of the Congress do not provide for the consideration of estimates in such manner that any Member of Congress, any committee, or either House of Congress as a whole may have at any time the information needed for the effective consideration of a program of work done or to be done.

The committee organization is largely the result of historical development rather than of the consideration of present needs.

Inadequate provision is made for getting before each committee to which appropriations are referred all of the data necessary for the consideration of work to be done, organization provided for doing work, character of expenditures, or method of financing.

Following the method at present prescribed, the estimates submitted by each organization unit may have to be split up for consideration by Appropriation Committees of the Congress and be made the subject of several different bills; in few places are all of the estimates or appropriations asked for by a single organization unit brought together.

The estimates for appropriations requested for a single class of work are similarly divided, no provision being made for considering the amount asked for, the amount appropriated, or the amount spent for a single class of governmental activity.

Generally speaking, the estimates for expenses (or cost of each definite class of service to be rendered) are not separately shown from estimates for capital outlays (or cost of land, buildings, equipment, and other properties acquired).

While the classification and summaries of estimates do not indicate a proposed method of financing, these summaries do not show classes of work or the character of expenditures provided for and therefore can not lay the foundation for the consideration of methods of financing as a matter of governmental policy, as is contemplated under the Constitution.

The appropriations are just as unsystematic and incapable of classification and summary as the estimates; in fact, follow the same general form, making it difficult and in many cases impossible to determine what class of work has been authorized, how much may be spent for each class, or the character of expenditures to be made; nor does any one bill cover the total authorization for any particular general class of work.

Bills for appropriations—the authorizations to incur liabilities and to spend—are not considered by the committee to which measures for raising revenues and borrowing money are referred, nor are revenues and borrowings considered by committees on appropriations in relation to the funds which will be available.

So long as the method at present prescribed obtains neither the Congress nor the country can have laid before it a definite, understandable program of business, or of governmental work to be financed; nor can it have a well-defined, clearly expressed financial program to be followed; nor can either the Congress or the Executive get before the country the proposals of each in such manner as to locate responsibility for plans submitted or for results.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

[From Need for a National Budget, H. Doc. 854, 62d Cong., 2d sess.]

The commission recommends:

1. That the President, as the constitutional head of the executive branch of the Government, shall each year submit to the Congress, not later than the first Monday after the beginning of the regular session, a budget.

2. That the budget so submitted shall contain:

"(a) A budgetary message setting forth in brief the significance of the proposals to which attention is invited.

"(b) A summary financial statement setting forth in very summary form (1) the financial condition, (2) a statement of the condition of appropriations and other data pertaining to the 'general fund' as well as to the other funds of the Government, (3) an account of revenues and expenditures for the last completed fiscal year, and (4) a statement showing the effect of past financial policy as well as of budget proposals on the general-fund surplus.

"(c) A summary of expenditures, classified by objects, setting forth the contracting and purchasing relations of the Government.

"(d) Summaries of estimates setting forth (1) the estimated revenues compared with actual revenues for a period of years, (2) estimated expenditures compared with actual expenditures for a period of years.

"(e) A summary of changes in law, setting forth what legislation it is thought should be enacted, in order to enable the administration to transact public business with greater economy and efficiency, i. e., changes in organic law, which, if enacted, would affect appropriations as well as the character of work to be done.

3. That the Secretary of the Treasury be required to submit to the Congress the following detailed reports supporting the general summaries and Executive conclusions or recommendations contained in the budget, as follows:

(a) A book of estimates, containing the supporting details to the summaries of estimates of expenditure contained in the budget.

(b) A consolidated financial report, containing a detailed statement of revenues and a consolidated statement of expenditures by departments and establishments for the last five fiscal years, with such explanatory matter as is necessary to give information with respect to increases or decreases in revenue or expenditure or other relations to which it is thought that the attention of the Executive and legislative branches is to be given.

4. That the head of each department and independent establishment should be required to submit to the Secretary of the Treasury and to the Congress annual reports, which, among other things, would contain detailed accounts of expenditures, so classified as to show amounts expended by appropriations as well as by classes of work, together with the amounts of increases or decreases in stores, equipment, property, etc., including lands, buildings, and other improvements, as well as such other data or operative statistics and comment in relation thereto as may be necessary to show results obtained and the economy and efficiency of doing Government work, as well as of contracting and of purchasing.

5. That the President and heads of departments issue orders which will require that such accounts be kept, such reports be made, and such estimates be prepared as will enable them to obtain the information needed to consider the different conditions, relations, and results above enumerated before the estimates are submitted; that the President recommend to the Congress the enactment of such laws as will enable the administration to comply with the requirements of the Congress.

6. That the President recommend for the consideration of the Congress such changes in the form of appropriation bills as will enable the Government to avail itself of the benefits of the exercise of discretion on the part of the Executive in the transaction of current business in order that the Government may do work and accomplish results with economy and efficiency and as will definitely fix responsibility for failure so to exercise such discretion.

[From "Why we have a pork barrel," in the New Republic, July 22, 1916.]

The executive budget is the procedure of control over the purse that has been employed with increasing success by every country that has an efficient government and every nation that has a government which is responsible to the people; it is in harmony with the principles and precepts of democracy; it corresponds to the best practices that have been worked out in both public and private enterprises; it has been evolved by centuries of progressive experience in making management efficient; it makes the executive responsible for careful planning; it makes the legislature responsible for careful review and criticism of executive plans; it provides for full publicity in review and discussion of plans; and through this enables the people themselves to follow discussion and criticism, and makes the electorate effective in determining whom they shall trust with the conduct of affairs.

The so-called legislative budget has been urged for adoption by those who would protect the supremacy of the legislature and retain a weak executive in matters of administration; by persons who are opposed to executive leadership. In recognition of the popular unrest certain Members of Congress and leaders in State legislatures are offering this as an "American" method of doing things in contradistinction to a "foreign" or "European" or "monarchical" method. The fact is that it is not American except to this extent: That America is the only great Nation that is still continuing practices which European nations have had the wisdom to get rid of after having suffered all the evils which we have continued to suffer for a century. Stourm in his great work, "Le Budget" vividly portrays the result of giving to individual members and committees of the French Parliament the right to initiate finance bills; and in this he tells the story of logrolling methods and the "pork barrel" as faithfully as if he had been describing a session of Congress or of our State legislatures.

FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND.

[From New York Constitutional Convention, 1915.]

Mr. PELLITREAU. I would like to ask the same question as to the auditor.

Dr. LOWELL. I think your auditor must be independent. Your auditor has to be a man who is wholly independent. I remember a case which I could tell you about that I came across in business myself when I was a comparatively young man.

It so happened that the auditor, who had been employed by the treasurer of a cotton mill, came in to a member of the committee of the stockholders on auditing the accounts and said to him, "The treasurer has been stealing. I thought I was employed by him to look after his subordinates, but I have learned that I was employed by the stockholders to report to them, and I report that the treasurer has been stealing."

This is not a case where we are seeking for fraud but seeking for irregularity. But in any case your auditor ought to be appointed clearly; he ought to owe his appointment to a party outside.

Mr. STIMSON. And his duties ought not therefore to be mixed up with executive duties?

Dr. LOWELL. Not in the least. He is to inspect and he ought to have no other duties, because otherwise he is investigating himself.

Mr. PELLITREAU. Should not he be appointed by the governor?

Dr. LOWELL. I should feel it would be a pity to mix up your auditor with your executives in any way. You do not want to mix these things together.

Mr. WAGNER. You have got to put the appointive power somewhere.

Dr. LOWELL. Certainly, but it ought to be outside of the executive. You may put it in your house, you may elect him, put him anywhere, but not in the hands of your executives. The probability is the best place to put him is in the legislature, but whatever you do you do not want to put him in the executive and you do not want to give him executive power.

Mr. STIMSON. And you do not want to put him in a position where he would be criticizing himself.

[From testimony of William Howard Taft before finance committee of the New York State Constitutional Convention, 1915.]

Mr. RHEES. Might I ask one question? What auditing function is there in the United States Government which has any independence of the Executive?

Mr. TAFT. Practically none. The Comptroller of the Treasury is at the head of the auditors. There are appeals from the six auditors of the Treasury to the Comptroller of the Treasury, who puts the final audit, and there is practically nothing independent of the Executive.

Mr. RHEES. Is the Comptroller of the Treasury—does he change ordinarily with the change of the administration?

Mr. TAFT. Yes; ordinarily he does. He did not change in my day; but, then, very few did. [Laughter.]

[From "The coming of the budget system," by Charles Wallace Collins, in the South Atlantic Quarterly, October, 1916.]

In order the more rigidly to enforce the provision of the Constitution that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law," Congress would establish a system of definite control over the expenditure of the budget items. They would, by minute examination of the accounts, as well as by checks on the method of payment, see that the executive branch of the Government in no way exceeded the authority given by the budget. This would prevent the shifting of items or the spending of any of the money for a purpose other than that specified.

The adoption of a budget system would eliminate "logrolling" entirely. Invisible government would disappear. The whole financial system of the Government would be run for the public benefit alone. The procedure would be open and aboveboard, democratic, and business-like. The people would know where and how the money was going. The budget would give them a concrete plan for criticism and discussion. It would bring their public business home to them. What is now a mystery to the average man would become a topic of daily conversation. The sovereign citizen would be in a position to keep a closer watch on his public servants. Efficiency and economy would be practiced and democracy furthered on its way.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I do not see the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. FLOOD] present; but I will ask the leader of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. KITCHIN] if it would not be well to rise now? I will say

to him that there are a number of gentlemen who have asked for time on this side, aggregating possibly two hours.

Mr. KITCHIN. I think we can very well arrange it to-morrow. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. FLOOD] has entered the Hall.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I will say to the gentleman from Virginia that I was just saying that gentlemen have asked me for time, which, taken altogether, will amount to two hours. In view of the fact that this debate has been absolutely without a tinge of partisanship and exceedingly interesting and instructive, I hope that these gentlemen will have an opportunity to speak to-morrow.

Mr. FLOOD. I have a request for 20 minutes, and if the gentleman can get along with 1 hour and 50 minutes, I will take 20 minutes.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. The gentleman from Virginia is not to control one-half of that time?

Mr. FLOOD. No; I will control 20 minutes and the gentleman will control 1 hour and 50 minutes.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. That will be satisfactory.

Mr. McFADDEN, by unanimous consent, was given leave to extend his remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I want to say for the benefit of gentlemen who heard the clear and able speech of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HAMLIN] that I called on the State Department a moment ago, and they stated to me, through Mr. Woolsey, the Solicitor, that they had got Mr. HAMLIN's letter of yesterday and immediately took the matter up with the President, and the President had given authority to give Mr. HAMLIN all the information he desired; that they had prepared a letter this morning and sent it down, and it was supposed to be in Mr. HAMLIN's office at the time he was addressing the committee. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. HUMPHREYS, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 9314, the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS.

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD on the liberty loan.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arizona?

There was no objection.

Mr. SNOOK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD on the liberty loan.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. EDMONDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD by submitting a compilation of addresses delivered in the House and Senate by the various war commissions of the allied nations visiting the House.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

CALENDAR WEDNESDAY.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business on Calendar Wednesday to-morrow be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia asks unanimous consent to dispense with the business on Calendar Wednesday to-morrow. Is there objection?

Mr. BURNETT. I object.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED.

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled bill of the following title:

S. 3081. An act to extend the time for the completion of the municipal bridge approaches, and extensions or additions thereto, by the city of St. Louis, within the States of Illinois and Missouri.

DANIEL W. COMSTOCK.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Sunday, February 17, be set aside for addresses on the life, character, and public services of the Hon. DANIEL W. COMSTOCK, late a Representative from Indiana.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill is taken up again general debate shall be limited to 2 hours and 10 minutes, 20 minutes to be controlled by myself and 1 hour and 50 minutes by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. COOPER].

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia asks unanimous consent that when the diplomatic and consular appropriation bill is again taken up general debate shall be limited to 2 hours and 10 minutes, 20 minutes of that time to be controlled by himself and 1 hour and 50 minutes by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. COOPER]. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 20 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, February 6, 1918, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication from the Acting Secretary of Commerce submitting a deficiency estimate of appropriation required by the Lighthouse Service for repairing and rebuilding aids to navigation on the Atlantic coast damaged by ice or storm (H. Doc. No. 911); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication from the Secretary of War submitting a supplemental estimate of appropriation required by the Quartermaster Corps for the construction of Army quarters, storehouses, etc., Panama Canal, fiscal year 1919 (H. Doc. No. 912); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

3. A letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting, with a letter from the Chief of Engineers, reports on preliminary examination and survey of Umpqua River, bar, and entrance, Oreg. (H. Doc. No. 913); to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors and ordered to be printed, with illustrations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

By Mr. CARAWAY, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 9354) to amend the practice and procedure in Federal courts, and for other purposes, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 284), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

By Mr. WEBB, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 9504) to amend section 4067 of the Revised Statutes by extending its scope to include women, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 285), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, the Committee on Invalid Pensions was discharged from the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9534) granting a pension to Edward P. Rae, and the same was referred to the Committee on Pensions.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DYER: A bill (H. R. 9563) fixing the grades of the commissioned officers of the Medical Corps and of the Medical Reserve Corps of the United States Army on active duty, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. AUSTIN: A bill (H. R. 9564) for enlistment and appointment of officers in the National Guard, District of Columbia, during the period of the war; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. BLACK: A bill (H. R. 9565) granting increased compensation to certain officials, employees, and laborers in the Post Office Department and Postal Service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GARLAND: A bill (H. R. 9566) providing that an imprint shall be placed on all articles manufactured in the United States and becoming the subject of interstate commerce, and providing that no manufactured articles or goods shall be admitted to the United States unless bearing an imprint; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9567) appropriating \$50,000 for payment of operating forces of public buildings for services performed; to the Committee on Appropriations.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9568) appropriating \$50,000 for the erection of a monument to the memory of Robert Morris; to the Committee on the Library.

By Mr. DENT: A bill (H. R. 9569) to create in the Army the grades and establish the pay of first-class bugler and corporal bugler, to increase the pay of buglers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9570) to amend articles 52 and 53 of section 1342 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes," approved August 29, 1916, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9571) to authorize the appointment of officers of the Philippine Scouts as officers in the militia or other locally created armed forces of the Philippine Islands drafted into the service of the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. BRODBECK: A bill (H. R. 9572) to provide for the permanent improvement of part of the Taneytown public road within the limits of the Battle Field of Gettysburg; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. VAN DYKE: A bill (H. R. 9573) to regulate the hours of duty of the officers and members of the fire department of the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. ALEXANDER: Resolution (H. Res. 243) for the consideration of S. 3389; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ALEXANDER: A bill (H. R. 9574) granting a pension to Reuben Phillips; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9575) granting a pension to Asa Daniel; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. ASHBROOK: A bill (H. R. 9576) granting an increase of pension to Samuel McQuate; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. AUSTIN: A bill (H. R. 9577) granting an increase of pension to Baty Cecil; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BORLAND: A bill (H. R. 9578) granting an increase of pension to Benjamin C. Bridges; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CAMPBELL of Kansas: A bill (H. R. 9579) for the relief of Dr. F. C. Cady; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. ELLIOTT: A bill (H. R. 9580) granting a pension to Orivilla Carter; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FRENCH: A bill (H. R. 9581) granting an increase of pension to John W. Dickens; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GODWIN of North Carolina: A bill (H. R. 9582) granting an increase of pension to Mrs. M. C. Shell; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HAMILTON of New York: A bill (H. R. 9583) granting an increase of pension to W. K. Wakefield; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HILLIARD: A bill (H. R. 9584) granting a pension to George F. Taylor; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9585) granting a pension to Bion Jay Dillon; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KEARNS: A bill (H. R. 9586) granting an increase of pension to William Richardson; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LITTLEPAGE: A bill (H. R. 9587) granting an increase of pension to A. J. Carter; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9588) granting an increase of pension to James O. Batten; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. McANDREWS: A bill (H. R. 9589) for the relief of Margaret Barstith Stover; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. McCULLOCH: A bill (H. R. 9590) granting a pension to Willard Kolp; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9591) granting a pension to Harry C. Miller; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9592) granting an increase of pension to Jesse W. Shaw; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9593) granting an increase of pension to Raymond E. Fisher; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9594) granting an increase of pension to John F. McDowell; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9595) granting an increase of pension to John M. Robison; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9596) granting an increase of pension to Eli Shidler; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9597) for the relief of David B. Turnipseed; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9598) to complete the military record of Theodore Silas Steffy and for an honorable discharge; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. POWERS: A bill (H. R. 9599) granting a pension to Joel Bryant; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SCHALL: A bill (H. R. 9600) granting an increase of pension to Henry Stephan; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SELLS: A bill (H. R. 9601) granting a pension to Elizabeth Jones; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. SLEMP: A bill (H. R. 9602) for the relief of George T. Larkin; to the Committee on Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9603) granting an increase of pension to Edward Collinsworth; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. CHARLES B. SMITH: A bill (H. R. 9604) for the relief of Nathan B. Wilber; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. SNELL: A bill (H. R. 9605) granting an increase of pension to Thomas O. Forbes; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. STEENERSON: A bill (H. R. 9606) granting an increase of pension to Edwin Andrews; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. TEMPLE: A bill (H. R. 9607) granting an increase of pension to James H. Johnson; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WOODS of Iowa: A bill (H. R. 9608) granting an increase of pension to James B. Ingalls; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9609) granting a pension to Robert J. Henderson; to the Committee on Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By the SPEAKER (by request): Resolution of the Maryville (Mo.) Commercial Club, protesting against the second-class postage rates in the war-revenue act; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also (by request), petition of citizens of Louisiana, Mo., in favor of H. R. 5531, creating a pharmaceutical corps; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. BACHARACH: Petition of Charles H. Borican, Bridgeton; Chester McWilliams, Bridgeton; J. E. Stackhouse, Medford; Everett B. Townsend, Cape May Court House; William Carr, Moorestown; George R. Elwell, Bridgeton; O. D. Willis, Bridgeton; Samuel McCormick, Burlington; and A. S. Parker, Burlington, rural letter carriers, all in the second congressional district of New Jersey, asking for increase in compensation; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin: Petition of citizens of Beloit, Wis., urging congressional action on legislation to provide for uniform physical training in public schools; to the Committee on Education.

By Mr. DALE of New York: Memorial of the Merchants' Association of New York, favoring the passage of the daylight-saving law; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. FULLER of Illinois: Petition of the Edward Hines Lumber Co., of Chicago, for the Sims bill, H. R. 8172; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, memorial of the Maryville (Mo.) Commercial Club, for the repeal of the second-class postage provisions of the war-revenue act; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HILLIARD: Papers in support of House bill 6693, granting an increase of pension to Francisco Brown; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, papers to accompany House bill 9584, granting an increase of pension to George F. Taylor; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, memorial of the Hesperian Club, of Denver, Colo., urging the immediate repeal of the act increasing postage rates on periodicals; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McANDREWS: Evidence in support of a bill for the relief of Mrs. Margaret B. Stover; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. NOLAN: Petition of W. S. Scott, secretary Master Plasterers' Association, San Francisco, Cal., and four other organizations, favoring the Madden bill (H. R. 1654); to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. O'SHAUNESSY: Memorial of Newport Lodge, No. 119, International Association of Machinists, urging the passage of H. R. 7356, the Keating bill; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. REED: Evidence in support of H. R. 9075, granting a pension to Arzanna Nesbitt; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SCHALL: Resolution of the Minneapolis branch of Women's Foreign Missionary Society, protesting against increasing postage rate on periodicals; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SNELL: Petition of members of First Baptist Church, Plattsburg, N. Y., favoring immediate nation-wide prohibition for the duration of the war; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WEBB: Petition of the Pastors' Association of Washington, D. C., for passage of resolution requesting President to ask British and French Governments to forbid their people to sell or give beer, wine, or other intoxicants to American soldiers; also to enact joint war prohibition with us, so that American grain sent abroad at our sacrifice may not be used to make intoxicants or in place of grain so used; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE.

WEDNESDAY, February 6, 1918.

The Chaplain, Rev. Forrest J. Prettyman, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, we rejoice in the abundance of Thy blessings to us, in the vast resources that Thou hast put at our command, in the institutions that we hold dearer than life, in the privilege of building upon the noble work of our forefathers who laid the foundations of our civil institutions. We pray that we may be kept true to the highest and best in our national history, and with visions for the future may we press on to accomplish the Divine will in us as a Nation. For Christ's sake. Amen.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. OVERMAN and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with and the Journal was approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by G. F. Turner, one of its clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H. R. 5489) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to exchange for lands in private ownership lands formerly embraced in the grant to the Oregon & California Railroad Co., in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. JONES of Washington presented a telegram in the nature of a memorial from Federal Employees' Union No. 34, of Blaine, Wash., remonstrating against the adoption of the so-called Borland amendment to the Agricultural appropriation bill increasing the hours of labor of Government employees, which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

Mr. PHELAN presented a petition of the Alameda Citizens' Committee, of Berkeley, Cal., praying for the Government ownership of railroads, munition factories, shipyards, etc., which was referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

He also presented a memorial of the German-American Central Verein, of Spokane, Wash., remonstrating against the rescinding of the charter of the National German-American Alliance of the United States of America, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. WARREN presented resolutions adopted by the Wyoming Woolgrowers' Association at its fourteenth annual convention, held at Douglas, Wyo., January 9 to 11, 1918, favoring a Federal dog tax and appropriation for work of exterminating predatory wild animals, which were referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

He also presented resolutions adopted by the Wyoming Woolgrowers' Association at its fourteenth annual convention, held at Douglas, Wyo., January 9 to 11, 1918, favoring the use of pure wool for soldiers' clothing, which were referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.